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Abstract
Psychotherapy and the Embodiment of the Neuronal Identity:
A Hermeneutic Study of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy:
Healing the Social Brain
Ari Natinsky
Antioch University Seattle
Seattle, WA
In recent years, there have been several ways in which researchers have attempted to
integrate psychotherapy and neuroscience research. Neuroscience has been proposed as a
method of addressing lingering questions about how best to integrate psychotherapy
theories and explain their efficacy. For example, some psychotherapy outcome studies
have included neuroimaging of participants in order to propose neurobiological bases of
effective psychological interventions (e.g., Paquette et al., 2003). Other theorists have
used cognitive neuroscience research to suggest neurobiological correlates of various
psychotherapy theories and concepts (e.g., Schore, 2012). These efforts seem to embody
broader historical trends, including the hope that neuroscience can resolve philosophical
questions about the relationship between mind and body, as well as the popular appeal of
contemporary brain research. In this hermeneutic dissertation I examined a popular
neuropsychotherapy text in order to explore the historical fit between neuroscience and
psychotherapy. The study identifies the possible understandings of the self (i.e., what it
means to be human) that could arise from Western therapy discourses that are based on
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neuroscientific interpretations of psychotherapy theories. The methodology of this
dissertation consisted of a critical textual analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. The primary content,
rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in Cozolino’s book were outlined and
interpreted from a hermeneutic perspective. This included a historical critique of
Cozolino’s claims about the origins, purpose, and efficacy of psychotherapy, his
assertions about the relationship between self and brain, and examples of his
psychotherapy case vignettes. Rhetorical strategies in his writing included analogy,
ambiguity, speculative language, and figures of speech such as metaphor and
personification. A discussion of these findings addressed the implications of Cozolino’s
efforts with regards to patient care, psychotherapy theory integration, and the possible
effects that these efforts may have on the profession of psychology. The electronic
version of this dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd
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Chapter I: Introduction and Background of the Problem
Introduction
Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social
Brain integrates neuroscience research with explanations for effective psychotherapy
practices. This text appears alongside over 30 other books in the Norton Series on
Interpersonal Neurobiology (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013). The series of texts
was inspired by the works of psychiatrist and author Daniel Siegel who, beginning with
his foundational text The Developing Mind (1999) and through subsequent works such as
The Mindful Brain (2007) and Mindsight (2010), has consolidated a vast collection of
research from neuroscience disciplines into an integrative theory of human psychological
and social development. Siegel’s theory, branded interpersonal neurobiology, has
proposed an integrated connectivity between the human mind, the human brain from
which the mind is assumed to emerge, and interpersonal relationships that continually
influence and are influenced by mind-brain interactions within and between individuals
(Siegel, 1999, 2001). Influenced by this theory, Cozolino encourages psychotherapists to
adopt (and perhaps encourage potential psychotherapy patients to request) psychotherapy
practices informed by recent advances in mind-brain research that have been facilitated
by recent advances in neuroimaging.
According to Cozolino, as of October 2013, approximately 25,000 copies of his
book have been sold since it was first published in 2002 (the second edition was
published in 2010). Twelve Thousand of those 25,000 copies have been sold in the last
three years. In other words, there has been a significant increase in recent sales (L. J.
Cozolino, personal communication, October 30, 2013). Portland State University now
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offers a certificate program in interpersonal neurobiology that students can use for
college credit, and professionals can use as continuing education (CE) credits (Portland
State University, 2013).
In a relatively short period of time, the idea of a brain-based psychotherapy has
become popular among psychotherapists of many theoretical persuasions. Why? What is
it about neuroscience research that has become so salient for many psychotherapists and
psychotherapy theorists and researchers in such a short period of time? What are the
hopes that it has stirred? What is it about the language that this body of literature uses,
and the larger understandings about self and society that it draws from and appeals to,
that has made its findings and interpretations so alluring? In other words, what is the
cultural and historical fit between neuroscience and psychotherapy? In this study I follow
the suggestions of several historians of brain science (e.g., Borck, 2001; Kay, 2001; Rose,
2007; Vidal, 2009) who encourage researchers to address the above hermeneutic
questions by historically situating and interpreting the primary content, rhetorical
strategies, and themes in Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy:
Healing the Social Brain.
The Interpretive Turn in the human sciences during the 20th century led many
theorists to suggest that scientific breakthroughs are often a matter of fit between the
larger cultural frame and a specific theory or practice, rather than an isolated discovery
removed from the history and politics of its time and place (Canguilhem, 1977/1988;
Cushman, 1995; Foucault, 1966/1994; Gadamer, 1975; Kuhn, 1962). However, theorists
to date have not adequately addressed the ways in which the integration between
neuroscience and psychotherapy reflect the current American political and cultural
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environment in which psychotherapists practice and in which this brain-based
psychotherapy literature has appeared. As a result, theorists have not been able to address
how the use of brain-based psychotherapy paradigms could contribute to a shift in the
ways in which patients and society generally understand the purpose and process of
psychotherapy, or in a larger view how the current way of being, that is, the self, is
thought to be understood.
Background
In this section I discuss the convergence of historical factors that I believe
contributed to the emergence of neuroscience-informed psychotherapies. I provide
historical perspectives on the understandings and social arrangements from which the self
is produced, and how the interest in scientifically locating the self in the material brain
emerged during the modern era. I describe how current neuroscientific research emerged
along with the advent of mid-20th century biomedical research, and I discuss ways that
neuroscientific understandings of mind or subjective experience contribute substantially
to the current way of being in Western culture. I also present philosophical and scientific
challenges to how neuroscience research often depicts a materialized mind. Finally, I
describe the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy.
The self in the modern era and the emergence of neuroscience during the
20th century. An understanding of the relationship between mental and physical aspects
of human beings has been a part of Western selfhood in each historical era from ancient
Greece through today. Historians and philosophers (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Vidal,
2009) often note the transition from the ancient conceptualization of nonmaterial
experiences as residing external to humans, to the modern era understanding of
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nonmaterial experience as located inside each embodied individual. Plato located soul
(that is, the power or purpose of a physical life form) as completely nonmaterial or
separate from human physicality. Aristotelian philosophy that followed Plato was
significant because it did not separate the body from the concept of soul. That is, the form
of matter and matter itself were considered two distinct parts of one entity. Soul in the
Aristotelian sense was not a religious concept but a concept referring to the essence of an
object—that is, the defining, essential attributes or functions of that object. In the view of
Aristotle, the understanding of human life was not compartmentalized; rather, his was a
vision of persons as immersed within social or shared context rather than distinct from it.
The modern self and the Cartesian split. The relationship between the
nonmaterial and the material (or personhood and physicality) in the modern
understanding of self (beginning during the 17th century) is most often associated with
the philosopher René Descartes. Descartes distinguished between mental experience and
physical aspects of individuals by interiorizing private mental experience within each
individual. This was the basis of a selfhood characterized by a dichotomy between
individual experience as separate from the physical world. According to Bordo (1987),
Cartesian or modern philosophy represents the culmination of the transition to modernity
during the 17th century. A foundational premise of the modern world is that the human
body resides in a material world that is considered void of intrinsic meaning. In this view
meaning about the world is connected to its discoverable and understandable physical
workings. Subjective experience resides in a mind considered to be internal and private
for each individual.
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Bordo (1987) noted historical events that directly preceded Descartes’ seminal
17th century writing, such as the advent of the telescope, the initial decline of church
authority, and the erosion of eurocentrism by global trade, all of which threw into
question many of the assumptions about the world and certainty about the purpose of
humans within it. According to Bordo, it was within that general uncertainty that
Descartes’ philosophy emerged. Central to Cartesian philosophy was a presupposition of
doubt about material existence, and efforts to overcome that doubt with certainty about
existence through replicable, controlled experimentation leading to mastery over the
natural world and establishment of objective and verifiable truth about the order of that
world. The scientism of the modern era was marked by the vision of human beings as
capable of understanding, explaining, and exerting control over nature. According to
Canguilhem (1977/1988), “Descartes contradicted Aristotle’s propositions point by point.
For him, nature was identical with the laws of motion and conservation. Every art,
including medicine, was a kind of machine-building” (p. 129). In his seminal historical
account of personal identity or the concept of self in the modern era in the West, Charles
Taylor (1989) outlined three primary aspects of the modern identity:
First, inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings with inner depths, and the
connected notion that we are “selves”; second, the affirmation of ordinary life
which develops from the early modern period; third, the expressivist notion of
nature as an inner moral source. (p. x)
Taylor (1989) described the transition from the philosophy of Plato to the modern
vision of a self as a private individual who exists in a dichotomy between the individual’s
internal world and the external material world. Taylor wrote,
The modern epistemological tradition from Descartes, and all that has flowed
from it in modern culture, has made this standpoint fundamental—to the point of
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aberration, one might think. It has gone as far as generating the view that there is
a special domain of “inner” objects available only from this standpoint; or the
notion that the vantage point of the ‘I think’ is somehow outside the world of
things we experience. (p. 131)
The modern self is a vision of human being that valorizes scientific inquiry or
acquiring objective evidence of the functioning of the outer material world in order to
overcome doubt about material existence. Taylor (1989) explained that Descartes’
rejection of a close relationship between scientific inquiry and morality situated moral
sources within humans rather than in an inherent cosmic order designed by a higher
divinity. In Cartesian philosophy, understanding the workings of a divine power or
cosmic order follows from understanding the material world (which includes the human
body). Taylor described how the vision of rational or instrumental control over the world
and the physical body is an entire way of being that defines life in the West. He wrote,
Rational mastery requires insight, of course. . . . But the insight is not into an
order of the good; rather it is into something which entails the emptiness of all
ancient conceptions of such order: the utter separation of mind from a mechanistic
universe of matter which is most emphatically not a medium of thought or
meaning, which is expressively dead. Insight is essential to the move we can call,
following Weber, “disenchanting” the world. We could also call it neutralizing
the cosmos, because the cosmos is no longer seen as the embodiment of
meaningful order which can define the good for us. And this move is brought
about by our coming to grasp this world as mechanism. . . .We demystify the
cosmos as a setter of ends by grasping it mechanistically and functionally as a
domain of possible means. Gaining insight into the world as mechanism is
inseparable from seeing it as a domain of potential instrumental control. (p. 149)
For Descartes, the rule of reason over passion was an essential part of the
instrumental or technical control over the external or natural world because such
rationality allows for an accurate understanding and manipulation of the mechanical
functioning or order of the natural world. These were the foundations of dualism (a
believed separation between mind and body) because the body is part of the external
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material world and must therefore be studied and explained by objective scientific
investigation separate from individual perspective or experience. Bordo (1987) explained
that in Cartesian philosophy, subject and object are ideally without any continuity
because, “the scientific mind must be cleansed of all its ‘sympathies’ toward the objects it
tries to understand. It must cultivate absolute detachment” (pp. 103-104). Bennett and
Hacker (2003) discussed how the Cartesian move of mind as separate from body
suggested a personification of mind as a distinct entity that acts with the body through its
connection in the pineal gland of the brain. The Aristotelian soul therefore became
separate from person and reconfigured as a nonmaterial, interiorized unit that gathers
information from the external world for the interiorized individual to accumulate. This
rejects the assumption of a shared external world and views a compartmentalized rather
than unitary mental and physical existence (as had been esteemed since Aristotelian
philosophy), thereby configuring a human being who is inherently detached rather than
connected to the world and other people.
Vidal (2009) argued that the brain has been one of the most important symbols of
human beings to emerge from the modern era because the brain has been intricately tied
to the modern concept of the self, and the study of neural processes has become strongly
connected to questions that have traditionally been raised by Western philosophy. He
used the term “brainhood” (p. 6) to denote the recent position that holds an individual to
be defined by “being, rather than simply having, a brain” (p. 6). Vidal argued that the
principles underlying the idea of the “cerebral subject” (p. 6) or the idea that self is a
brain replicate the principles of private individualism that are at the core of modern
Western selfhood. He wrote,
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To the extent that Locke himself, in a revolutionary move, redefined “person” as a
continuity of memory and consciousness, each individual’s absolutely inalienable
self-ownership could in principle be attached to any substance. In practice,
however, it was necessarily located in the brain as organ responsible for the
functions with which the self was identified. By an intellectual mechanism
involving both transitivity and metonymy—from self-functions to brain, from the
part to the whole—the self and the brain became consubstantial. The
individualism characteristic of western and westernized societies, the supreme
value given to the individual as autonomous agent of choice and initiative, and the
corresponding emphasis on interiority at the expense of social bonds and contexts,
are sustained by the brainhood ideology and reproduced by neurocultural
discourses. (Ehrenberg, 2008, as cited in Vidal, 2009, p. 7)
In other words, the link between body and self has had longstanding prominence
in Western philosophy, yet the brain was a fitting physical symbol for the modern
concept of individual selfhood. The idea that an individual is (rather than simply has) a
brain represents an ontological premise, that is, a way of understanding and confirming
existence. In Vidal’s view, neuroscience research therefore does not simply or
unexpectedly discover connections between mind or self and brain, but instead serves as
a way to validate the engrained Western belief that individual existence is inseparable
from individual brain functioning. Vidal (2009) argued that ”whether ontological or
methodological, the belief in brain-self consubstantiality seems to have impelled brain
research. The idea that ‘we are our brains’ is not a corollary of neuroscientific advances,
but a prerequisite of neuroscientific investigation” (p. 7). By suggesting that neuroscience
investigates an already-assumed connection between self and brain (rather than having
unexpectedly discovered evidence that supports that claim), Vidal suggested that the
history of how the brain became such a prominent symbol of the self in the West cannot
be understood through the findings of neuroscience research. Instead, the goals,
principles, and discoveries of brain science can only be understood by situating the rise of
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this research in the broader time and place in which these efforts emerged. Similarly,
Vrecko (2010) argued that, “the facts, theories and practices that emerge from brain
research are always cultural and historical products, with particular political and
economic trajectories—and should be analyzed as such” (p. 4).
Early 20th century brain science in Western societies. Historians have examined
the interplay between neuroscientific research and various cultural and political trends in
Western societies during the 20th century. These cultural histories illustrate ways in
which the interest in the relationship between mind and brain, the science used to study
that relationship, and the discourses in which that science is enveloped, are all reflective
of wider social, political, and economic issues of their time and place. For example, in his
history of cortical localization (that is, locating mental capacities within the cortex or
outermost region of the brain) by brain scientists in Germany during the late 19th century
and early 20th century, Hagner (2001) situated widespread discourses about the brain
within broader political and cultural shifts during that time. Scientists portrayed the brain
as the location between competing needs and drives. This partly served as a way to gain
funding and raise public interest in this new science. However, the Western cultural
issues that became metaphors to be physically mapped onto the brain are especially
noteworthy.
Borck’s (2001) history of the emergence of electroencephalography in Germany
during the early 1900s described how the electroencephalogram or EEG (an instrument
that records electrical waves in the human brain) became established as a method of
revealing individual personality in material form by understanding the underlying brain
activity that corresponds to mental faculties. Although initially controversial among
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many scientists, the EEG gained popular acclaim as a method for achieving a
materialized understanding of nonmaterial aspects of human experience. Borck’s account
describes how measures of electricity in the brain used to reveal individual psychological
experiences appealed to both modern and pre-modern understandings of human beings.
According to Hayward (2001), the emergence of the EEG in Britain during the 1930s can
be understood through newspaper articles during that time that suggested the machine’s
relevance had evolved into “a kind of truth machine or electric confessional that would
reveal the occult workings of the human mind. It was a technology that materialized
conscious life, transforming private mental states into public images” (p. 620). According
to Hayward, through the promotion of this technology by scientists such as William Grey
Walter, “the brain was pictured as a kind of hopeful, if sentimental, radar searching for
comfort and stability among the random patterns of the world” (p. 626). Similar to
Borck’s history of the EEG in Germany, Hayward suggested that the EEG represented an
ability to transcend or overcome the boundaries between private individual experience
and the external world by translating inner nonmaterial experience into accessible
material images.
Post-World War II cognitive science in the United States. Cognitive sciences
gained prestige and academic influence in the United States after World War II. Historian
Lily Kay (2001) argued that the interest in the concept of mind had waned for the first
half of the 20th century. During the 1940s and 1950s, studies conducted by Warren
McCulloch and Walter Pitts brought the study of mind to a laboratory brain research
setting. Kay noted that from the 1940s through the 1960s, the concept of mind gained
legitimacy and valor as an object to be studied, “an object of quantitative representations
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that bore novel implications for the age-old queries about the relations between mind and
body, the natural vs. the artificial, and for automated military technologies of the postwar
era” (p. 592). She argued,
It is not “the mind” as an eternal and immutable object which McCulloch and
Pitts brought into experimental quantitative research in the 1940s. It was not the
same mind that, as the epitome of human consciousness and identity, had been an
object of scientific intrigue since antiquity. Though some features and images
have indeed persisted through the ages, the soul, psyche, anima, and mind have
always been suffused with historically-situated spiritual symbolisms and cultural
meanings. . . . The McCulloch-Pitts notion of mind as neural nets was
reconstituted within a new space of representation—the information discourse—
which emerged in the 1940s in the United States and Europe. That discourse . . .
would reconfigure representations of life and society as systems of decisions and
signals; it was a technoepistemic transformation across disciplinary landscape and
the culture at large. (pp. 592-593)
Kay (2001) showed how the use of brain research to study the mind gained
relevance in the United States and represented a convergence of a variety of historical
and cultural phenomena around a belief that mind resulted of the logical patterns of
neuronal activity. The mind as neural patterns represented a convergence of
neurophysiology, psychiatry, philosophy, formal logic, algebra, theology, and military
imagery, and it was wrapped in a new social discourse that mirrored postindustrial
communication technology. As with the emergence of early brain scan technologies in
Europe, the mind as logical neurons or neural nets also bridged the Cartesian divide
between form and matter—that is, physical and nonmaterial aspects of human existence.
All of the cultural histories discussed above challenge mainstream histories of
science that depict scientific discoveries as linear, inevitable, and able to be removed
from their time and place. Traditional histories depict science as a series of ahistorical
truths that explain the natural world and are automatically applicable across cultures and
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eras (see Canguilham, 1977/1988; Foucault, 1966/1994; Kuhn, 1962). Critical histories of
20th century brain science suggest that the neural investigation of mental experience has
been wrapped in popular scientific and technological discourses. From these historical
accounts, popular interest in brain science and technologies suggests widespread interest
in an inner material sourcing of wider political, economic, and social trends. These
discourses suggest a fascination with being able to observe and thereby understand
individualized mental life, which had been considered private and unknowable in the
modern era whose hallmark philosophical origins rested on the separation between mind
and body or private and public realms. In the next section I discuss the emergence of
contemporary neuroscience with molecular and genetic sciences, and the role of this
brain research in the late 20th century understanding of self.
Late-20th century neuroscience as a biomedical institution. Abi-Rached and
Rose (2010) discussed the emergence in the United States during the mid-1950s and early
1960s of what is now called neuroscience, and disciplinary integration between
psychological theories and physical sciences, particularly molecular science. They wrote,
“while there is a long history of research on the brain,”
The neurosciences formed in the 1960s, in a socio-historical context characterized
by political change, faith in scientific and technological progress, and the rise of a
molecular gaze in the life sciences. They flourished in part because these
epistemological and technological developments were accompanied by multiple
projects of institution-building. An array of stakeholders was mobilized around
the belief that breakthroughs in understanding the brain were not only crucial,
they were possible by means of collaborative efforts, cross-disciplinary
approaches and the use of a predominantly reductionist neuromolecular method.
(Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010, p. 11)
Abi-Rached and Rose (2010) argued that the emergence of the neurosciences
represented a use of the brain as a new epistemology or way of understanding the
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confluence of biology and psychology. Because neuroscience in its current form emerged
alongside biomedical sciences during the mid-20th century, the aims of neuroscience
research and intervention function at the molecular and genetic levels. Rose (2007)
observed that medical research and treatment today focuses on “our growing capacities to
control, manage, engineer, shape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings
as living creatures” (p. 3). He proposed five tenets that distinguish 20th century
biomedicine from the 18th and 19th century medical sciences that preceded it: A vision
of life as existing at the molecular level where it becomes malleable and unconstrained by
a previously assumed natural order; a focus on optimizing life rather than simply curing
disease; an understanding of human being as somatic or bodily and therefore concerned
with conducting life in accordance with material concerns such as preventing illness and
actively participating in health care rather than passively receiving it; seeking services
from biomedical experts such as genetic counselors in order to navigate medical
interventions and bioethical issues; and participation in a biomedical economy by citizens
who actively anticipate, hope for, and directly advocate for biomedical advances that hold
promises of preventing or curing disease, or enhancing physical and mental functioning.
In other words, biomedicine began to make claims that replicated Watson’s (1913)
pronouncement that psychology’s job was the prediction and control of behavior.
The novelty of contemporary biopolitics arises from the perception that we have
experienced a . . . qualitative increase in our capacities to engineer our vitality,
our development, our metabolism, our organs, and our brains. . . . It is now at the
molecular level that human life is understood, at the molecular level that its
processes can be anatomized, and at the molecular level that life can now be
engineered. At this level, it seems, there is nothing mystical or incomprehensible
about our vitality—anything and everything appears, in principle, to be
intelligible, and hence to be open to calculated interventions in the service of our
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desires about the kinds of people we want ourselves and our children to be. (Rose,
2007, p. 4)
An interest in biomedical sciences has created a trend of commonplace efforts of
individuals to manipulate the somatic self in accordance in whatever ways are desired.
This includes our minds. Rose (2007) continued,
While our desires, moods, and discontents might previously have been mapped
onto a psychological space, they are now mapped upon the body itself, or one
particular organ of the body—the brain. And this brain is itself understood in a
particular register. In significant ways, I suggest, we have become
“neurochemical selves.” (p. 188)
In Rose’s (2007) account, neuroscience represents the historical movement of a
variety of human qualities, which were previously understood as existing within
psychological space, onto the body. Moreira and Palladino (2005) described the idea of a
neurochemical self as a primary indicator of Westerners’ fascination with “the endless
possibilities of humanity as it finally comes to terms with its embodiment” (p. 69).
Further, neuroscience positions individuals as “deeply enmeshed in a world where the
staid, historical boundaries between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ are everywhere shattered”
(pp. 69-70). In other words, the vision of the self as connected to alterable neurochemical
processes appears alongside the cultural preoccupation with an interest in biomedical
discoveries aimed at altering, enhancing, or remedying the human body, in ways that
have not previously been possible, through molecular or genomic intervention. The
shattering of the boundaries between nature and culture reflects a desire for humans to be
unrestricted in the pursuit of physical modification in accordance with shifting cultural
norms and trends. In the next section I discuss the work of theorists who have examined
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various ways that these beliefs show up in routine behaviors, self-care practices, and
social arrangements in Western cultures today.
Health improvement, hopefulness, and biosocial groupings. Scholars (e.g.,
Moreira & Palladino, 2005; Novas, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Rose, 2007; Sulik, 2009) have
discussed how the understanding of self as a somatic, biomedical individual entails an
ethical regime of disease prevention, health improvement, hope for biomedical
advancements, and biosocial groupings. In biosocial groupings, social participation
involves activities such as advocacy on behalf of patients for advances in disease
detection, prevention, or treatment. The role of biomedicine in the understanding of
selfhood has also been tied to themes of hopefulness and futurity among the initiatives or
research promoted by molecular and genomic advances. For example, Rajan (2006)
argued that genomic research aimed at calculating disease risk fosters a public discourse
that “allows us to grammatically conceive of life in certain ways. . . . This shifting
grammar of life, toward a future tense, is consequential not just to our understanding of
what ‘life’ now means, but contains within it a deep ethical valence” (p. 14). According
to Rajan, the individual interest in using genomic science to calculate personal disease
risk suggests that a significant aspect of subjectivity among many Westerners now
involves an individual’s expected participation—as both a patient and a consumer—in
markets for biomedical procedures and products.
Moreira and Palladino (2005) argued that a “regime of hope” (p. 55) is central to
social groupings focused on patient advocacy and disease awareness through
campaigning for biomedical research and advancements, including those promoting
medical research for diseases in which brain functioning is implicated. To illustrate the

16

concept of a regime of hope, they analyzed patient advocacy organizations’ support for
continuing an experimental neurosurgical procedure for Parkinson’s disease patients
following highly publicized experiments during 2001 that resulted in serious physical
harm for some of the American research volunteers. Similarly, Novas (2006) posited that
large organizations that advocate on behalf of patients and families for biomedical
research in areas such as disease screening comprise a “political economy of hope”
(p. 290) in which group members engage in political participation based on a shared
advocacy for biomedical advances, and a sense of hope that is not confined “to an act of
the imagination, but that is…materialized through a range of social practices” (p. 290).
Novas (2006) discussed practices that are characteristic of these groups’ purposes
such as assisting patients and families in learning about diseases, and directly attempting
to influence health policy, and noted how these types of activities brandish influence over
the flow of public knowledge about medical issues, thereby linking social engagement to
changes in market value of biological entities such as human tissue and blood. Rajan
(2006) argued that this interplay between personalized biomedical knowledge and
anticipated participation in a biomedical economy creates a particular configuration of
personhood that exists at the crossroads of personal risk and market risk. In the next
section I discuss how widespread images of the brain in popular media have perpetuated
the understanding that self is observable through brain functioning, and neuroscience is
as an authority about the self.
The influence of brain imaging on the understandings of self and personal
identity in Western culture. The advancement of imaging or visualization technologies,
including significant advances in brain imaging during the late 20th century, has been an
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essential bridge between biomedicine and a biomedical (especially neuroscientific)
understanding of self. Joyce (2008) argued that MRI (magnetic resonance imaging),
which is one type of imaging used to observe the inner workings of the body or brain, has
itself become a “cultural icon” (p. 2).
The technology and its benefits are often referred to in popular culture, science
exhibits, news stories, and policy debates to the point that MRI can be considered
a cultural icon—a sacred object on which revolve questions about personal
health, identity, and life’s many dilemmas. (p. 2)
Joyce (2008) highlighted how MRI has become a “technology of truth” (p. 2) in
contemporary culture where it is granted a position of authority even though its findings
in medical settings might not be as clear or unambiguous as those findings are portrayed
in popular television or movies. She argued that “the development of MRI technology
and our desire to use it must be understood in relation to the broader sociotechnical turn
toward visualization” (p. 6).
In a symbolic economy that equates photographic pictures with the person or
object represented, medical images appear to offer the possibility of accessing the
inner body without mediation to discover truth. . . . The claim of truth is staked
partially on the terrain of the visual: For something to be true, it must be seen.
This point is illustrated when patients with mental illness and their families
support brain imaging as a way to prove to skeptical scientists and policy makers
that disease exists and research funding is needed (Dumit, 2000). Culture, interest
groups, and power determine whether knowledge is perceived as trustworthy, and
what counts as evidence varies across time and place. (Joyce, 2008, pp. 10-11)
Joseph Dumit’s (2004) ethnographical study of positron emission tomography or
PET scans (one type of imaging technology that is used in brain imaging) provides an
important cultural and historical analysis of the widespread use of brain imaging and the
effects of how brain images contribute to the widespread depiction of selfhood as
straightforward and observable through images of the brain.
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The brain scans that we encounter in magazines and newspapers, on television, in
a doctor’s office, or in a scientific journal make claims on us. These colorful
images with captions describe brains that are certifiably smart or depressed or
obsessed. . . . These brain images make claims on us because they portray kinds of
brains. As people with, obviously, one or another kind of brain, we are placed
among the categories that the set of images offers. To which category do I
belong? What brain type do I have? Or more nervously: Am I normal? (Dumit,
2004, p. 5)
Dumit (2004) further argued that “alongside the social and institutional
components of brain-fact production, we must face this question of how cultural
identification and intuition coincide with these representations of reality so that we are
persuaded to take them as true” (pp. 6-7). He proposed the concept of the “objectiveself” (p. 7) that “consists of our taken-for-granted notions, theories, and tendencies
regarding human bodies, brains, and kinds considered as objective, referential, extrinsic,
and objects of science and medicine” (p. 7). The objective self entails an understanding of
personhood that is greatly influenced by images of the brain and the claims attached to
those images, necessarily involving a constant interplay between the claims of scientific
research, the way that research is disseminated by certain media outlets, and the way that
readers or consumers of that information come to embody certain understandings of
human beings that are taken for granted or assumed to be true. The effects of associating
brain images with expert claims about the self, and the contests between competing
understandings of self that brain images replicate, “are socially embedded across spheres
of activity: mass-media science journalism, mental-illness activism, courtroom
admissibility, and widespread readership of published speculations, as well as
neuroscientific research” (p. 13). In the next section I discuss evidence for the popular
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influence of widespread brain images, and the implications of this influence on everyday
activities that are part of the current way of being.
Brain improvement as self-improvement: Biomedical selfhood, lifestyle choices,
and personal healthcare practices. Above I discussed Rose’s (2007) interpretation of the
emergence of a biomedical understanding of the self that shows up as a somatic or bodily
person that exists at a molecular level where it is explainable, and receptive to disease
prevention, medical intervention, and personal enhancement. For Rose the biomedical
self entails a neurochemical self where mind is understandable and manipulated at the
level of the brain. Other theorists (see Brenninkmeijer, 2010; Garza & Smith, 2009;
Ortega & Vidal, 2007) have described the emergence and relevance of self-improvement
practices that are tied to brain-improvement or cognitive enhancement. Brenninkmeijer
(2010) succinctly observed that an interest in neuroscience research, “combined with the
unremitting quest for a better life, has resulted in a successful self-help industry for brain
enhancement” (p. 108).
Ortega and Vidal (2007) argued that neuroscientific understandings of selfimprovement and health lead to lifestyle choices that are manifested in a demand for
goods and services that claim to promote brain vitality, for example, “help-self manuals,
brain-fitness software and computer programs” (p. 257), as well as “vitamins and all
kinds of dietary support purported to enhance brain performance” (p. 257). Consumerism
that is driven by the promise of brain improvement is evidence of the appeal and the
authority of claims about brain health driven by an understanding of neuroimaging as
expert or authority on selfhood. As an effect of neuroimaging’s widespread influence,
Ortega and Vidal also described the emergence of a “biosocial criterion of social
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grouping” (p. 257) with regards to brain enhancement as a form of self-enhancement,
evidenced by the emergence of social groups or events where membership is based on
common goals such as maximizing cognitive performance or mental abilities. In one
example of a biosocial grouping that places value on brain enhancement as a source of
personal performance, they described the phenomenon of competitions based on mental
agility such as memory championships. They also argued that biosocial groupings in
general tend to be based on an understanding of self that is rooted in certain physical
practices that are “structured according to criteria of health, bodily performances, specific
illnesses or longevity, and they function according to criteria of merit and recognition that
express values embodied in hygienic rules, activity schedules, and ideal models of the
self” (p. 257). Ortega and Vidal argued that these goals represent individual or private
interests, and therefore suggested that biosocial groupings are apolitical and not civically
engaged. Further, the authority of brain images on selfhood is reflected not only in the
self-improvement activities of individuals but also in the recent trend toward a significant
role of neuroscience in humanities disciplines that were previously separate from
reductionist scientific inquiry. Ortega and Vidal noted that this is a significant trend
because it contributes to a view of social practices as beneficial for individual health and
wellbeing.
According to Brenninkmeijer (2010), the idea that self-improvement is brain
improvement involves an unusual paradox, since it requires at once a vision of self as
brain, and also a vision of self and brain as separate because the self is tasked with
gaining control over the brain. Brenninkmeijer argued that neither Cartesian dualism (the
idea that a material brain is ontologically distinct from a nonmaterial mind) nor monism
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(the view that mind emerges from the workings of the brain) accurately captures the
relationship between the self and the brain that is promoted when individuals engage in
activities to improve the self on the basis of improving the brain. In order to examine the
understanding of self or the relationship between brain and self that is promoted by brainimprovement technologies, Brenninkmeijer analyzed interviews with practitioners and
patients of neurofeedback. In neurofeedback, clinicians use electroencephalogram (EEG)
to identify mental states that are associated with a reduction of psychological symptoms
(or an enhancement of physical and mental performance), and then train patients to
maintain those states. From these interviews she attempted to ascertain participants’
expectations about neurofeedback, their understandings of proper participation in this
treatment, and their understandings about the relationship between self and brain. Her
results were inconclusive:
New technologies of the self give rise to new selves, stated Foucault, and in the
case of the brain devices this is clearly the case. The act of manipulating the brain
with a device makes people very aware of their biological constitution. First they
learn that their problems are brain problems, then they see these problems
visualized in their brain map, and next they interfere directly with their brains to
fix these problems. In this process the brain is clearly separated from the self. But
more than that, users of brain devices need more and more entities to explain their
selves and their healing process. (p. 121)
From the analysis of interviews with neurofeedback patients and participants,
Brenninkmeijer (2010) found that none of the broad categories of mind-brain
relationship—monistic (the position that mind emerges from the material body), dualistic
(the position mind and body are distinct), or triadic (a neo-Cartesian view of mind-brainbody integration) entirely capture the understanding of self or the understanding of the
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relationship between self and brain that users of this brain-based treatment reportedly
experienced.
Pitts-Taylor (2010) noted that although many scholars have argued that the
mapping of moral and psychological questions onto brain functioning is suggestive of
biological determinism, other scholars have used the concept of plasticity (the ability of
the brain to change in response to its environment) as material evidence that humans are
situated within a historical and social context in order to validate progressive political
ideas such as agency, creativity, and non-determinism, rather than a rigidly centered
modern selfhood. She rejected the optimistic use of brain plasticity as justification for
progressive political views. She wrote,
The use of neuroscience does not inherently lead to determinism and can promote
its opposite. But…brain plasticity positions neurological ontology not only as
ever open to change, but also open to being changed. Plasticity is deployed to
encourage us to see ourselves as neuronal subjects, and is linked to the continued
enhancement of learning, intelligence, and mental performance, and to the
avoidance of various risks associated with the brain, including mental
underperformance, memory loss, and aging. While endorsing a view of the
body/self which resists biological determinism, I find that the popular discourse
on plasticity firmly situates the subject in a normative, neoliberal ethic of personal
self-care and responsibility linked to modifying the body. (p. 639)
According to Pitts-Taylor (2010), the strategy of advocating for social and
cultural understandings of behavior by appealing to the idea of neuroplasticity instead
reinforces a biomedical understanding of self wherein morality is tied to preventive
health practices, and standards of citizenship or social inclusion are tied to ideals of selfimprovement and work-related productivity. She suggested that the brain as a symbol of
the self is rooted in a vision of the good as modern individualism that valorizes personal
gain above shared civic engagement. Her argument that the brain represents a neoliberal
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self is similar to the critical interpretations of neuroscience posited by Ortega and Vidal
(2007) and Vidal (2009) I discussed above. Later I examine whether neuroscienceinformed psychotherapies might also reinforce an individualized somatic selfhood.
Studies examining uses of neuroscience in popular media and the psychological
impact of neuroscience’s appeal. Studies suggest that claims about the brain are often
appealing to general audiences. Results of one noteworthy psychological study found
evidence that decision-making by research participants was influenced by the presence of
neuroscientific explanations of human behavior. In that study, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein,
Rawson, and Gray (2008) found that a sample of research participants who had been
presented with a series of psychological explanations for common human behaviors
tended to rate explanations that contained neuroscientific information most favorably
even when the extra information about the human brain was irrelevant to the
explanations.
In a separate study, Gurley and Marcus (2008) found that research participants
serving as mock jurors were significantly more likely to vote in favor of not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI) verdicts when they had been presented with expert testimony
and neuroimaging evidence showing that a defendant’s psychosis had occurred as a result
of a head injury. Both of these studies provided evidence of the authority that
neuroscientific claims hold over common understandings of truth and the location of the
self. In Gurley and Marcus’ study, the idea that the brain is the location of self also
entails a vision of the brain as the location of self-control, and participants’ responses
suggested that this understanding of the brain mitigated notions of individual culpability.
There is no question that in some cases brain injury or disease impacts behaviors in ways
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that are relevant for legal and other purposes. However, these studies indicated that
participants acted on the belief that there is a close relationship between brain functioning
and the self, and therefore that neuroscience is an authority on the self.
The ways in which neuroscience is presented to popular audiences also has
important implications for how people view neuroscience as an authority on the self, the
relationship between mind and brain, and consumer demand. In a qualitative analysis of
the reporting on neuroscience in popular news sources, Racine, Bar-Ilan, and Illes (2005)
collected over 1200 news articles between 1995 and 2004 that featured reporting on brain
science technologies. The researchers found three broad categories of techniques that
journalists used in their reporting on neuroscience: Neuro-essentialism, or the conflating
of self with brain; neuro-realism, or portraying brain imaging as conclusive proof of the
existence of a mental phenomenon; and neuro-policy, or using neuroscience to promote a
certain public policy or social practice (for other discussions of these categories of
neuroscience in popular media see Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Iles, 2006; Racine, Waldman,
Rosenberg, & Iles, 2010). These findings suggest that neuroscience is commonly
portrayed as an authority on the self and often portrayed in popular media as the source of
the self and confirmation that psychological experiences actually exist because
neuroscience can observe their physiological correlates.
In this section I presented historical perspectives on the emergence of
neuroscience, evidence of its popular appeal, and ways that it influences individual
activities and interests. In the next section I discuss philosophical challenges to the use of
neuroscience in the study of human psychology.
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Philosophical challenges to mind-brain reductionism in cognitive
neuroscience. Thus far I have discussed the modern era configuration of self, cultural
histories of 20th century brain science, the emergence of neuroscience in the United
States with biomedicine and its subsequent effects on the self or the Western way of life,
and evidence of neuroscience’s current authority and societal influence. In this section I
discuss how contemporary mind-brain research is embedded within the disciplinary
integration between psychology and neuroscience (titled cognitive neuroscience). I
review critical perspectives on how certain uses of terminology or rhetorical strategies
depict close relationships (or total interchangeability) between brain functioning and
human psychological experience in ways that obfuscate the distinct and possibly
incompatible concepts and methods of psychology and neuroscience. In my textual
analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) book I examine his use of rhetorical strategies and how his
grammar conceals and unknowingly perpetuates certain understandings of self.
Tallis (2004) argued that the idea that mind is reducible to the brain came about
through the merger between analytic philosophy and cognitive science during the middle
of the 20th century. He described the historical “capitulation” (p. 12) of philosophy of
mind to cognitive science, arguing that the movement toward holding science in higher
esteem than philosophy represented a backlash against the linguistic turn in philosophy.
The linguistic or Interpretive Turn saw the ascent of theories positing truth as something
that depends on how discourses are constructed rather than on an objective reality that
philosophy is capable of understanding. He argued that the integration between analytic
philosophy and the philosophy of science was premised on the hope that combining the
views of various academic disciplines would result in better answers to the philosophical
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dilemmas (including mind-brain dualism) that had been the subject of controversy and
debate for much of the modern era.
According to Tallis (2004), “eventually, admiration for science and its methods
modulated into something more subservient. Some thinkers began to agree with their
more scornful scientific colleagues that in many areas of investigation philosophy was an
anachronism” (p. 10). With the advancements of neuroscientific methods during the mid20th century, the philosophy of mind strayed even further from philosophy and toward
cognitive sciences. Rather than trying to understand human thought through
philosophical discourse or epistemology, the study and understanding of human thought
or knowledge became favored by many philosophers as an inquiry into cognitive
processes and their material correlates. Rather than simply integrating epistemology (the
study of knowledge) with natural science, natural science became increasingly thought of
as the source of epistemological inquiry. According to Tallis, the influence of analytic
philosophy was significant because this branch of philosophy dismissed the importance
of the concept of consciousness or individual subjective awareness.
Tallis (2004) also situated the rise of a mind-brain lexicon during that time within
emerging philosophical challenges to psychologism (i.e., the 19th century attempt to
reduce logical entities such as propositions to mental states, thereby subsuming
philosophy under empirical psychology). He wrote that antipsychologism “led…to a
wide-ranging suspicion of talk about memories, sensations, thoughts, beliefs, and so on as
if they were distinct, non-material, inner entities with an existence of their own” (p. 13).
The combination of neuroscience with a philosophy of mind that disregarded
consciousness and subjective experience led to the following grammatical problem:
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The most striking . . . evidence of the continuing influence of the hostility in
analytical philosophy to mental contents, is the vogue for theories of mind that
evacuate the latter of contents of consciousness and/or equate them with linguistic
or quasi-linguistic entities construed in an abstract, grammatical way. “Syntactic
theories of mind” that reduce the mind to sets of rules linking inputs and outputs
in a functionally effective way—offered as a “scientific” alternative to the “folk
psychology” which invokes entities such as beliefs—are only the most literal
expressions of this ubiquitous influence. The prominence in this Lexicon of terms
such as “calculation,” “grammar,” “logic,” “rule” testifies to the after-life of
Fregean ways of thought in the philosophy of mind. Only after the “linguistic
turn” could philosophers be inclined to think of the mind as an ensemble of
“symbol processing devices,” a “syntactic engine operating on mental sentences”
and the like. (pp. 15-16)
I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) provided an overview of two different versions of what
they identified as the neuron doctrine, and the implications of these two doctrines for
psychology. The first version they titled the trivial neuron doctrine, noting that it is
already the basis of cognitive neuroscience. It states that, “a successful theory of mind
will be a theory of the brain” (p. 814). The second version, titled the radical neuron
doctrine, states that, “a successful theory of mind will be a solely biological
neuroscientific theory” (p. 814). In other words, theory of mind will be expressed in
terms of the brain instead of merely being explained in terms of the relationship with it.
The result of this would be what scholars have identified as eliminativism or eliminative
materialism. Proponents of this position predict that many concepts in psychology will
not be found to correspond to neural functioning, and therefore will eventually be
disregarded as nonexistent. This view suggests that notions of human subjectivity will be
dismissed in favor of direct brain-behavior explanations.
I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) noted that the two neuron doctrines tend to become
conflated because of how authors and theorists write about brain research. That is, the
neuron doctrine has two interpretations appealing to audiences simultaneously, and this
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explains how the theory that mind is reducible to brain can be both widespread and
controversial. According to the authors, the trivial neuron doctrine is plausible but
inconsequential since psychology and its related fields of study would still exist if it were
ever proven correct; however, they noted that the radical version is very consequential
because it would signal an epochal defeat for psychology, even though, according to I.
Gold and Stoljar, eliminative materialism is not scientifically supported. The authors
posited that because of this confusion, many people often believe in the eliminativist
principles of the radical neuron doctrine because they read mind-brain claims or
predictions and they see elements of both doctrines at the same time. This is how
audiences understand cognitive neuroscience literature as both radical and scientifically
sound.	
  Theorists (e.g., Noë, 2009) who have criticized attempts to radically reduce
personhood to the human brain, have argued that the portrayal of recent neuroscientific
advances as revolutionary is itself a rhetorical strategy, since it has been known for at
least thousands of years that brain functioning and conscious experience are somehow
related. I. Gold and Stoljar (1999) articulated how the portrayal of neuroscience as a
revolutionary endeavor may unknowingly lead audiences to support eliminativism when
they think they are simply showing interest in research that seeks to find the neural
correlates of mental events.
Scholars such as Bennett and Hacker (2003), Brothers (2001), and Tallis (2004)
have argued that in many ways the scientific study of the brain is logically incompatible
with the study of psychological concepts. These scholars criticize cognitive neuroscience,
which is the subfield of neuroscience that studies psychological concepts by identifying
their corresponding neural structures and functions (other branches of neuroscience
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emphasize the study of the material brain for disease treatment and other scientific
reasons). Bennett and Hacker rejected the methodological premise of cognitive
neuroscience on the basis that combining psychology and neuroscience confuses
conceptual and empirical questions. They explained that conceptual questions are
concerned with “forms of representation” (p. 2), that is, what does and does not make
sense, and these questions precede empirical questions addressed by scientific study,
which seeks to answer a question that is empirically true or false based on the conceptual
issues that were already assumed. Thus, a scientific investigation hoping to yield an
answer to a question that was unknowingly based on a conceptual error is a flawed
experimental design that produces meaningless results. They argued that cognitive
neuroscience, which attempts to answer psychological questions in terms of their
underlying neurophysiology, is based on a conceptual confusion. In their view, while
neuroscience can answer questions about the correlations between psychological
functioning or impairment and neurophysiological functioning or impairment,
neuroscience cannot replace psychological concepts or explanations with neurological
concepts or explanations, and it cannot explain psychological abilities as abilities of the
brain.
An important part of Bennett and Hacker’s (2003) expansive survey of the history
and philosophical bases of mind-brain research is their discussion of what they call the
mereological fallacy, or ascribing qualities to a part of an entity that can only apply to the
entity as a whole. According to the authors, this becomes the mereological principle of
neuroscience when psychological predicates are ascribed to brains, since psychological
predicates were intended to describe people. According to Bennett and Hacker, early-
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20th century brain researchers were largely Cartesian dualists because they attributed
certain human qualities or abilities to the mind rather than to humans, thereby using
language that kept mind or nonmaterial mental experience separate from brain or
neurophysiological functioning. More recently, they argue, neuroscientists have claimed
to reject mind-body dualism by using language that ascribes human qualities to the brain
instead of ascribing them to the nonmaterial mind. According to Bennett and Hacker, it is
not simply that it is inaccurate to attribute abilities such as thinking or remembering to an
entity such as the brain rather than to humans; rather, it actually makes no sense to do
this. To say that it is inaccurate implies that it is testable or disprovable, whereas the idea
that the brain rather than humans perform uniquely human tasks, or possess uniquely
human attributes, is unable to be confirmed or disconfirmed through scientific inquiry.
They noted that psychological concepts are difficult to define, but they are attributes of
whole beings, they represent common understandings of persons (and some animals), and
psychological concepts are not theoretical concepts. Therefore, believing that it is still
unknown how mental and physical aspects of life are related (the premise of much
neuroscientific study) is an “illusion” (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 119). Psychological
concepts do not necessarily separate mental from physical in their descriptions of people,
and therefore they are already adequate descriptions of how humans and animals “have
the kinds of capacities that characterize them” (p. 119).
Brothers’ (2001) rejection of cognitive neuroscience is based on the same logical
argument. She noted that although neither psychology nor hard sciences can be extracted
from the social practices within each area of study, psychology studies concepts that have
ancient roots and involve ideas about personhood which exist because those ideas are

31

agreed upon by the community studying them. Hard or natural sciences, on the other
hand, use the relatively recent scientific method to test theories about a physical external
world by rejecting false hypotheses. Concepts related to mental experience exist in the
realm of the social, and whether or not a statement about something involving human
psychology is true is largely determined by whether a group of people agrees that the
statement is true in the circumstance in which it is made. In other words, it can be argued
that psychology does not study the workings of the external or natural world.
According to Brothers (2001), even empirical or scientific psychological
experiments depend on operationalizing concepts in a way that ultimately rest on
however a certain community agrees upon the definition of the concept being measured,
rather than resting on the observation itself. Conversely, natural science is based on a
belief in the existence of a physical world that is external to the people making
observations about it. Therefore, psychology is not a science according to the traditional
definition of a science because the truth of a psychological statement does not ultimately
rest on observations of an external material world (even though psychology presents itself
in a way that combines mental concepts and objective material discourse). Psychological
studies require attributing motivations to the subjects being studied and therefore
psychological statements depend upon other psychological statements, not upon
observations of a material object (in psychology, the object of study is a person). For
example, the study of a concept such as depression requires a community of people
agreeing upon what that concept means and ways to interpret whether a person is
exhibiting it. But logically it is not the person or subject who is being studied; what is
being studied is a quality or attribute of that person, even though psychological concepts
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are embedded in everyday language, and in everyday language psychological concepts
typically describe whole persons, not just their mind or mental state.
According to Brothers (2001), it is easy to forget that simply because the general,
everyday understanding of a person is that a person is an entity who is both mental and
physical, this does not mean that it is easy to combine the two distinct fields (psychology
and neuroscience) that each study one of those parts of humans. This is why cognitive
neuroscience is able to exist. As humans we go about our daily life and think or talk
about people, but we do not think or talk about them as a mind or as a brain. The word
person assumes that a set of mental and a set of physical qualities are present. So in order
to accept cognitive neuroscience claims about the relationship between mind and brain,
one must assume that the study of the mental and the study of the physical can go
together as easily as the mental and physical go together when we think or talk about
people in normal everyday grammar.
Since psychology and neuroscience have separate histories, vocabularies,
concepts, and research methods, rhetoric or grammar has to fill in the gaps. Brothers
(2001) identified rhetorical strategies that are often used in cognitive neuroscience
literature to do that (she also noted that at times authors acknowledge uncertainty about
the mind-brain relationship and suggest that these questions will be answered with more
neuroscience research; or, some neuroscientists solve the mind-brain problem with
eliminativist claims that psychological concepts are fictions and the concept of mind is a
placeholder for neuroscientific explanations of behavior).
For example, Brothers (2001) noted the strategy of using everyday words to
describe both psychological concepts and brain activity, which ignores the separate
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contexts of each of those fields. She observed, “ignoring the contexts makes it look as
though there is no hard work involved in equating the brain and the mind” (p. 15). A
common example is the use of Freud’s concept of the unconscious by neuroscientists to
imply a relationship between psychoanalytic theory and neuroscientific research even
though the idea of the unconscious mind had nothing to do with the fact that brains and
body typically function outside of awareness. Another strategy is the use of analogy to
portray brain structures as mirroring the way psychological experiences are
conceptualized. In other words, “the complex everyday grammar of a mental term is
discovered in the brain itself. The discovery, of course, depends on constructing
appropriate narratives of brain architecture” (p. 19). For example,
The widespread idea that socialization and rationality constrain our primitive
natures is often recast as the dominance of the cortex over subcortical brain
structures. This oversimplified, ideologically based idea about brain structure is
then used, circularly, to prove the cultural idea. (p. 19)
Because brain functioning (in this case the cortex) is not entirely understood by
scientists, this type of argument is able to depict brain functioning and cultural values as
fitting perfectly together as if the brain causes those cultural values to exist through its
functioning. These narratives therefore function to naturalize social values and mores.
Another strategy is to present a new narrative as a neuroscientific discovery—in other
words, to portray brain functioning as having proved something previously unconsidered
in psychology such a relationship between some mental or affective concepts that had not
previously been recognized. The problem is that the psychological narrative preceded the
interpretation of brain structures acting in a certain way, which then proved the narrative
that an author is trying to construct (see also Bennett & Hacker, 2003).
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Brothers (2001) argued that the reason cultural narratives can be easily mapped
onto the brain is because, although neuroscience uses natural science methodology to
study a physical object, neuroscience lacks a central organizing theory against which to
test hypotheses, even though a central theory is a standard in other sciences. Scholars
(e.g., Atmanspacher, 2007; Uttal, 2007) have noted that psychology also lacks a central
organizing principle unifying its numerous and often unrelated sub-disciplines.
According to Uttal (2007), psychology will always be questioned as a legitimate science
as long as its terminology (e.g., concepts such as mind or consciousness) are too
numerous in quantity and often ambiguous in meaning. Uttal reminded readers that some
theorists do not consider these issues to be problematic, and some theorists do not
consider these issues to entirely negate the argument that psychology is a science.
Regardless, he argued that in order to compensate for the perceived problem of
psychology not being a science, psychologists often take abstract concepts regarding
mind or mental life and describe them as physical in order to make them seem observable
or quantifiable entities. In fact these mental-physical associations are actually figurative
or metaphorical ways of talking.
Brothers (2001) concluded by cautioning against two potentially harmful effects
of the attempt to use cognitive neuroscience to overcome the mind-body split of
Cartesian or modernist philosophy. First, describing problems in terms of the brain makes
it more difficult to attribute those problems to unfair social and economic arrangements.
Second, brain-based understandings of self are transferred from an expert class to society
more generally, and therefore the authority of neuroscience suggests a process of turning
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control of human nature (and beliefs about how people change) over to the opinions of a
few high-status scientific experts.
Uttal (2007) argued that evidence of psychology’s reliance on the material
concepts of other scientific fields can be found in noticing that over the last century,
psychology has periodically adopted anew whatever latest technologies or machines are
popular to use as a metaphor for the mind, leading to the computer metaphor for mind in
cognitive psychology. Even more problematic is how psychology’s borrowing of material
understandings of other sciences to serve as accessible metaphors for mental processes
has caused a reification or seemingly literal understanding of concepts that are actually
nonmaterial. He suggested that the fusion between neuroscience and psychology is itself
a good example of this because the functions of the neuroscience technologies have often
become adopted as actual psychological theories rather than methods for answering
specific psychological questions under investigation. For example, in psychology’s mindbrain research the use of EEG recordings led to electromagnetic or field theories of mind
whereas the use of fMRI images reinforces a view of mind as localized in the brain.
What was a well-defined problem in physics, information processing, or medical
pathology often becomes an entrenched paradigm of psychological research with
all of the accoutrements of a scientific endeavor but without adequate
consideration of the seductive call of what might well have been an ill-connected
metaphor. (Uttal, 2007, p. 64)
Tallis (2004) called this problem “thinking by transferred epithet” (p. 34), and he
used that issue to deconstruct common terminology that is used to portray the mind as
analogous to the functioning of various technologies, yet which have come to be
incorrectly understood as literal descriptions and explanations of the mind. He suggested
that this association between mind and machine is based on (and constantly reinforces)
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the view that neuroscience has already explained or will explain the phenomenon of
consciousness. In other words, Tallis argued that technological terms reinforce the
premise that mind is brain by reinforcing the idea that mind functions like machines. This
happens to be a largely unquestioned part of typical parlance since machines are
generally anthropomorphized in a variety of ways that unknowingly (and incorrectly)
attribute to them qualities of being conscious, free-willed, human-like entities that think
and perform tasks. Like Uttal (2007), Tallis (2004) noted that the ambiguity of
psychological concepts is one reason for the persistence of material misrepresentations of
mind. For example, concepts such as calculation, complexity, goals, and instructions are
concepts that are often used to describe the functioning of machines such as computers,
yet are also applied by cognitive psychologists to describe mind (or to describe how the
brain works to produce the mind).
Like Brothers (2001), Tallis (2004) is also a physician who has conducted
neuroscience research yet is vocal in his criticism of the neuroscientific study of
psychological concepts. He is primarily concerned with the disregard for the concepts of
consciousness and subjectivity that a reductionist neuroscientific understanding of human
psychology frequently depicts. His concern is that attributing all human experience to the
brain tends to overlook many of the important philosophical and social issues that those
questions have traditionally been thought to raise. In his view, the neuroscientific vision
of self is ultimately a scientistic, Darwinian understanding of humans that is
uncomplicated and boring. Further, the understanding of a mechanistic, material self,
when described in ways that neglect concepts such as consciousness or subjectivity,
ultimately portrays humans without agency or self-directedness.
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In sum, critics of cognitive neuroscience have argued that using neuroscience to
locate psychological concepts within neurobiological processes is illogical and therefore
requires using rhetoric or grammar in ways that make nonmaterial concepts seem either
interchangeable with, or able to be easily mapped onto observable physical correlates.
Critics also suggest that cognitive neuroscience, despite its popularity, and despite
promising an explanation of how humans experience life in both physical and
nonphysical ways, often naturalizes and individualizes social and philosophical issues.
This has significant consequences for what people understand to be the location of human
experience, difficulties, and change. In the next section I discuss the integration between
neuroscience and psychotherapy.
A brief history of arguments supporting the integration of psychotherapy
and neuroscience. In this section I discuss ways in which authors have portrayed
neuroscience as having the potential to help therapists discern among the multitude of
psychotherapy theories, select appropriate treatments, and measure the effectiveness of
these treatments for third-party payers who often hold significant control over the
delivery of mental health care. These issues have been identified in psychotherapy
literature as explanations for why various psychotherapy-neuroscience integration efforts
are necessary.
Integration of psychotherapy theories. In light of the expansive number of
psychotherapy theories, the question of which psychotherapy treatment should be
provided to which psychotherapy patient has not been easy to answer. The integration or
combination of separate therapy theories has been driven in part by research findings
suggesting that most psychotherapies seem to confer equally helpful results for patients,
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and, in general, most patients seem to respond well to psychotherapy for reasons that are
similar regardless of the specific therapy modality (Norcross & Newman, 2003). A
second attempt to resolve this dilemma was the creation of evidence-based treatments
specifically tailored for psychological disorders, and with the purpose of maintaining
verifiable and replicable psychological treatments.
The history of psychotherapy integration includes the initial decline of
psychoanalysis’ prominence during the mid-20th century, which had significant
implications for professional psychology. Cushman (1995) noted a split even within
psychoanalytic theories during the 1940s following the death of Sigmund Freud.
Although now widely regarded as a flawed study, Hans Eysenck’s seminal study during
the 1950s, which claimed to find psychoanalysis ineffective as a mental health treatment,
was thought to have catalyzed the drive to implement alternative psychological
approaches (Goodwin, 2008). Lazarus (2005) argued that in professional psychology
journals, disagreements between various schools of practice within professional
psychology were evidenced at least as early as the 1960s, and were initially pronounced
in expert debates between psychoanalysis and behavioral models of treatment for
psychological conditions. During the mid-to-late-20th century psychotherapy experienced
a proliferation of psychotherapy theories, at times accompanied by noticeable
disagreements between the experts affiliated with them, and competition for professional
legitimacy among advocates of separate paradigms (J. Gold & Stricker, 2006; Miller,
Duncan, & Hubble, 1997; Norcross, 2005). Today psychotherapists continue to confront
the challenge of understanding and selecting appropriately from among a multitude of
psychotherapy modalities. According to Barker (2001),
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For over 30 years society has been drowning in psychotherapies. Where
psychoanalysis once strode confidently, alone, now the path to the client’s door is
beaten by a Technicolor assortment of approaches, models and interventions,
some with only the most tenuous attachments to the five main forces of
psychological thought. (p. 11)
Miller, Duncan, and Hubble (1997) suggested that contentious disagreements
among advocates of specific psychotherapy theories and modalities might be attributable
in part to financial interests of authors who have sought to differentiate new products
from already-existing yet similar treatments. They also noted the pressing need among
psychotherapy providers to prove to third-party payers that the reliability and verifiable
effectiveness of treatments administered with psychotherapy patients. Formal integration
between psychotherapy theories has been a prominent late-20th century psychotherapy
trend. According to Goldfried, Pachankis, & Bell (2005), the origins of psychotherapy
integration could be seen as early as the 1930s when some theorists proposed a
convergence between certain principles of psychoanalysis and the emergent behavioral
models of treatment for psychological conditions. Psychotherapy integration offers an
alternative to psychotherapists promising allegiance to any one psychotherapy approach.
One of the goals of psychotherapy integration has been the discovery of areas of
convergence among various effective psychotherapy models in order to “create theories
and practices that are superior to the existing pure-form models” (Lampropoulos,
Spengler, Dixon, & Nicholas, 2002, p. 1228). With the hopes of improving
psychotherapy overall, some authors have suggested that psychotherapy integration might
curtail the disputes among competing schools of psychotherapy with regards to best
practices in therapy (Alford & Beck, 1997).

40

The finding that many treatment approaches have the potential to confer similar
benefits upon therapy clients is now commonly understood among professional
psychotherapists to be a driving factor behind the movement for multi-theoretical or
integrative approaches to psychotherapy treatment (O’Brien & Houston, 2007; Prochaska
& Norcross, 2003). As theoretical integrationists seek to determine the most efficacious
psychotherapy modality for each patients’ presenting problems (Norcross, 2005; Stricker
& Gold, 2006), integrative modalities have, by some survey measures, constituted a
significant portion of professional psychotherapists’ identified psychotherapy approach
(Norcross, Karpiak, & Lister, 2005; Prochaska & Norcross, 2003). According to Nuttall
(2002), psychotherapy integration represents a convergence of historical factors in
professional psychology, including the influence of a postmodern worldview that
questions the idea of singular or objective truth; the need to prove cost-effectiveness of
psychotherapy treatments to third-party payers; and the need to efficiently train providers
to be able to identify the needs of individual clients and maintain flexible treatment
approaches. As a primer to his multitheoretical adult psychotherapy guide, Brooks-Harris
(2008) similarly argued that the movement toward theoretical integration has probably
been a result, in part, of emerging postmodern approaches driven by constructionist,
systemic, and cognitive theories. Evidence of this argument can be seen in humanistic
psychotherapists’ adopting experiential techniques, as with the emotional-focused
therapy recommended by Leslie S. Greenberg (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg,
2004); psychodynamic theorists adopting interpersonal techniques, such as the cyclical
psychodynamic paradigm by Paul Wachtel (1993); and the well-known merger of
numerous cognitive and behavioral psychotherapies which have included dialectical
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behavioral therapy created by Marsha Linehan (Robins, Schmitt, & Linehan, 2004) and
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) devised by Steven Hayes (2004).
The effects of managed care organizations (MCOs) on professional psychology
and psychotherapy. The emergence of managed care organizations (MCOs) and their
strict oversight of patient care has also factored prominently among the difficulties that
psychologists and psychotherapy have faced in the delivery of services over the last
several decades. Managed care organizations, which are private health insurance
agencies, emerged during the 1980s and placed barriers to financial compensation for
mental health services such as restrictions on reimbursable psychotherapy methodologies,
and limitations on the number of psychotherapy sessions for which patients might receive
coverage (Cohen, 2003; Panzarino, 2000). The emergence of short-term psychotherapy
approaches and the efforts to devise methods of measuring psychotherapy progress has
since been ubiquitous (Cushman & Gilford, 2000; L. M. Richardson & Austad, 1991).
Authors have suggested that long-term psychotherapies, which seem more likely to
address clients’ longstanding behaviors or personality characteristics within the context
of the therapeutic relationship, have often been discouraged by managed care guidelines
(Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Ragan, 2006; Sperling & Sack, 2002).
Authors have also noted the social, ethical, and practical difficulties cause by
managed care oversight for mental health services. For example, Braun and Cox (2005)
noted the ethical and legal challenges that have arisen as clinicians, confronted with
managed care restrictions on clients’ coverage, might have intentionally or
unintentionally misrepresented a client’s diagnosis or treatment in order to provide
reimbursable treatment. Discrepancies in therapists’ diagnoses of patients based on
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payment method has been studied and reported elsewhere (see Kielbasa, Pomerantz,
Krohn, & Sullivan, 2004). Cushman and Gilford (2000) described the social implications
of managed care organizations’ regulatory control over psychotherapy approaches and
preferred diagnostic categories, and the surveillance by MCOs over the relationship
between psychotherapist and patient. They argued that the mandates of managed care
companies promote an uncomplicated understanding of complex human problems, and
therefore has the potential to result in psychotherapy practices that indirectly promote
political values consistent with conformity or compliance to authority. Wilcoxon,
Magnuson, and Norem (2008) further proposed potential implications of these types of
inflexible psychotherapy practices during the mental health treatment of minority clients.
Managed care limitations on reimbursements for psychotherapy providers also coincided
with the increased use of psychiatric medications, against which psychotherapists have
frequently found themselves competing as treatment providers (Linford & Arden, 2009).
Linford and Arden also argued that psychotherapists have often struggled to define or
explain succinctly the factors that comprise the quality of the psychotherapy experience,
whereas advocates for psychiatric medications have been able to explain the efficacy of
their treatments as an assumed correction to chemical imbalances.
Applying neuroscience to psychotherapy integration and validating
psychotherapy efficacy. In psychotherapy articles and books, authors have advocated
strongly for a continued and growing relationship between psychotherapy and
neuroscience. One argument suggests that psychotherapy research that uses brain
imaging has the potential to identify effective psychotherapy practices and allow
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psychologists and psychotherapists to have confirmed scientific explanations of the
purpose of therapy. According to Beitman and Manring (2009),
Psychotherapy may be leaving its prescientific state as neuroimaging and
specialized electroencephalograms of brain function help to define the
neurophysiological bases of psychotherapeutic change. As therapists theorize,
their theories will be increasingly testable by concrete brain mapping. Such work
will challenge therapists to learn that mind and brain are not separate but are
different aspects of the same thing. (p. 713)
Similarly, Linden (2006) argued that “psychotherapy needs to be based on a
sound understanding of the biological processes involved. There is no reason why this
general standard of contemporary medicine . . . should not apply here as well” (p. 528).
According to Fonagy (2004), “non-biased, non-subjective measures of outcome are
urgently required. Neuroscience (particularly brain imaging) will deliver this sooner
rather than later” (p. 357). These statements seem unwavering in both the convictions
about the importance of integrating neuroscience with psychotherapy, as well as the
attitude of certainty that neuroscientific methods will indeed become increasingly
intertwined with the specific practice of psychotherapy and the general understanding of
its purpose and efficacy.
Authors (e.g., Beitman & Manring, 2009; Beitman & Viamontes, 2006; Porto et
al., 2009; Toomey & Ecker, 2007; Walter, Berger, & Schnell, 2009) have argued that the
use of neuroimaging technologies in psychotherapy research could prove which
psychotherapy theories (and which common factors amongst various psychotherapy
theories) are most efficacious for brain change and therefore worthy of being
recommended as psychological treatments. The assertion is that such neuroscientific
research would provide conclusive evidence as to which therapies are least effective,
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consolidating the myriad of psychotherapy theories into sets of precise interventions for
specific clinical problems. For example, Linden (2006) proposed that neuroscience might
contribute to these professional goals because “a better understanding of . . . biological
mechanisms might aid in the improvement of therapeutic interventions or even in the
utilization of these very mechanisms, as in the case of neurofeedback” (p. 528). In their
neuroscience-informed understanding of the purpose of psychotherapy, Beitman and
Viamontes (2006) argued that “a pragmatic look at the psychotherapeutic interaction
suggests that it is a relationship between two brains and their bodies” (p. 214). Beitman
and Viamontes predicted that by utilizing neuroscience in psychotherapy research,
“psychotherapists will be able to visualize the brain processes that underlie both
psychopathology and psychotherapeutic change” (p. 214). These statements materialize
psychotherapy by reducing psychotherapy theory and practices to the brain.
Broadening the scope of established psychotherapy theories. Psychotherapy
theorists have used neuroscience research in an effort to either verify the accuracy of
already-existing psychotherapy theories’ models of behavior and change, or to overcome
limitations to well-known psychotherapy paradigms by broadening the scope or utility of
those theories. In other words, the appeal to neuroscience is very wide. For example, with
regards to remedying the purported decline in prominence of psychoanalytic theory,
seminal neuroscience researcher and psychiatrist Eric Kandel (1999) has encouraged
psychoanalytic therapists to embrace neuroscience research as proof of psychoanalytic
interpretations of memory, consciousness, and mind, and to portray the aims of
psychoanalysis as convergent with the aims of neuroscientific research in those areas.
Kandel argued that such a merger between psychoanalysis and neuroscience could
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potentially reverse what he described as the declining influence of psychoanalytic ideas
within professional psychological practice. Boag (2007) similarly declared, “the
significance of this direction for psychoanalysis cannot be overstated. . . . The venture
into neuroscience makes possible the further evaluation of some of the fundamental
concepts within psychoanalytic theory” (p. 376). In one article, Ragan (2006), a physician
and psychoanalytic practitioner, bemoaned his experiences of being instructed by
managed care agents to avoid discussing transference issues with therapy patients in
order to avoid issues that might lead to patients’ regression and possibly lengthier courses
of therapy. He argued that by appealing to neurobiological evidence for its theories,
“psychoanalysis can join the ranks of those fields claiming a modicum of ‘objective’ and
‘subjective,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘hierarchical’ understanding of the essential workings of what
it is to be human” (p. 643).
In a different application of neuroscience to psychotherapy, Ilardi and Feldman
(2001) proposed that the study of the neural correlates of mental activities could serve to
widen behavioral psychology’s limited disciplinary boundaries. Noting that behaviorists
traditionally have assumed that behavior is largely determined by an individual’s
environment and that behavior is measured with observable individual actions, Ilardi and
Feldman argued that advances in neuroimaging may allow for observations of mental
states, thereby broadening what is considered to be observable phenomena. In another
unique application of neuroscience to an effort to expand the scope of psychotherapy
theories, Cromby (2004) argued that psychotherapies based on social constructionism
should incorporate brain-based explanations of subjectivity in order to incorporate the
idea of physical embodiment into their understanding of human beings. He argued that
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some contemporary psychotherapy theories have become extreme in their view that
reality is ambiguous, in effect perpetuating an understanding of mind and body as
separate even though constructionist theories had been incorporated into psychotherapy
to challenge mind-body dualism. Cromby argued that incorporating supposed
physiological correlates of mind into social constructionist approaches could therefore
enable these psychotherapies to “more profoundly challenge the cognitivism and
individualism of mainstream approaches” (Cromby, 2004, p. 817). These theorists’
efforts all suggest a materialization of mind and other psychological concepts. The
variety of ways in which these theorists appeal to neuroscience to resolve an array of
challenges in psychotherapy theory is also noteworthy.
Authors have suggested that neuroscience research might eventually contribute to
an overhaul of dichotomous classifications between physiological processes and mental
disorders, anticipating that the relationships between molecular and cognitive levels of
functioning will be identified (see Linden & Fallgatter, 2009; Mizen, 2005; Peres &
Nasello, 2008). For example, Linden and Fallgatter (2009) suggested that, “classical
concepts of mental disorders such as schizophrenia have been variously attacked as being
too broad or too narrow. Here, the hope is that neuroimaging may contribute diagnostic
markers to support or refute existing categories” (p. 1). Similarly, according to Peres and
Nasello (2008), “functional neuroimaging technologies are perhaps the most important of
several recent developments that promise to correct, or even eliminate, the rigid
classification of disorders as neurological, psychiatric, or psychological” (p. 944). These
goals seem ambitious and assume theoretical integration among various understandings
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of psychopathology in order to facilitate broadly agreed-upon understandings of
psychology distress or discernible mental illness.
Statement of the Problem
Despite the significant role of neuroscience and mind-brain research in the
contemporary understanding of self, there has been a relative absence of studies that
critically examine the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience. There has
been a convergence of historical and political developments in Western culture that has
led to the formation of contemporary neuroscience. Several philosophical and scientific
controversies have emerged about cognitive neuroscience’s efforts to study psychological
concepts by identifying their neural correlates, and yet there has been a relative absence
of critical analyses of the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience in the
literature. Therefore, there is a need for a cultural and historical interpretation of a
neuroscience-informed psychotherapy text based on a careful analysis of the claims and
rhetorical strategies used to integrate mind and brain or psychotherapy and neuroscience.
Description of the Study
Specifically, in this hermeneutic study I historically situate a brain-based
psychotherapy text. I first conduct a textual analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. In that analysis I discuss
examples of the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in the book. I
then examine the implicit cultural and historical assumptions in Cozolino’s claims and
recommendations, and I discuss ways in which he used linguistic devices to identify
psychotherapy with neuroscience. Finally, in Chapter V I discuss the implications of the
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text for professional psychology and psychotherapy, and the broader economic, political,
and social arrangements that the text at once embodies and replicates.
Rationale for the Study
This project could bring greater attention among psychotherapists and general
audiences to understandings about the self that are unknowingly perpetuated in a brainbased psychotherapy discourse. As a hermeneutic study of a psychotherapy text, it is
assumed that certain understandings about the self or what it means to be human are
present in the text’s claims about psychological health, illness, and approaches for
facilitating healing. Hermeneutic philosophy is an interpretive framework for
understanding how healing practices embody and then replicate certain sociocultural
trends and moral understandings of a historical time and place. Revealing the
understanding of the self in a brain-based therapy theory is necessary for understanding
the political, economic, and social arrangements that are promoted in a brain-based
therapy discourse.
Importance of the Study
This study is important because it could contribute to a substantive dialogue
within professional psychology and psychotherapy about some of the possible
implications of a brain-based psychotherapy discourse for patients and for the larger
societal understandings of issues such as psychological health and illness, as well as the
purpose of psychotherapy. Because of the relative absence of critical interpretations about
brain-based psychotherapy theories despite well known but separate critical historical
examinations of both psychotherapy and neuroscience, this study attempted to bring
attention to some of the underlying values, assumptions, and lifestyle choices that brain-
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based psychotherapy discourses reinforce, and that authors of brain-based psychotherapy
texts (and psychotherapists employing their recommendations) might have overlooked.
It is clear from a review of the literature that authors who support the integration
between neuroscience and psychotherapy have many hopes that neuroscience will resolve
some longstanding yet unresolved issues such as how best to explain psychotherapy’s
effectiveness, and how to select or combine psychotherapies for the treatment of a
specific patient or for the treatment of a specific psychological problem. However, some
of the possible implications of using neuroscience to answer these psychological and
treatment-related questions (and to devising psychotherapy interventions from brain
research) have gone largely unexamined. By identifying many of the recurring rhetorical
strategies or devices in a brain-based psychotherapy book, I intended for my hermeneutic
study to build on the work of scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001;
Tallis, 2004) who have critiqued the logic underlying cognitive neuroscience’s
integration of psychology and neuroscience, and voiced concerns about the societal
implications of viewing human psychology in neurobiological terms. I am particularly
interested in how the understandings about self that have been associated with mind-brain
research might come to be replicated in psychotherapy, and the implications of that
possible trend for the profession of psychology. I believe that psychotherapists, patients,
and general audiences could benefit from greater awareness of the possible implications
of literature that uses mind-brain research to justify established psychotherapy therapies
(or possibly to create new therapy discourses based on interpretations of brain
functioning or discussions about the brain).
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Summary
In this chapter I introduced the modern era concept of the self, some of the
historical and cultural trends from which neuroscience research emerged during the 20th
century, and critical perspectives on the neuroscientific study of psychology or mental
experience. I identified the problem of a relative absence of literature critically examining
the integration between psychotherapy and neuroscience, and I described the study of
Cozolino’s (2010) book that I conduct in Chapters IV and V. In the next chapter I review
the justifications and uses of neuroscience in psychotherapy research, and ways in which
neuroscience has been applied to psychotherapy theory.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
In Chapter I, I discussed the configuration of the self in Western culture beginning
around the 17th century with what is considered to be the start of the modern era. I
showed that although humans have recognized for thousands of years that brain and
conscious experience are somehow related, contemporary neuroscience has created a
unique and powerful place in the understanding of the self. In this chapter I broadly
survey the literature pertaining to the uses of neuroscience in psychotherapy research and
the integration of neuroscience with psychotherapy theories.
Neuroscientific Explanations for Psychotherapy Efficacy
In this section I briefly describe several neuroimaging technologies and I review
some of the proposed neurobiological explanations for psychotherapy’s effectiveness in
reducing psychological symptoms or improving psychological functioning.
A brief overview of common neuroimaging technologies. A brief overview of
neuroimaging technologies is necessary to understand the foundation of the research
methods and conclusions that authors have drawn from psychotherapy-neuroimaging
studies. Lee, Kannan, and Hillis (2006) categorized brain imaging technologies according
to whether the technologies have been used to identify abnormalities in brain structure
(such as computerized tomography or CT and magnetic resonance imaging or MRI), or
changes in brain function (such as positron emission tomography or PET and single
photon emission computerized tomography or SPECT), or both structural and functional
issues (functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI). Kolb and Whishaw (2009)
categorized neuroimaging technologies based on whether the technology has been used to
detect and record the electrical activity of neurons (such as electroencephalogram or
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EEG), or whether the technology uses x-rays to display densities of brain regions and
anatomy (such as computerized tomography or CT), or as dynamic imaging methods
(PET, MRI, and fMRI). The dynamic imaging methods, all spawned from the principles
of CT, utilize computers during scanning sessions which sequentially capture a number
of images of an individual’s brain, then combine the multitude of images in order to
display areas of brain activation (Kolb & Whishaw, 2009).
Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) and positron
emission tomography (PET) technologies both display regional cerebral blood flow
(rCBF) in an individual’s brain, which is strongly suggestive of glucose metabolism or
energy use and therefore is used to indicate increases in activity in various regions of the
brain. Each of these technologies tracks the activity of a radioactive tracer that is
typically injected into participants’ bloodstreams prior to brain scanning (Linden, 2008;
Peres & Nasello, 2008). FDG-PET, for example, is named for F 18 fluorodeoxyglucose,
the radioactive isotope injected into participants or patients prior to scanning that emits
positrons as it decays. A computer detects the decay of the tracer as a measure of
metabolic activity in human tissue (Peres & Nasello, 2008).
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology captures images of an
individual’s brain that display the responses of brain tissues when tissues are exposed to a
powerful magnet. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used in
neuroimaging to display images of an individual’s brain that can discern between
different responses of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood when exposed to the fMRI’s
magnet. In fMRI, increases in the neural activity in specific areas of an individual’s brain
are indicated through detecting increases in flow of oxygenated blood flow to those areas
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(Beutel, Stern, & Silbersweig, 2003; Lee et al., 2006). FMRI technologies display both
anatomical structures and blood-flow processes (Peres & Nasello, 2008). In the next
section I discuss how these technologies have been used to explain material correlates of
psychotherapy treatments.
Neuroplasticity, learning, and memory. Stress or trauma during early
development is believed to impact neurobiological functioning in ways that result in
psychological symptoms (Fonagy, 2004; Watts-English, Fortson, Gibler, Hooper, & De
Bellis, 2006). Therefore, certain experiences such as psychotherapy are believed to
produce changes in individuals’ brains that correspond to a reduction of symptoms of
psychopathology (Dumont, 2009; Peres & Nasello, 2008). Central to this argument is the
broader concept of neuroplasticity, that is, the ability of the brain’s structures and
functioning to be amenable to changes in response to certain environmental or
experiential factors (Brenner, Roder, & Tschacher, 2006; Fuchs, 2004; Grawe, 2007;
Liggan & Kay, 1999; Peres & Nasello, 2008). According to Fuchs (2004),
There is a life-long re-mapping of cortical networks according to the individual
experience, including the de novo generation of neurons in the adult
hippocampus, as proven recently. Neuroplasticity is a prerequisite for any
enduring change in behavior, cognition, and emotion. . . . In order to produce
lasting effects, psychotherapy should arrive at restructuring neural networks,
particularly in the subcortical-limbic system which is responsible for unconscious
emotional motivations and dispositions. (p. 479)
Etkin, Pittenger, Polan, and Kandel (2005) emphatically remarked, “there is no
longer any doubt that psychotherapy can result in detectable changes in the brain”
(p. 155). According to Dumont (2009), “successful psychotherapy entails neuronal
restructuring, which in turn enables more functional behavior” (p. 33). Liggan and Kay
(1999) outlined several specific physiological mechanisms which have been proposed as
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explanations for psychotherapy’s ability to effect changes in patients’ brains and
subsequently behavior. These include altering metabolism in brain regions (and altering
serotonin metabolism specifically), impacting thyroid functioning, and creating new
synapses (electrical signals between neurons) similar to those that are expected to emerge
during new learning experiences.
Brenner et al. (2006) argued that an individual’s brain develops largely in
accordance with a genetic foundation, yet they noted that
Learning processes control the construction of cognitive-emotional schemata,
which is correlated in particular to dendritic cross-linking. . . . If psychotherapy is
understood to be a form of learning, then the unfolding learning process can also
effect changes in gene expression and thus influence the strength of synaptic
connections. (p. S11)
That learning processes are suspected to occur during certain experiences is one
of the primary explanations for psychotherapy enabling changes in patients’ brain
functioning (Centonze, Siracusano, Calabresi, & Bernardi, 2005; Etkin et al., 2005).
Centonze et al. (2005) explained that psychotherapy alleviates psychological
distress because processes such as the inhibition of memory consolidation and
reconsolidation disrupt patients’ emotional reactivity to distressing memories (see also
De Raedt, 2006). Researchers suspect that neuroplasticity underlies lasting psychological
and emotional reactivity in response to early experiences (forming the basis of implicit or
emotional memory, the effects of which are often out of patients’ awareness), or allowing
for lasting psychological or behavioral change, as new memory alters patients’
expectations and perceptions of themselves and others (see Fuchs, 2004; Liggan & Kay,
1999).
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According to Centonze et al. (2005), “an effective psychotherapy must be directed
to erase maladaptive implicit memories and aberrant synaptic plasticity” (p. 124). Liggan
and Kay (1999) noted, “once learned implicitly, rules may exert a self-perpetuating bias
for interpreting later experience in a manner consistent with past experience, regardless
of the appropriateness of such an interpretation” (p. 105). Liggan and Kay further
explained that
In psychotherapy, these patterns of implicit rules are revealed and reflected upon,
and change occurs through the learning of new patterns explicitly repeated until
the new habit-based manner is engrained in the implicit memory system. Within
this proposition, psychotherapeutic change may be attributed to a process of
insight or to the provision of abstract explanations regarding underlying
relationship patterns. (p. 105)
Some theorists have posited that psychotherapy causes neurobiological changes
because the therapeutic relationship itself acts as a reparative attachment relationship that
decreases the psychological impact of implicit memories formed during early childhood
social interactions (see Duquette, 2010; Fuchs, 2004; Liggan & Kay, 1999). At the end of
this chapter I discuss the use of attachment theory in brain-based psychotherapies such as
interpersonal neurobiology.
Neuroimaging Methods in Psychotherapy Outcome Studies
In this section I review and discuss the use of neuroscientific research in studies
of psychotherapy treatments. According to Linden and Fallgatter (2009),
Treatment monitoring with functional neuroimaging has had particularly
fascinating applications in the field of psychological interventions. We can now
safely say that there has been a paradigm shift over the past 10 years to an
integrated view of psychological and neurobiological models of mental illness and
its treatment. (p. 5)
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Beutel et al. (2003) argued that, “neuroimaging procedures are based on the fact
that mental activity is accompanied by a change of neural activity associated with a
change (increase or decrease) of metabolic activity in these areas” (p. 777). Many studies
have investigated the neurobiological correlates and impairments of various mental
disorders through neuroimaging of research participants who have been diagnosed with
specific disorders (see Melcher, Falkai, & Gruber, 2008). For example, researchers have
used neuroimaging to display underlying neurobiological processes that are suspected to
be involved in a variety of mental disorders including schizophrenia (Carter, Mintun,
Nichols, & Cohen, 1997) and bipolar disorder (Blumberg et al., 2003).
In Baxter et al.’s (1992) study, researchers used positron emission tomography
(PET) to compare possible neurobiological changes in members of a healthy control
group to neurobiological changes in patients who had been treated for obsessive
compulsive disorder with either antidepressant medication or a course of behavioral
therapy. Since that study, neuroimaging technologies have been used to measure changes
in the brain activity of psychotherapy patients following participation in various
psychotherapy treatments for various psychological disorders. A sufficient number of
these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies have been conducted such that recent review
articles have organized and compared these studies’ methods, results, and psychotherapy
treatment implications (Frewen, Dozois, & Lanius, 2008; Peres & Nasello, 2008; Porto et
al., 2009; Roffman, Marci, Glick, Dougherty, & Rauch, 2005). Peres and Nasello (2008)
examined 21 of these studies and concluded, “the results in general show that the
psychotherapeutic approaches used had the potential to modify dysfunctional neural
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circuits associated with the disorder in question” (p. 950). Peres and Nasello further noted
that
Psychotherapy influenced neuropsychological normalization with a corresponding
development of the patient’s psychological equilibrium. In fact, changes occurring
at the mental level through psychotherapy are accompanied by changes in brain
blood flow and normalization of patients’ neural dynamics. (p. 950)
A review of studies in which research participants attended a structured
psychotherapy modality for treatment of a specific psychological disorder, followed by
neuroimaging procedures to measure possible neurobiological changes attributable to the
psychotherapy, indicate that these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies can be broadly
categorized in several ways. For example, the most frequent disorders for which
participants in these studies have been treated with psychotherapy and then administered
brain scans have been post-traumatic stress disorder (Farrow et al., 2005; Peres et al.,
2007), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Baxter et al., 1992; Brody et al., 1998; Nakao et
al., 2005; Nakatani et al., 2003; Schwartz, Stoessel, Baxter, Martin, & Phelps, 1996),
panic disorder (Prasko et al., 2004; Sakai et al., 2006) major depressive disorder (Brody
et al., 2001; Goldapple et al., 2004; Martin, Martin, Rai, Richardson, & Royall, 2001) and
social or specific phobias (Furmark et al., 2002; Johanson, Risberg, Tucker, & Gustafson,
2006; Paquette et al., 2003). The psychotherapy modalities provided to treatment-group
participants in these studies have generally been short-term courses (typically comprised
of 2 to 24 sessions) of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), interpersonal therapy (IPT),
behavioral therapy (BT), or exposure therapy. The most commonly used neuroimaging
technologies in these psychotherapy-neuroimaging studies have been positron emission
tomography (PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), magnetic
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resonance imaging (MRI), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Participants during neuroimaging have undergone brain scanning while in a resting state,
or during symptom provocation, or during some neuropsychological test such as a
measure of attention, in order to examine possible neurobiological correlates of the
effects of the psychotherapy on psychological symptoms.
These studies have also varied based on the specific research design used in each
study. That is, in order to determine the effects of psychotherapy participation on an
individual’s brain activity, studies have compared psychotherapy participants’
neuroimaging results to neuroimaging results of participants in control groups comprised
of individuals who had not been diagnosed with the psychological condition under
investigation (see Nakatani et al., 2003; Paquette et al., 2003), or individuals who had
been diagnosed with the same psychological condition as the treatment group members
but who did not receive psychotherapy (see Furmark et al., 2002), or individuals who had
been diagnosed with the same clinical condition but received treatment with psychiatric
medications in place of psychotherapy (see Brody et al., 1998; Martin et al., 2001).
Examples of neuroimaging in psychotherapy outcome studies. I discuss the
following examples of psychotherapy studies in order to illustrate the use of
neuroimaging technologies within varying research designs that were used to investigate
neurobiological changes in participants who had each undergone specific psychotherapy
treatments for treatment of psychological conditions shared by members of their
treatment group.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and cognitive behavioral
therapy (CBT). Paquette et al. (2003) investigated neurobiological changes in

59

participants’ brains using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) following
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for treatment of spider phobia. In this study design,
12 female participants were screened for inclusion based on two self-report symptom
questionnaires, a review of DSM-IV criteria for specific phobia, and observations of the
participants’ reactions to viewing images of spiders while placed in an inactive MRI
scanner in order to determine whether reactions to this situation were sufficiently
tolerable to allow participation in similar procedures during the actual experimental
conditions. For treatment comparison, a control group was comprised of 13 female
participants who demonstrated no phobic responses to images of spiders and who
presented with no histories of psychiatric or neurological illnesses. The participants in
both groups underwent fMRI scanning prior to the psychological intervention that was
administered to participants in the treatment group. Treatment group participants who
received the CBT intervention were re-administered fMRI scanning following treatment
in order to assess for neurological changes following therapy, while the control group
members did not participate in any further fMRI procedure and received no psychological
intervention.
The course of psychotherapy for treatment group members consisted of weekly
three-hour group cognitive behavioral therapy sessions, with 6 members in each therapy
group, for four weeks. The therapy sessions consisted of gradual exposure therapy (from
viewing pictures, to viewing films, to viewing real spiders, to touching spiders) with
accompanying exposure-based homework that was completed by participants between
sessions. In this experiment, participants were determined to be responsive to therapy
after demonstrating the ability to touch the pictures of spiders, the video screen
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displaying films of spiders, and then the actual living spiders. Participants also rated their
subjective fear responses after viewing the film sequences.
While undergoing the fMRI scan following the course of therapy, participants
were shown video images of spiders alternating with images of butterflies for a statistical
comparison of patients’ brain activity during each of these conditions. The fMRI results
that had been captured during both exposure to the butterfly images and exposure to the
spider images were compared within treatment-group members and between treatmentand control-group members in order to measure possible neurobiological changes in
treatment-group participants accompanying symptom reductions following cognitive
behavioral therapy. fMRI images of participants’ brains were acquired and then analyzed
using “Statistical Parametric Mapping software” (Paquette et al., 2003, p. 403). Each
voxel or pixel of the brain images from participants in the treatment-group (before and
after psychotherapy) and control group-members was compared in its activity using a
computer program that measured the amount of blood oxygenation response in various
regions of the brain. A t-test was then used to compare the average level of activity at
each voxel within and between groups.
Paquette et al. (2003) reported that the comparison between brain images of
control subjects and pre-treatment phobic subjects demonstrated that “the dorsolateral
prefrontal and the parahippocampal gyrus were significantly activated in phobic subjects,
before CBT, but not in the control group” (p. 406). A comparison of brain images of
treatment subjects demonstrated, prior to the CBT treatment, “significant loci of
activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus and the parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally”
(p. 406), and increases in blood oxygen “were also noted in the left inferior occipital
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gyrus, left fusiform gyrus, and right middle occipital gyrus” (p. 406). After undergoing
CBT, neuroimaging results of treatment-group members reportedly showed activation
that had not been observed prior to the intervention, “bilaterally, in the middle occipital
gyrus and the superior parietal lobule. Significant peaks of activation were also seen in
the left inferior occipital gyrus, left fusiform gyrus, and right inferior frontal gyrus”
(p. 406). Paquette et al. noted among their conclusions, “the brain activation pattern
found in phobic subjects, after effective CBT, displayed some similarity with that noted
in normal control subjects; that is, in controls, no frontal or hippocampal activity was
detected during the viewing of the spider film excerpts” (p. 407). They also claimed that,
in support of the efficacy of CBT that had been suggested by earlier findings, “the
absence of activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus . . .
provides strong support to the view that CBT reduces phobic avoidance by
deconditioning contextual fear learned at the level of the hippocampal/parahippocampal
region” and also “by decreasing cognitive misattributions and catastrophic thinking at the
level of the prefrontal cortex” (p. 407). That statement explained psychotherapeutic
efficacy through a neurobiological mechanism of change.
The methods and conclusions of this study warrant further discussion. In Chapter
I, I discussed the concerns of scholars (e.g., Uttal, 2007) who have questioned whether it
is logical to reify or attempt to materialize psychological concepts by associating those
concepts with related brain regions and neural activity. Faux (2002) outlined several
conceptual and methodological critiques of experiments that use neuroimaging to study
cognitive psychology constructs. The specific methodological issues that Faux raised
about validity and reliability of mind-brain research is applicable to Paquette et al.’s
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(2003) use of neuroimaging to study neural correlates of cognitive behavioral therapy that
was shown to have been effective for decreasing symptoms of specific phobia.
Paquette et al. (2003) used what Faux (2002) identified as a common
experimental design in cognitive neuroscience, which consists of subtracting the brain
activity recorded during one cognitive task from the brain activity recorded during
another cognitive task in order to identify whether changes in brain activity occurred and
if so, the brain regions that were involved. In the Paquette et al. study, this process
entailed measuring neural activity during a treatment task (e.g., viewing spiders), and
measuring neural activity during a baseline task (e.g., viewing butterflies), and then
computing an average brain scan for each participant under each condition. Researchers
subtract average baseline scans from average treatment scans to determine whether the
averages across all individuals in all scans suggest the presence of any “brain regions
with averages that are statistically different from zero” (Faux, 2002, p. 166). In cognitive
neuroscience studies that use the subtraction method, the brain regions with statistical
significance are thought to explain the cognitive process being investigated.
According to Faux, there are several problems that may arise with conclusions
drawn from this method. In these studies, baseline and treatment tasks are said to differ
based on a cognitive process, yet Faux argued that it is unlikely that a single task or
concept could be devised that elicits a single brain operation, as many brain processes are
required even for simple cognitive tasks. Legrenzi and Umilta (2011), who also critiqued
the subtraction method, noted that if the baseline task is for any reason wrongly selected,
the conclusions about the experiment are meaningless.
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Faux (2002) also argued that, whereas brain activity can be directly observed,
cognitive concepts (e.g., attention) are broad and imprecise, and therefore at times there
is not general agreement on their exact meanings. In the Paquette et al. (2003) study, this
issue may arise with the researchers’ use of concepts such as “volitionally” (p. 404) and
“vigilance” (p. 407) to describe participants’ mental states. “If relevant variables are not
under proper experimental control, then the results are likely to be uninformative or
misleading” (Faux, 2002, p. 167). With varying interpretations of important constructs,
an experiment’s validity (that is, the accuracy with which an experiment identifies and
measures a concept under investigation) may be questionable. Poorly quantified concepts
also limit the reliability of an experiment (that is, the ability to replicate its findings).
Paquette et al. (2003) used a t-test to compare averages of brain region activation
within treatment-group participants before and after CBT, and between phobic subjects
and subjects in the normal control group. t-tests were conducted on each voxel. Faux
(2002) cautioned against the use of univariate statistics to compare the activity of
thousands of voxels. Faux wrote, “not only does Type I error inflate due to multiple
correlated tests, but statistical significance, accurate or not, may have little relation to
neurological significance” (p. 171). In other words, there is an increased chance of
incorrectly concluding that there is a statistically significant difference between two
samples of voxels or pixels representing brain activity. In the Paquette et al. study, Type I
error may have arisen from analyzing the multitude of brain images produced from only
12 participants in the treatment group and 13 participants in the control group. Further, all
participants in both groups were female, which also suggests limited generalizability of
this study for wider populations. In sum, the concerns that Faux raised about the use of
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neuroimaging to study cognitive concepts are relevant in light of the neuroimaging
methodology and conclusions of Paquette et al.’s study of neuroimaging and
psychotherapy.
Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) and exposure
therapy. Peres et al. (2007) recruited 37 participants who had been diagnosed with
subthreshold posttraumatic stress disorder, of which 16 were administered a manualguided exposure-based therapy for 15 weeks while the remaining 11 participants
remained on a waiting list to receive psychotherapy and were therefore used as a
comparison group. Participants in both groups each underwent two SPECT scans. The
neuroimaging procedure for both groups consisted of having each participant listen to a
script read aloud describing their traumatic experience, then voluntarily recalling the
memory in order to re-experience the episode. A radioactive tracer was injected into
participants 30 seconds into the reading of the trauma narrative. 50 minutes were
provided for rest before participants were taken to receive their SPECT scan.
The psychotherapy treatment group members underwent one scan following
retrieval of the traumatic memory prior to beginning psychotherapy, and then received
the second scan (also following retrieval of the traumatic memory) after completing 8
weekly sessions of the psychotherapy treatment. Members of the control group received
initial SPECT scans prior to treatment group members beginning therapy, and again after
60 days, with the same symptom provocation method (although the control group had not
been receiving treatment). Participants in both groups were administered the same two
structured diagnostic interview assessments before the first scan and after the second
scan. Three self-report symptom measures (one each pertaining to depression, anxiety,
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and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms) were administered after each scan. Further,
an inventory measuring the intensity of traumatic memories was administered prior to
treatment and after treatment as a pre- and post-treatment measure (control group
members were administered this instrument twice in 60 days).
Peres et al. (2007) found decreases on nearly all psychological symptom measures
for treatment group participants, and no change on nearly all measures for control group
participants. The authors correlated these psychological findings with changes in brain
activity that SPECT scan results indicated. They selected seven brain regions for their
statistical analysis, as prior research suggested that those regions are active during
traumatic memory retrieval. Among the findings, participants showed decreased activity
in the left amygdala, and increased activation of the left anterior cingulate, left prefrontal
cortex, left and right thamalus, left parietal lobe, left hippocampus and left Broca’s area.
Peres et al. (2007) discussed a variety of observed correlations between the
reduction of posttraumatic symptoms and changes in regional brain activity. For example,
they noted that “integrating sensorial traces of memories into structured therapeutic
narratives is one of the main challenges for psychotherapies applied to trauma victims”
(p. 1488). They then concluded,
The circuitry involved in the post-psychotherapy SPECT scans probably indicates
better codification and processing of the sensory information, which was not
processed in the baseline scans. The relative decrease in activation of the
amygdala during the psychotherapy follow-up scan may also be related to a less
intense subjective experience of unpleasant emotions, accompanied by activity in
the neural network associated with conscious interpretation, synthesis, and
integration of those sensory and emotional stimuli. (p. 1488)
As with Paquette et al.’s (2003) neuroimaging study of cognitive-behavioral
therapy for specific phobia that I discussed above, Peres et al.’s (2007) study warrants
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further discussion. This study did not use the subtraction method as in the Paquette et al.
study in order to identify differences in brain activity before and after a psychotherapy
treatment. Instead, Peres et al. recorded participants’ brain activity before and during the
course of treatment, each time following a task that induced traumatic memories (and the
psychological experiences of re-experiencing those memories consistent with
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms). This means that Peres et al. might have guarded
against problems that arise in the subtraction method if a baseline task is poorly selected
for treatment comparison (see Legrenzi & Umilta, 2011). In other words, this study may
have greater validity because there is less chance that factors other than psychotherapy
accounted for the neural differences between treatment and control group members.
Further, the treatment and control group members were more diverse in this study (at
least with regards to gender) than those in the Paquette et al. study, and therefore the
results of this study could offer greater reliability than that study.
It is noteworthy that after Peres et al. (2007) read trauma narratives to participants
prior to administering the brain scans, participants were asked to voluntarily reexperience their traumatic events, and it was unclear how the researchers could verify or
quantify that participants were complying with those instructions. Because brain activity
is measured by averaging neural changes across participants, individual differences in
brain activity could still be vast.
As with the study by Paquette et al. (2003), Peres et al.’s (2007) use of univariate
statistics to test for statistical significance between psychological symptoms and brain
activity suggests a heightened risk of incorrectly concluding that a statistically significant
relationship exists between those variables (i.e., Type I error). Peres et al. used several
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psychological assessment instruments to determine psychotherapy treatment efficacy, to
measure psychological symptoms pre- and post-treatment, and to compare changes in
control group members and treatment group members over two months. Although
psychological assessment and treatment are well paired, the conceptual problems with
mapping psychological concepts onto brain regions that scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker,
2003; Faux, 2002) have raised also deserve attention here. In sum, although there are still
conceptual and methodological concerns associated with using neuroimaging to study
psychotherapy concepts, Peres et al. took steps to increase the validity and reliability of
their experiment that seemed to be missing in Paquette et al.’s neuroimaging study
discussed above.
Brain-Based Psychotherapy Theories
Whereas neuroimaging technologies have been applied to psychotherapy outcome
studies in order to assess changes in the brains of therapy patients that occur with the
reduction of psychological symptoms following certain psychotherapy treatments, some
authors have proposed new psychotherapy paradigms based on the integration of
neuroscience research and psychotherapy theories. Examples of these include coherence
therapy (Toomey & Ecker, 2007) and interpersonal neurobiology (Siegel, 1999). A brainbased interpretation of psychoanalysis called neuropsychoanalysis (Schore, 2012)
integrates neuroscientific research with psychoanalytic concepts and theories.
Coherence therapy. Toomey and Ecker’s (2007) coherence therapy is a
psychotherapy modality derived from a neurobiology-informed relationship between
memory and psychological distress. The goal of the therapy is to reduce the strength
(depotentiation) of certain neurons thought to be responsible for the implicit (emotional)
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memories associated with distressing psychological symptoms (Ecker & Toomey, 2008;
Toomey & Ecker, 2007, 2009). Toomey and Ecker (2007) described their goal of
devising a psychotherapy modality that would unite reductionist sciences with the
experiential process of psychotherapy, and would also surpass the shared rate of
effectiveness among various psychotherapy modalities. They proposed that coherence
therapy interventions achieve those goals by maximizing the plasticity of patients’ brains,
indicated by targeting brain regions in which symptoms originate, doing so as quickly as
possible, and targeting the most powerful types neural connections (Ecker & Toomey,
2008).
Toomey and Ecker (2007) based the coherence therapy model on the premise that
neurobiological explanations for effective psychotherapy practices are best understood
through constructivist theory. As a constructivist psychotherapy, they favored a
philosophy of human psychology in which each individual is assumed to create and exist
in his or her world in a way that is consistent with certain personal constructs or
individual interpretations rather than a single true or objective reality. They further noted
that each individual is believed to actively assemble knowledge rather than passively
receiving it, and then adapting to the world through personal experiences rather than
through any single true human nature. Within this theory, personal constructs or
knowings enable individuals to experience and adapt to the world, are created through a
variety of perceptual and physical processes, are synonymous with memory (some are
implicit or unconscious and others are explicit or conscious), and are able to be revised.
According to Toomey and Ecker (2007), “psychological constructivism’s central
insistence on the active role of the individual in shaping experiential reality receives
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extensive corroboration from findings on how the brain functions” (p. 205). They cited
Quartz & Sejnowsky (1997) as having identified this phenomenon as neural
constructivism, and portrayed a fit between this phenomenon and the tenets of
constructivist theory as applied to psychotherapies positing a highly subjectivist view of
reality.
According to Toomey and Ecker (2007, 2009), most psychotherapy patients’
symptoms are caused by implicit memories, which are emotional reactions that are
triggered in situations that are in some way reminiscent of earlier formative experiences.
As certain psychotherapy interventions encourage a patient to change his or her
constructs or personal beliefs, these interventions enable a reduction in psychological
symptoms through a corresponding reduction in emotional reactivity. In coherence
therapy, psychotherapy techniques that reduce psychological symptoms consist of
identifying the early experiences that first produced certain constructs or views of reality
that continue to maintain unwanted emotional reactivity. The authors stated that the
purpose of all psychotherapies informed by neuroscience research appears to be the
integration between areas of the brain that are involved in this longstanding out-ofawareness reactivity, and areas of the brain that allow a person’s current attention to
identify and focus on the underlying beliefs that maintain those longstanding reactions
(Ecker & Toomey, 2008).
Interpersonal neurobiology. Some authors who have advocated for the creation
of a theoretically integrative psychotherapy in which interventions target neurobiological
change have also cited brain-based explanations for the healing effects of the therapeutic
relationship, that is, the purported ability of the human brain to respond positively to the
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empathic qualities of some interpersonal relationships. For example, authors Linford and
Arden (2009) argued that, “beyond the surface differences of various therapeutic
methods, at heart we help clients change by enhancing the neuroplasticity of their brains”
(p. 22). Those authors further noted,
Our brains are exquisitely adapted to change in response to the attuned and
compassionate interest of another human being. Attunement helps our clients face
what has been hidden and experience what has been denied, and as that happens
both their brains and ours are changed. We also help by educating clients about
how their behavior affects their brains and how that in turn changes how they feel.
(p. 22)
One paradigm that explores the interplay between the quality of human
relationships and the effects on individuals’ brains (with a particular but not exclusive
interest in parent-child relationships) is titled interpersonal neurobiology. Psychiatrist and
author Daniel Siegel (1999) presented the phrase interpersonal neurobiology in his book
The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are.
In that book Siegel provided a theoretically integrative model of human social
development for the stated purpose of building “a foundation for a neurobiology of
interpersonal experience” (Siegel, 1999, p. 1). According to Siegel (2001), “the brain is
structured with an innate capacity to transcend the boundaries of the skin of its own body
in integrating itself with the world, especially the world of other brains” (p. 87). Authors
have described interpersonal neurobiology as a general paradigm of human
psychological, neurobiological, and social development, the tenets of which represent
convergent views and findings from various disciplines across sciences and humanities
(Badenoch, 2008; Codrington, 2010; Siegel, 2001). Siegel was the founding series editor
in Norton Books’ Series on Interpersonal Neurobiology, which displays over 30 books
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for sale on its Internet webpage, and one large physical model of the human brain with
moveable parts, which the website has marketed to mental health clinicians as “an ideal
tool for helping your clients to visualize the complexities of the brain and mental health
disorders—and a useful refresher for practitioners who find brain anatomy
overwhelming” (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013, para. 2). The topics of the books
in Norton’s interpersonal neurobiology series are varied and include general
psychotherapy texts for practitioners (Badenoch, 2008; Cozolino, 2010), and
psychotherapy texts specifically purposed for the treatment of trauma (Wilkinson, 2010),
infant mental health and child-parent interventions (Lillas & Turnbull, 2009), and
neuroscience-informed approaches to social work (Applegate & Shapiro, 2005).
In general, the interpersonal neurobiology paradigm is based on neuroscience
research suggesting that the structures of individuals’ brains are “constantly being formed
and re-formed through interactions with other brains” (Hollingsworth, 2008, p. 841).
Specifically, interpersonal neurobiology draws heavily from developmental neuroscience
as described by authors such as Allan Schore (1994), who has proposed that an
individual’s capacity for emotional regulation and a stable sense of self has its origins in
early attachment relationships, which are internalized and stored in the right hemisphere
of an infant’s brain. These attachment experiences therefore impact brain development,
influence the quality of later personal relationships, and confer either protection against,
or increase individual risk for developing symptoms of psychopathology (Schore, 2001,
2002, 2005). According to Schore (2005), early attachment experiences occur during
preverbal stages of development and form the basis of implicit memories that arise as
nonverbal or emotional reactions to later social experiences. According to interpersonal
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neurobiology as a psychotherapy paradigm, the relationship in psychotherapy between
therapist and client is potentially analogous, in terms of its neurobiological effects, to
healthy attachments during childhood. Therefore, influenced by the ideas of Schore
(2005), interpersonal neurobiology interventions attempt to effect psychological change
in patients in part through influencing right-brain (and other neurobiological) activity of
therapy patients through an empathic and supportive therapy relationship (Siegel, 1999).
Neuropsychoanalysis. Schore (2012) founded neuropsychoanalysis or the
disciplinary integration dedicated to combining psychoanalytic concepts and theories
with an understanding of their neural correlates. Neborsky (2006) advocated for a shortterm psychodynamic therapy approach that he based on Schore’s (1996) interpretation of
right-brain processes as the seat of unconscious relational processes. In attributing
psychopathology to inadequate attachment experiences that prevent right-brain
development of typical emotional regulation, Neborsky (2006) wrote, “some of us now
think of infants from birth to about 16 months as right brain creatures” (p. 524). He
argued that an adult psychotherapy patient’s defensiveness could represent unresolved
separation anxiety caused by the inability of an early caregiver to help the patient
internalize a sense of emotional regulation. He also posited that traditional long-term
psychodynamic psychotherapy, with a dialogue centered on therapists’ interpretations or
explanations of patients’ behaviors, has often neglected the patients’ emotional or
nonverbal experiences and therefore failed to correct patients’ attachment-oriented, righthemisphere neurobiological processes. Neborsky (2006) explained that during
psychotherapy, after a patient’s superego (that is, anxiety-producing fears of abandoning
his or her defensiveness) is sufficiently lowered, “the therapist can become a new

73

attachment figure and rapidly improve attachment status” (p. 527). Neuropsychoanalysis
contends that therapy is a process of communication between the right hemisphere of a
therapist’s brain and the right hemisphere of a patient’s brain. These statements illustrate
a relocating of psychological concepts to the individual brain.
In sum, within psychotherapy literature, rationales for neurosciencepsychotherapy integration include identifying the efficacy of psychotherapy approaches,
integrating psychotherapy theories based on those findings, and in general providing a
putatively more coherent and scientific explanation of the purpose and process of
psychotherapy. A review of psychotherapy literature involving the integration of
neuroscience and psychotherapy suggests that neuroscience research methods have been
used to study the neurobiological effects on patients undergoing primarily short-term,
evidence-based psychological treatments for specific psychological disorders, and
neuroscience has also been used to combine aspects from various psychotherapy theories
into integrative paradigms such as interpersonal neurobiology.
I provided this review of literature to highlight ways in which psychotherapy
research has included neuroimaging, as well as ways in which psychotherapy theories
have incorporated cognitive neuroscience into psychological and psychotherapy theories.
Cozolino’s (2010) neuroscience-informed psychotherapy text, which I examine and
critique in Chapters IV and V, emerged amidst these applications of neuroscience to
psychotherapy. This chapter was therefore intended to provide a more immediate
historical and professional context for the emergence of his book than the longstanding
Western philosophical and social issues I presented in Chapter I.
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Summary
In this chapter I provided a sample of psychotherapy literature integrating
neuroscience and psychotherapy. In the next chapter I outline the methodology of my
research project. I discuss the textual analysis I used to interpret the content, rhetoric, and
themes in Cozolino’s (2010) book.
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Chapter III: Methods
In this chapter I discuss the research approach and theoretical framework of this
hermeneutic study of Cozolino’s (2010) brain-based psychotherapy text The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain.
Research Approach
In Chapter I, I reviewed several recent cultural histories of brain research during
the late-19th and early-20th century in Western Europe and the United States that showed
how discourses about the brain and brain research reflected political, social, and
economic trends and changes of their time and place. Those critical historical accounts
illustrated how the origins of those historical and cultural phenomena became assigned to
the structures of the individual material brain. Those histories included accounts of how
early brain scanning technologies such as the EEG sparked widespread excitement about
translating mental experiences that had been considered private, and contained within
each individual, into observable depictions of individual psyches or personalities. In other
words, the use of technology to transcend the material-nonmaterial or inner-outer divide
suggested an interest in resolving mind-body dualism or revealing in public and material
form the interiorized private individual self. I recognized that a textual analysis was
particularly relevant for interpreting the understandings of self that might be perpetuated
by a brain-based therapy discourse, in part because scholars have examined the way
language is used in cognitive neuroscience literature to portray psychological concepts as
easily studied by neuroscience when in fact there are philosophical and scientific
controversies with that position. Scholars have also commented on the societal effects of
a vision of the self as reducible to the brain. Philosophical hermeneutics is relevant for
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interpreting the ways in which a brain-based psychotherapy text and its subsequent
therapy discourses emerge from this sociocultural situation and use language in a way
that then replicates contemporary social practices and understandings of self.
Theoretical Framework
Philosophical hermeneutics and the self in psychotherapy. In this section I
discuss the tenets of philosophical hermeneutics as a sociocultural paradigm that emerged
during the Interpretive Turn in the humanities during the mid-20th century, and the use of
hermeneutics to understand psychotherapy practices as reflections of the historical and
cultural situations in which they emerged. By understanding psychological concepts as
contextual phenomena—that is, the understanding that experience is situated between
people rather than within each individual, and emerges uniquely from a convergence of
cultural and historical trends—theories such as hermeneutics provide alternatives to
empirical, scientific research methods in psychology and psychotherapy. Hermeneutics
challenges the understanding that individuals exist a priori over the context into which
they are born. This rejects the assumption of an inner-outer or a mental-material
dichotomy born of modern era philosophy and scientism. It also stands contrary to the
claim that scientific discoveries necessarily represent inevitable, ahistorical truths about
the world, thereby rejecting the primacy of empirical research methods in psychology and
psychotherapy. Especially applied to critical analyses of psychotherapy theories,
hermeneutics has been influential for the understanding that these theories embody and
therefore replicate certain understandings of the good and therefore make claims about
morality or a vision of the best way of life that emerges uniquely within a historical era.
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The term hermeneutic has longstanding meaning in Western civilization involving
the concept of interpretation, notably the interpretation of texts. Kirschner and Martin
(2010) placed philosophical hermeneutics as one among several primary sociocultural
theories that have been influential to late-20th century psychotherapy theories that have
challenged empirical or statistical research as the preeminent research paradigm for
understanding human psychology. They noted that philosophical hermeneutics shares
with other prominent sociocultural perspectives (such as discursive, constructionist, and
dialogical theory) an interest in how “self and mind can be studied in terms of how an
individual’s sense of identity, and related phenomena such as memory and emotion, are
patterned in terms of cultural narratives, symbols, and practices” (p. 9). In these
approaches, self is constituted by multiple discourses and relationships, human agency is
valued over determinism, and the Cartesian split between mental and physical experience
is refuted without appealing to any one emphasis on physiology, emotions, or personality
traits to explain human psychology. Rather, “the primary object of psychological study is
the person acting within the biophysical and sociocultural world” (Kirschner & Martin,
2010, p. 11).
Although hermeneutics challenges the core assumptions of modern era
philosophy and most mainstream psychological theories and research, Kirschner and
Martin (2010) noted that some elements of this contextual and relational thinking were
present in the early founding of the discipline of psychology, and were present in some
form throughout Enlightenment, Romantic, and even modern era thought. According to
Frie (2011), despite the late-20th century turn toward critical social theories of selfhood
in psychotherapy that challenge the inherent valuing of embodied individualism typical in
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20th century psychotherapy discourse, those individualist Western values remain
embedded in much of psychotherapy practice. In other words, hermeneutic and other
interpretive theories respect the fluidity between historical eras and how traditions
emerge uniquely in a certain time and place yet are also continuous between successive
eras.
According to Woolfolk, Sass, and Messer (1988), hermeneutics has provided an
alternative to empirical research (that is, sensory or observation-based research) that has
typically been most valued in professional psychology (see also F. C. Richardson, 2009).
Spence (1988) argued that, rather than opposing the interests of physical or empirical
scientific methodology, hermeneutics as an interpretive research approach is interested in
meaning, and is critical of the assumption among empirical sciences that individual
behaviors can be understood apart from the context within which those behaviors occur.
Some scholars have argued that although hermeneutic research has served as a primary
alternative to the empirical research that is most prominent in psychology, interpretive
and critical research can also inform and improve empirical research, and interpretive and
critical theorists and researchers often share with empirical scientists a mission to find
meaning (Meichenbaum, 1988; Spence, 1988). For example, these authors argue that
hermeneutics improves upon empirical research by encouraging researchers to consider
that interpretations have an impact on scientific inquiry, and therefore it is misguided to
believe that scientific efforts represent objective or neutral inquiry that is removed from
persons conducting the research. Further, hermeneutics challenges empiricist researchers
to consider how context impacts behavior (thereby challenging the assumed of validity of
behavioral research conducted in laboratory settings separate from daily life).
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Hermeneutics encourages empirical investigators to recognize not only that people and
their contexts are dynamic and change over time, but also that psychological or
behavioral constructs being measured change over time (Meichenbaum, 1988).
Philosophical hermeneutics as an interpretive research paradigm in contemporary
psychotherapy (Bernstein, 1988; Cushman, 1995; Meichenbaum, 1988) is most
associated with the writings of the 20th century German philosopher Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1966/2004, 1975, 1986/1994a, 1986/1994b). Gadamer (1966/2004), borrowing
the term hermeneutical from Martin Heidegger, attributed the reemergence of
hermeneutic interpretation in the 20th century to philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Critical
psychotherapy researchers have noted this as well, and have also noted that philosophical
hermeneutics emerged in part as an effort to challenge the interpretive efforts of Dilthey
and to focus on how a shared reality emerges through language, as opposed to the
modern-era notion of an inner private self that most 20th century psychotherapy practices
seem to have encouraged (see Sass, 1988).
Sass (1988) summarized H.-G. Gadamer’s position that self is inseparable from
the historical and cultural context in which the self exists. Therefore, attempts at selfreflection or understanding subjective experiences necessitate a consideration of those
contextual factors. Sass further discussed the hermeneuticists’ argument that scientific
theories also reflect the historical and cultural contexts in which those theories have
emerged and are disseminated. Psychotherapy theories have been described by many
interpretive theorists as privileging or valuing certain ways of living and experiencing the
world even though the theories at times ignore the underlying values or virtues that they
promote (Meichenbaum, 1988; Sass, 1988; Woolfolk et al., 1988). Historically situating
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scientific efforts—in this case, psychotherapy theories, research, and practices—allows
researchers in the humanities to engage in dialogues about the cultural values and virtues
that inspired those theories, research, and practices, and which therefore unknowingly
promote certain aspects of the wider cultural context.
H.-G. Gadamer (1966/2004) observed the mid-20th century turn in philosophy
toward an emphasis on language or semantics as a way of interpreting how individuals
come to embody or live certain social practices rather than merely contemplate or reflect
upon these practices. For psychotherapy practices, this interpretive emphasis on language
and discourse creates certain implications for the effects that psychotherapy practices
might have on therapy patients, as psychotherapy patients come to embody or replicate
whatever wider cultural values or beliefs that might be encouraged through therapeutic
discourse (Cushman, 1995, 2002; Orange, 2009; F. C. Richardson, 2002; F. C.
Richardson & Christopher, 1993; Stigliano, 1989). “By saying that the world is linguistic,
hermeneutics is saying that we can understand action by its reference to a larger common
discourse, a community’s conversation which pervades and gives context for that action”
(Stigliano, 1989, p. 48).
Hermeneuticists have suggested that meaning results from active experiencing
rather than passive contemplation (Woolfolk et al., 1988). Philosophical hermeneutics
considers that language or discourse, rather than simply describing social practices,
actually constitutes the self (Wachterhauser, 1994). In critical psychotherapy research this
enables researchers to interpret psychotherapy theories as appealing or acceptable for
patients and clinicians because of the ways that therapy theories implicitly contain
beliefs, customs, and traditions shared by members of a society within a certain time and
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place. This provides psychotherapy researchers with the means by which to reflect
critically about the broader configuration of self that is reinforced through the resulting
therapy practices (Cushman, 1995; F. C. Richardson & Bishop, 2004).
In the tradition of Heidegger’s ontological premise, hermeneuticists argue that
individuals experience the world by actively interpreting the world through the lens of
culture and social order; language, or speech, allows for understanding that social order.
Individuals are therefore assumed to not simply understand the world through language;
instead, individuals are thought of as actively living the discourses of their historical era.
The goal of hermeneutics is “to reconstruct these ontologies or distinctions embodied in
our practices” (Stigliano, 1989, p. 49). Further, hermeneutics “does not attempt to find
out necessarily the truth of these interpretations, but only how these interpretations shape
and determine the way we live in the world” (p. 49). The hermeneutic circle—the
metaphor for this interpretive research—describes a cultural practice or artifact such as a
text as simultaneously constructed by, and actively constructing the larger historical
framework from which it emerged, in an ongoing and mutually dependent relationship
(Cushman, 1995).
Cushman (1995) applied philosophical hermeneutics in his cultural history of
psychotherapy in the United States. In the modern era, the idea of human being as a selfcontained individual was a cornerstone of philosophical and scientific inquiry. The
conceptualization of psychological symptoms and psychological treatment that began
during the early-20th century occurred amidst a sudden urbanization and
industrialization, yet within the backdrop of racism and violence that had been part of
American culture since the nation’s inception. Within this context psychoanalysis gained
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popularity within that cultural and historical frame as a “local” cure for a “local” self
(Cushman, 1995, p. 25). A cultural history of psychotherapy suggests that understanding
why Americans were ready to embrace psychoanalysis as a cure for psychological
symptoms requires an understanding of the convergence of sweeping economic and
social changes amidst shared historical traditions. Cushman discussed how psychotherapy
expanded in power and influence as an American institution, aligning itself with the
scientific methodology of psychological research. Psychotherapy theories throughout the
20th century can be understood as reflections of wider cultural trends and social
practices. Periodic changes in psychological theory are believed to mirror broader shifts
in how people live and communicate with each other. Following this tradition, I based my
critical historical interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy
on philosophical hermeneutics.
Late-20th century changes in selfhood reflected in psychotherapy theories.
During the 20th century an epochal historical shift occurred in Western science and
philosophy after three centuries of modernity. In understanding the transition between
modernity and what has been broadly termed postmodernism, Huston Smith (2003)
wrote,
The modern outlook can be summarized by identifying its three controlling
presuppositions. First, that reality may be personal is less certain and less
important than that it is ordered. Second, man’s reason is capable of discerning
this order as it manifests itself in the laws of nature. Third, the path to human
fulfillment consists primarily in discovering these laws, harnessing them where
this is possible, and complying with them where it is not. The reason for
suspecting that this modern outlook has had its day and is yielding to a third great
wave in Western thought is that reflective men are no longer confident of any of
these three postulates. . . . Frontier thinkers are no longer sure that reality is
ordered and orderly. If it is, they are not sure that man’s mind is capable of
grasping its order. Combining these two doubts, we can define the Postmodern
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Mind as one which, having lost the conviction that reality is personal, has come to
question whether it is ordered in a way that man’s reason can lay bare. (pp. 6-7)
Smith (2003) identified significant changes in science, philosophy, theology, and
art during the 20th century. He noted that 20th century advances in physics have led some
theorists to question whether humans are capable of visualizing or imagining the possible
behavior of matter and energy. Philosophy has seen a collapse of objective metaphysics
and the emergence of a general uncertainty about whether humans are capable of
explaining how reality emerges and becomes ordered. In theology, most Judeo-Christian
religions seem to have moved past the integration between belief in God and rationality
that dominated the modern era; most Western religions today question in some way
whether reason is suited to understand the existence of God, and instead embrace a faith
in God rather than delineated reasons for believing in God. Further, religious beliefs now
often stem from personal histories or subjective experiences rather than arguments or
practices espoused by religious institutions. With art and literature, Smith recalled the
prominence during the 20th century of authors questioning concepts of objectivity and
morality, and often lacking a shared artistic framework entirely. Protagonists such as
those in the seminal existential novels find themselves in a world devoid of meaning and
struggling to find purpose—even punished for attempting to do so. In visual arts the
questioning of objectivity and meaning shows up, for example, in bold depictions of
trivial and common aspects of human life such as commonplace objects, thereby
illustrating how the seemingly trivial is as worthy a way of understanding human beings
as depictions of religious experiences or historical events.
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According to Smith (2003), recent changes within science, philosophy, theology,
and art share an “acceptance of reality as unordered in any objective way that man’s mind
can discern.” (p. 15). Further, “this acceptance separates the Postmodern Mind from both
the Modern Mind, which assumed that reality is objectively ordered, and the Christian
Mind, which assumed it to be regulated by an inscrutable but beneficent will” (p. 15).
Neimeyer (1993) noted that the influence on psychotherapies of constructivism (the
rejection of objective reality or truth in favor of an interpretive framework that views
individuals as active creators of meaning and experience) has fit broadly within a
postmodern understanding of social and cultural influences on human behavior. Hoyt and
Combs (1996) described the impact of the Interpretive Turn in the humanities on
late-20th century psychotherapy approaches such as Michael White’s narrative therapy
and solution-focused therapy.
Theorists have noted that some psychotherapy theories during the 20th century
increasingly turned away from the idea that individuals are comprised of a unitary
individual with a deep interiority, and began to embrace sociocultural theories that posit a
shift in the configuration of self toward a shallow, relational, decentered person described
by the quality of multiplicity or being a multiple self (Cushman, 2002; Cushman &
Gilford, 1999; Frie, 2009a, 2009b; Frie & Coburn, 2011; Salgado & Hermans, 2005). The
broad cultural shift from a strongly entrenched modern or Cartesian self to a fragmented,
multiple self has been significant for late-20th century shifts in psychotherapy theories.
As Cushman & Gilford (1999) noted, "multiplicity, in other words, has begun to appear
as the embodiment of the good" (p. 18). According to Salgado and Hermans (2005), two
broad antecedents can be ascribed to the paradigm shift toward a multiple or non-unitary
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self amongst psychotherapy models: The social-cognitive perspective (which views self
through the computer metaphor of an information-processing device) and the social
constructionist framework (which views self as a construct that is constituted through
language).
Frie and Coburn (2011) noted that gestalt psychotherapy theorists were the first
major school of therapy to embrace a relational rather than an individualistic conception
of selfhood. Late-20th century psychoanalytic theorists have followed in the
understanding of self as relational (Bromberg, 1993). Psychoanalytic theorists have noted
a return to the seminal work of psychiatrist and author Harry Stack Sullivan who has
become highly influential for psychotherapists, particularly interpersonal or relational
psychotherapists. In his cultural history of psychotherapy in the United States, Cushman
(1995), whose hermeneutic or critical historical framework for interpreting
psychotherapy theories is the basis of this textual analysis and historical interpretation of
brain-based psychotherapies, described the eschewing and ignoring by psychiatrists and
psychologists of Sullivan’s highly critical and progressive understanding of self that
would have radically altered the history of psychotherapy had it been embraced during its
time.
The adopting of late-20th century sociocultural perspectives has led some of the
primary psychotherapy theories to view therapy as a fundamentally relational endeavor
shared between therapist and patient, rather than an effort at individual improvement
through predictable, empirically-based, or pre-determined and replicable therapy
interventions. A hermeneutic perspective understands this relational shift as mirroring the
historical time and place in which therapists now practice. Relational practices emerge
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from a broader cultural embrace of late-20th century shifts toward a self characterized by
multiple, flexible, and changing identities. Cushman and Gilford (1999) cautioned against
a misuse of those interpretive theories by some psychotherapy approaches that seem to
inadvertently reinforce or encourage for patients some of the problematic aspects of the
shallow, decentered self. For example, the privileging of a self that is capable of quick
lifestyle and personality changes may contribute to fleeting relationships and
psychological instability.
Within psychotherapy, authors such as Orange (2003), Hoffman (2009), and
Vivona (2009) have come out against efforts to integrate neuroscience and psychotherapy
that use neuroscience to explain and validate psychotherapy theories. For example,
Hoffman (2009) situated the appeal of neuroscience within the broader movement in
psychoanalysis to validate itself as a legitimate science through empirical or positivist
research methods. Orange (2003) criticized the reductionism of mind to brain that is
involved in neuroscientific interpretations of psychoanalytic theory and practice. She also
rejected the frequent claim in psychotherapy literature that integrating neuroscience with
psychoanalysis constitutes a return to Freud’s early speculation that mind or ego would
ultimately be discovered as neural processes. Orange proposed a perspectival realism
paradigm as an alternative to the reduction of psychoanalytic theory to cognitive
neuroscience models. She also argued that perspectival realism is an alternative to
problematic incarnations of postmodern or constructivist theories that implicitly dismiss
the importance of agency and subjective experience for therapy patients. In
psychotherapy literature there has been a relative absence of critical interpretations of the
integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy.
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Application of hermeneutics to textual analyses. Above I discussed how
philosophical hermeneutics emerged during the 20th century as an alternative to
positivism or quantitative research methods in the social sciences. Hermeneutics is
applied to interpret the cultural and historical traditions, meanings, beliefs, and values
that are implicit in psychological and psychotherapy theories and practices. As an
interpretive paradigm critical of modern era scientism, hermeneutics challenges the
privilege of rigidly structured, procedural research approaches. Scholars have debated
how hermeneutics can be applied to research in psychology without replicating the
scientific objectification that hermeneutic theorists historically situate and interpret
(Woolfolk et al., 1988).
Stigliano (1989) addressed this issue in his discussion of how hermeneutics can be
applied to the cultural and historical interpretation of a certain narrative or discourse such
as a text. He argued that although hermeneutic theory challenges the primacy of rigid,
technical approaches for collecting and analyzing data, there is a sequence of identifiable
“moments” (p. 67) that researchers commonly experience when selecting and interpreting
a text that is characteristic of valued practices within a certain time and place. A textual
analysis can use a book, an interview or series of interviews with research participants, or
other cultural artifacts that are representative of implicit assumptions and meanings that
are shared amongst readers and between authors and audiences.
The first moment, titled text generation, entails either composing a new text (such
as a series of interviews), or selecting a text that already exists and is exemplary of a
certain historically distinct practice. I selected Cozolino’s (2010) book as a popular text
that is exemplary of brain-based psychotherapy discourses because of its broad scope and
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the variety of therapy theories and practices that it contains. I generated questions about
how Cozolino (2010) integrated neuroscience into his understanding of the history,
purpose, and best practices of psychotherapy, and specific ways in which he used
language to do this throughout his book. I addressed these questions by identifying
exemplary passages in which he directly or indirectly discussed these issues. In the
remaining sections in this chapter I explain further the selection of Cozolino’s text, the
categories of primary content I devised for collecting passages from his text, the
rhetorical strategies I identified, and my approach to identifying recurring themes in his
book.
The second moment, called distanciation, involves recognizing that the text
emerges within a certain historical era, and therefore its discourse refers to social
practices, values, concerns, and norms of its time and place. In Chapter IV I provide the
findings of my textual analysis and interpret the exemplary passages in light of the
contemporary trends, practices, and beliefs about the self that scholars have identified as
implicit within contemporary neuroscience. I identified ways in which Cozolino used
language that was noteworthy because it combined psychology and brain functioning. For
example, I noticed the use of phrases and statements that were unclear, speculative,
figurative, and repetitive. As I studied his text I considered reasons why therapists might
find his claims and rhetoric to be appealing, and I thought about whether the rhetorical
strategies could cause readers to be confused or misled about the relationship between
human experience and neurobiological functioning.
In the third moment, called appropriation, the researcher engages in personal
reflection about his or her worldview and perspective. This facilitates a contextual
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understanding of a text and its implicit meanings and ideologies. As I interpreted
Cozolino’s (2010) text in light of the convergence of historical factors from which the
integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy emerged, I considered my
experiences as a therapist and psychology student. I reflected on why Cozolino’s
psychotherapy recommendations might assuage readers’ anxieties about validating
psychotherapy practices and verifying the efficacy of psychological treatments.
For the fourth moment in a hermeneutic study, Stigliano (1989) used the term
reconstruction to describe the effects of having contextualized and historically situated
the practice under investigation. In this phase the practice is reframed and possibly
altered after recognizing that it exists within a historical context and therefore replicates
or embodies certain aspects or assumptions of that broader context. I considered how a
brain-based therapy is at once a recent and historically distinct phenomenon, yet it is also
a practice that understandably follows from the history of psychology and psychotherapy.
My interpretation rejects the claim that late-20th century neuroscience naturally or
automatically provides a better explanation for the emergence of psychotherapy theories
and practices that were devised prior to recent advances in neuroimaging. However, my
interpretation also recognizes that the understanding of the self as a brain is appealing to
therapists and other readers because this vision follows certain beliefs about human
experience, illness, and healing that have longstanding philosophical roots in psychology
and psychotherapy. The reduction of psychological illness and healing to the brain
appears as a materialized version of psychology’s reduction of social and philosophical
issues to psychological concepts explaining individual experience. These interpretations
of psychotherapy practices differ from the interpretation of neuroscience-psychotherapy
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integration as inevitable, universally applicable across eras and cultures, and objective or
unbiased in its observations of human being.
In accordance with the fourth moment that Stigliano (1989) described, the
hermeneutic interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) text is intended to change the way
therapists read and implement brain-based psychotherapies. I hope to broaden therapists’
understanding of the possible implications of neuroscience-informed psychotherapy
discourses. Stigliano argued that a successful hermeneutic study would not consist of
results claiming to confirm an independent reality. Instead, hermeneutic interpretation
challenges unquestioned empiricism by revealing the social arrangements concealed by
everyday, taken-for-granted discourse. This provides alternative understandings of the
world. Stigliano noted that, rather than simply rejecting scientific inquiry entirely,
hermeneutic studies often contribute to improvements within social institutions such as
the delivery of healthcare services, “not only by increasing effectiveness, but also by
loosening the grip of ideology” (p. 63). I intended for the interpretation of Cozolino’s text
to improve psychological treatments by encouraging therapists to consider the history of
neuroscience-psychotherapy integration, and to question the cultural assumptions
embedded in this growing therapy discourse.
Hermeneutic’s Critiques of Intrapsychic Theory
Above I discussed the emergence of hermeneutics during the 20th century as a
post-Cartesian philosophy that challenges the separateness between individual life and
social context that had typically been assumed in modern era philosophy (see Cushman,
1995; Taylor, 1989). Scholars have applied hermeneutics as a critical interpretive
paradigm in order to historically situate psychotherapy theories and discuss how these
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theories embody moral discourses that unknowingly support certain cultural values and
make claims about the best way of life (i.e., the good). The ideals of Western
individualism have been reinforced in most psychotherapy theories, beginning with early
psychoanalytic theory. F. C. Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) argued that
psychotherapy and counseling valorize the emancipatory outlook of the modern era
through promoting individual self-sufficiency, personal freedom, and autonomy over
shared, voluntary social practices that comprise civil society. By doing so they may
promote
A “preoccupation with the inner self” that by itself does little to restore a sense of
purpose within some community of shared values, without which the conditions
for personal insecurity and directionlessness may only be reinforced, promoting
yet more preoccupation with inner distress. (p. 7)
Therapies that uncritically emphasize concepts such as an inner life or an inner
world of each person, and describe psychological health as an inner wellbeing, may serve
to reinforce a rigid divide between individual experience and social context, and therefore
perpetuate a notion of the good as the isolated individual concern with personal gain.
Scholars argue that encouraging this worldview ultimately leads therapists and patients to
reinforce the problematic attitudes that have often caused the psychological difficulties
for which patients seek therapy. For example, F. C. Richardson et al. (1999) noted that
the modern era expectation of self-directed individualism leads many people to
experience emotional distress and shame when their sense of autonomy fails even
slightly. The authors argued that the result is a culture in which narcissism and confusion
reigns among individuals as they long for meaning and purpose in a culture that discredits
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shared historical traditions and common moral standards as authoritarian and therefore
restrictive of individual success (see also Cushman, 1995).
Hermeneuticists argue that agency comes from recognizing that individuals are
embedded in, rather than removed from their world. F. C. Richardson et al. (1999)
applied the hermeneutic philosophy of H.-G. Gadamer in their argument for considering
the psychotherapy relationship as a civic arrangement between therapist and patient, who
exist within a shared historical context even though both have developed from a
subjective personal history. Hermeneuticists have also described how the emergence of
relational and interpersonal psychotherapy theories reflects broader late-20th century
shifts in the configuration of the self (Cushman & Gilford, 1999). Late-20th century
psychotherapy theories such as relational psychoanalysis, some humanistic-existential
psychotherapies, and feminist therapy (e.g., Layton, 2009) have challenged intrapsychic,
decontextualized accounts of human behavior, psychopathology, and change (Frie, 2011).
Relational and interpersonal theories share an understanding that individuals cannot be
understood apart from the social interactions that individual personality and behaviors
emerge within, or apart from a broader cultural context in which individuals develop and
live.
In my analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) text I will identify whether there are ways in
which he appeals to both intrapsychic, individualized understandings of the self as well as
theories that challenge those understandings. This may be contradictory. However, in my
textual analysis and discussion of his brain-based theory and treatment recommendations
I will also identify and challenge ways in which intrapsychic, individualistic
conceptualizations of self might be reinforced through a therapy discourse that

93

materializes psychological experience through neuroscientific interpretations of
psychology and psychotherapy. In other words, in my review of his text I maintain a
critical post-Cartesian position such as those supported among contemporary
psychotherapy theories such as intersubjective systems theory (e.g., Stolorow & Atwood,
1994) and relational psychoanalysis (e.g., Mitchell, 1988).
In following scholars such as Cushman and Gilford (1999) and Walls (2004),
relational and interpersonal understandings of selfhood, in addition to avoiding
discourses that uncritically replicate the modern ideals of personhood that lead to a lack
of meaning and purpose, also broaden the relevance of psychology and psychotherapy
across minority groups. A White majority ideal of selfhood has traditionally consisted of
an individual who achieves freedom and autonomy by overcoming rather than adhering
to moral standards and historical traditions. In a pluralistic society, traditional
psychotherapy theories that unknowingly embrace this vision are irrelevant for many
patients. According to Walls (2004), by considering how therapist-patient interactions are
reflections of the cultural beliefs and sociopolitical experiences of each participant
(especially with regards to race, gender, and class), therapists consider factors beyond the
traditional limited vision of therapy as a resolution of a patient’s intrapsychic conflict
(see also Layton 2009). This extends psychoanalytic and psychotherapy theories to
populations beyond those for whom individualist accounts of psychological experience,
pathology, and change have historical and cultural appeal.
A balance between an understanding of the personal and an understanding of the
social is necessary to avoid perpetuating a disregard for the roles of both meaningful
social engagement and shared moral standards in psychological wellbeing. Such a
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balance is also necessary in order to avoid a radical postmodern position that, according
to some scholars, negates the concepts of agency and subjectivity and is therefore no less
problematic than classical intrapsychic theories (Cushman, 2005; Frie, 2009b; Orange,
2003). Although hermeneuticists critically examine psychology and psychotherapy by
historically situating the concepts and assumptions of these fields, hermeneutics avoids a
historical determinism by embracing agency and emphasizing an encounter with
difference (see Cushman, 2005). Hermeneutics therefore provides a balance between
intrapsychic and extreme postmodern positions that advocate for a relativism that,
according to some scholars, unknowingly removes agency or a sense of freedom and
choice from therapy patients (Orange, 2003) or promotes a radical individualism that is
completely removed from what postmodern philosophers intended with their challenges
to modernity (Cushman, 2005; Cushman & Gilford, 1999).
In sum, my critique of Cozolino’s (2010) text is premised in large part on
relational and interpersonal theories that challenge the modern era notion that a rigid
individualism is the necessary condition for freedom and agency. I favor theories that
endorse a vision of human psychology as at once individual, interpersonal, and cultural
because these approaches promote more inclusive and philosophically sound mental
health practices that in turn hold the possibility for a more equitable and participatory
society (Layton, 2009; F. C. Richardson et al., 1999). For these reasons I will critique
instances in Cozolino’s (2010) text in which his brain-based therapy theory, by
materializing psychological concepts and experiences, may unknowingly uphold rigid
individualist or intrapsychic accounts of human psychology even when appealing to late20th century relational theories.
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Selection of the Text
I selected as my primary text Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of
Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (2nd ed.). A major publishing company, Norton
Books, published this text in a series of books titled the Norton Series on Interpersonal
Neurobiology. These books integrate neuroscience with topics encompassing lifespan
development, trauma, social work, parenting, psychotherapy, and other areas of human
psychology. Daniel Siegel, who served as the series editor, has been credited with
creating the phrase interpersonal neurobiology to describe his paradigm of human
development that is based on a triad of psychological, neurobiological, and social
development. I selected Cozolino’s book because, as its title indicates, it is marketed as a
psychotherapy text, and it is broad in its scope, with chapters integrating neuroscience
with topics such as attachment theory, trauma and other psychopathology, and a variety
of psychotherapy theories and practices. Cozolino (2010) provided brain-based
explanations of the mechanisms by which psychotherapy can effectively alleviate
psychological symptoms, and he described psychotherapy interventions through the lens
of research in the neurosciences, thereby making claims about the relationship between
mind and brain, the origins of psychopathology, and the purpose of psychotherapy.
Cozolino’s book provides a comprehensive overview of psychotherapy and its integration
with neuroscience.
Cozolino (2010) is identified as a psychotherapist in his book. He holds the title
of Professor of Psychology in the Graduate School of Education and Psychology at
Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. According to his biography on Pepperdine’s
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website, Cozolino earned his doctorate in clinical psychology, and he also holds degrees
in philosophy and theology. According to that website,
He has conducted empirical research in schizophrenia, child abuse and the longterm impact of stress. His areas of interest include neuroscience and
neuropsychology, which is the integration of psychological observation on
behavior and the mind with neurological observation on the brain and nervous
system. In addition, he has conducted research on the biobehavioral sciences and
psychotherapy. (Pepperdine University, 2013, para. 1)
The website also notes that in addition to The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy and
various articles and book chapters about psychological issues, Cozolino also authored
books titled The Neuroscience of Human Relationships: Attachment and the Developing
Social Brain and The Making of a Therapist: A Practical Guide for the Inner Journey.
The website notes, “in addition to his teaching and writing, Cozolino maintains a clinical
and consulting practice in Los Angeles” (Pepperdine University, 2013, para. 1).
Cozolino’s publication history and professorship, combined with his experience as a
psychotherapist, suggests that he is likely to be considered an authority in the fields of
psychology and psychotherapy. This also substantiates the relevance of a textual analysis
of The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain for a historical
interpretation of the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy.
Research Questions
The following research questions guided my hermeneutic interpretation of the
primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes in Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience
of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain.
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1. According to Cozolino (2010), what is the historical fit between neuroscience
and psychotherapy, and what are the implications of his claims for the purpose of
psychotherapy and the identity of psychotherapists?
2. What are some of the primary functions that Cozolino’s (2010) use of rhetoric
served in his neuroscience-psychotherapy integration?
3. What is the understanding of self or what it means to be human that is
perpetuated by Cozolino’s brain-based psychotherapy theory and recommendations?
4. What are the political, economic, and social arrangements that might be
unknowingly replicated by psychotherapy conducted in accordance with Cozolino’s
(2010) theory and recommendations?
Structure for Gathering and Categorizing Primary Content, Rhetorical Strategies,
and Recurring Themes
I devised the following rubric and then I used it as a guide while reading
Cozolino’s (2010) text and collecting passages that were exemplary of the primary
content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring themes in the text.
Primary content in Cozolino’s (2010) text. For primary content I was interested
in reviewing passages in which Cozolino addressed an array of topics related to the
history, theory, and practice of psychotherapy, which I explicate below.
Outline and background. I first provide a brief summary of the sections or parts
of Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain.
Then I present a summary of passages in which Cozolino depicted or discussed the
following topics related to the history of psychotherapy, the history of his theory,
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descriptions of established therapy theories, and differences between his therapy theory
and other therapies.
Tenets of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this portion of my interpretation I
discuss Cozolino’s broadest understandings or descriptions of the purpose of
psychotherapy, the general populations of psychotherapy patients or common reasons
why people seek talk therapy (as well as types of abnormal behavior or psychopathology
that psychotherapists treat), Cozolino’s understanding of self, mind, and brain (and the
relationships between those aspects of human experience), the neurobiological
mechanisms of psychotherapy, the psychological mechanisms that activate those
corresponding brain processes, ways in which therapists should provide therapy so that
those mechanisms are utilized, and indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes.
Case vignettes from Cozolino’s psychotherapy practice. I discuss two examples
of psychotherapy case vignettes from Cozolino’s own treatments of patients that seemed
to encapsulate some of the recurring themes or recommendations for psychotherapy
practice and illustrate how he applied the tenets of his theory to psychological treatment.
Rhetorical strategies and elements of writing style in Cozolino’s (2010) text.
After summarizing the primary content following the outline above, I list examples of
recurring rhetorical strategies or devices that Cozolino used throughout his book. I
primarily referenced the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 3rd edition (Baldick,
2008) for my definitions of these strategies.
Analogy: A logical argument comparing two relationships between two entities or
objects.
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Ambiguity: Passages or statements in which an author’s intended meaning was
unclear because the arrangement of the statement could imply two or more distinct
meanings.
Aporia: A statement by an author (or in literary works a character) that
intentionally casts doubt on a main premise or purpose of his entire book that he had
previously identified.
Diction: Recurring style of writing or choice of words that seemed rhetorically
useful and significant.
Epigraph: Quotes preceding a book or any part of a book (such as a chapter or
subsection).
Figures of Speech: I focus on the following four types of figures of speech in
Cozolino’s (2010) text.
Apposition: Phrases in which two nouns are placed next to each other with the
intention of using one of the nouns to describe or portray some quality of the second
noun.
Metaphor: A comparison between two unlike objects or entities on the basis of
some shared quality, without using the words like or as.
Personification: Attributing human qualities or actions to nonhuman material
objects.
Prosopopoeia: Personification of a nonmaterial concept such as memory or
emotion.
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Themes. For primary themes I highlight some of the broadest categories of
recurring issues or arguments, and as subthemes I provide examples of Cozolino’s
specific applications of those arguments and issues.
In Chapter IV I outline the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes, and
I provide passages that exemplify those topics. I also provide my initial interpretations or
commentary about those passages. I used the four research questions above as guidelines
for Chapter V. In that chapter I then summarize and discuss my Results chapter,
Cozolino’s central thesis, the historical claims he used to support the thesis, the rhetorical
strategies he used to support the thesis, the understanding of self perpetuated by the
thesis, the potential effects of the thesis and its understanding of self on the practice of
psychotherapy and the profession of psychology, and finally, my interpretation of the
political, economic, and social arrangements perpetuated by the thesis.
Definitions
For the purpose of this research study I used the following definitions of relevant
terms and concepts.
Biological determinism: The ideology that favors biological or genetic
explanations for all aspects of human life and behavior.
Brain-based or neuroscience-informed psychotherapy: I use these phrases
interchangeably to refer to psychotherapy theories premised on the integration between
neuroscience and psychotherapy. Although neuroimaging has been included in research
studies of specific psychotherapy modalities (such as behavioral therapy and exposure
therapy), I used these phrases to describe paradigms such as interpersonal neurobiology,
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or Cozolino’s (2010) psychotherapy text, which combine a variety of psychological
concepts and psychotherapy theories with cognitive neuroscience findings.
Dualism: The theory that mind and body are separate. That is, nonmaterial,
subjective experience is believed to exist as altogether separate from body, which belongs
to the natural or physical world. Mental and physical aspects of individual experience are
therefore considered separate ways of being or experiencing the world.
Eliminative materialism or eliminativism: The position that psychological
concepts exist only insofar as they are found to be products of underlying physical
processes. However, eliminativists predict that neural correlates will not be found for
psychological concepts. Therefore in this view those concepts will be considered
fictitious and should be replaced by neurobiological terminology once neuroscience
research identifies the physical processes that generate behavior. This is a radical
reductionism that does not view mental qualities as having corresponding physical
correlates, but instead challenges the existence of human subjectivity.
Emergentism: The philosophical position that the component parts of a whole
phenomenon are necessary but not sufficient for its existence. Emergentism has been
used as a counter to reductionism, especially the efforts to reduce mind to the workings of
the brain.
Materialism or reductive materialism: The position that mental phenomena are
reducible to physical or material existence. Materialism specifically involves the mapping
of mental processes to neurobiological processes.
Naturalism: The position that only the physical world is real. Naturalism is
frequently aligned with the belief that the scientific method (rather than fields such as
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religion or philosophy) will explain how and why the world appears and functions as it
does (see scientism, below).
Rhetorical strategies or devices: Recurring uses of language and figures of speech
in a text. I primarily referenced the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 3rd edition
(Baldick, 2008) to define the rhetorical strategies I identified in Cozolino’s (2010) text.
Neuroscience and neurosciences: An integrative academic discipline that emerged
in the United States during the mid-20th century. One goal of neuroscience has been the
use of brain research to investigate neural origins of sociological, psychological, and
other phenomena.
Professional psychology and psychotherapy: Any talk therapy conducted by a
licensed mental health professional, either a doctoral level psychologist or master’s level
mental health clinician (e.g., therapists who hold a master’s degree in psychology, or
marriage and family therapy, or social work but practice as licensed clinical therapists).
These professionals provide psychotherapy for individuals, couples, families, and groups
in a way that is consistent with state licensure and health care laws. These clinicians also
follow generally accepted practices and professional psychotherapy ethics provided by
national professional organizations. Ethical practices vary among organizations such as
the American Psychological Association and the American Association for Marriage and
Family Therapy.
Psychological or subjective experience: I use these terms interchangeably to
describe conscious awareness. In my interpretations of Cozolino’s (2010) text, for
example, I use these terms when I discuss his views on how human psychology is related
to brain functioning. With that grammar I am not intentionally recreating a dichotomy
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between mental and physical experiences; instead I am distinguishing between
psychological concepts that are shared understandings of human experience, and
descriptions of brain functioning. I use the terms interchangeably in order to foster a flow
to my writing.
Scientism: A rigid adherence to the position that natural or physical sciences will
explain everything about the world and life. Proponents of scientism maintain an
epistemological stance that valorizes naturalism or materialism to such a degree that nonmaterial aspects of human experience (such as culture, subjectivity, the humanities, and
religion) are either dismissed entirely or reduced to quantitative data points, or a physical
location or processes within the human body.
Reductionism: The position that a whole entity or system can be understood in
terms of its smaller parts. Reductionism is also used to position the concepts of one
discipline or academic area as constituent parts of the concepts of a broader area of study.
For example, some scientists and philosophers claim that mind is solely a product of
brain functioning. This claim reduces the field of psychology to the field of neuroscience
because it asserts that mind or conscious experience is better explained by brain
functioning which is one constituent part of human experience.
Summary
In this chapter I described the rationale and methodology of my research project,
including a description of philosophical hermeneutics and the use of 20th century
interpretive theory to situate scientific efforts and achievements within the time and place
in which they emerged. In the next chapter I provide the results of my textual analysis of
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Cozolino’s (2010) book using the outline for primary content, rhetorical strategies or
elements of writing style, and recurring themes, as I described above.
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Chapter IV: Results of the Textual Analysis of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain
In this chapter I lay out the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring
themes throughout Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy according to
the format I discussed in Chapter III.
Primary Content
Outline and background. In this section I interpret the six parts of The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain and describe Cozolino’s
statements about the history of psychotherapy, the history of his theory, his descriptions
of established psychotherapy theories, and his understandings of the differences between
his theory and established psychotherapy theories.
The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain is divided into 18
chapters spread evenly across six parts. Part I includes chapters on the relationship
between the professions of neurology and psychology, ways in which psychological
phenomena and mechanisms of well-known psychotherapy treatments relate to
neurobiology.
Part II contains chapters on the workings of the human nervous system, ways in
which the brain stores memories, the differences between left and right hemispheres of
the human brain, and ways in which these issues are relevant for the practice of
psychotherapy.
Part III includes chapters on higher-level cognitive processes or executive
functioning and the human brain, the relationship between the workings of the human
brain and the ways in which the workings of the human brain impact the perception of
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reality, and how the human capacity for language or narrative facilitates integration
amongst brain regions.
Part IV includes chapters on the relationship between the nervous system and
attachment, linking the evolution and functioning of the human brain to the social
qualities of human beings.
Part V includes chapters on psychopathology, focusing on trauma and anxiety
disorders, and the ways in which the quality of a child’s early relationships with
caregivers comes to shape personality.
Part VI includes chapters that review how psychotherapy emerged historically
because of the evolution of the brain, the ways in which psychotherapy serves the
purpose of altering the functioning of a patient’s brain, and predictions for how
psychotherapy will become closely tied to neuroscience, for example, including
neurobiology terms in case conceptualizations, and using neuroimaging to plan treatment
and assess psychotherapy progress.
General history of psychotherapy according to Cozolino. In this section I focus
on Cozolino’s understanding of the historical origins of psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy as an inevitable necessity due to the evolution of the human brain.
According to Cozolino, psychotherapy emerged because it is a corrective intervention for
problems created by how the human brain evolved.
Many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences are organized
and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our awareness and
distorted by our immature brains. To a great extent, psychotherapy owes its
existence to these artifacts of evolution and development. (p. 9)
Evolution’s legacy is a complex brain, vulnerable to a variety of factors that can
disrupt the growth and integration of important neural networks. The field of
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psychotherapy has emerged because of the brain’s vulnerability to these
developmental and environmental risks. (p. 11)
The human brain is an amazing organ, capable of continual growth and lifelong
adaptation to an ever-changing array of challenges. Our understanding of how the
brain accomplishes this mandate increases with each new theoretical development
and technological advance. At the same time, we are uncovering some of natural
selection’s more problematic choices. If necessity is the mother of invention, then
evolution itself has created the necessity for psychotherapy by shaping a brain that
is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties. (p. 306)
These statements suggested that the emergence of psychotherapy was inevitable
because it serves as a cure for problems that are a result of the functioning of the human
brain. According to Cozolino, the human brain evolved to have a tremendous influence
over individual behaviors and experiences, which at times leads to the personal
difficulties for which therapy happens to be able to remedy. His ahistorical understanding
of psychotherapy depicted in these passages naturalized psychological treatments as
corrective interventions for a brain that develops and learns outside of conscious control,
thereby at times resulting in maladaptive behaviors and emotions. Interpretive theories
and critical historians of science have challenged the common portrayal of scientific
advancements as inevitable because this removes those efforts from their broader time
and place. The passages above established evolution as a central organizing principle of
Cozolino’s theory of psychotherapy and psychopathology (see Themes, pp. 213-220).
Freud’s rebellion against the medical establishment. According to Cozolino,
Freud’s early professional interest in the relationship between mind and brain was at odds
with the medical establishment of his time. Cozolino implied that Freud was a maverick
for having an interest in the relationship between brain and behavior, and that soon he
chose to ignore this interest because it was ahead of its time. As a result he was forced to
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focus instead on devising a language of psychology or mind rather than neurobiology as a
way to describe human experience.
“Freud started out as a rebel, a neurologist curious about the mind. I suspect he
was frustrated with the mind-brain partisanship of medical school, and longed to
work with others who shared his interests” (p. 1).
It is noteworthy that Cozolino speculated about Freud’s intentions (“I suspect he
was frustrated”; see also Speculation language, pp. 195-203) and by doing so attempted
to justify the history of psychotherapy he depicted.
Despite his enthusiasm, Freud realized that his dream for psychology to be based
in an understanding of the nervous system was far ahead of its time, and at odds
with prevailing religious beliefs and medical dogma. For these and other reasons,
he suppressed the publication of The Project until his death. Perhaps Freud kept
the Project to himself because he feared that it would be relegated to the same
sort of obscurity as the case of Phineas Gage. (p. 4)
Freud, the neurologist, became all but forgotten as his psychological theories
moved further and further from their biological roots. He chose instead to utilize
the more palatable and accessible metaphors of literature and anthropology to
provide the primary vocabulary for psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, Freud’s shift
from the brain to metaphors of mind opened psychoanalysis up to all sorts of
criticism throughout the 20th century. Metaphors such as the Oedipal and Electra
complexes were seen as contrived fictions, shielding them from scientific
evaluation. Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would
eventually be integrated with its neurobiological substrates. (pp. 4-5)
Cozolino suggested that Freud happened to be correct in understanding the human
mind because his theory is now validated by recent neuroimaging research. The claim
that mind is an antiquated placeholder for brain ignores the controversies associated with
that type of reductionism while overlooking the differences between psychological and
neurobiological understandings of self and the problems that arise when assuming that
the founding principles and vocabularies of two separate fields of study are so easily
intertwined. Cozolino later established the purpose of his book as purportedly revisiting
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and continuing Freud’s intended mapping of psychological concepts such as mind onto
underlying neurobiological structures.
Cozolino’s strategy seemed to be an illustration of what historians of psychology
such as Danziger (1979), Furumoto (1989), and Samelson (1974) have called an “origin
myth,” complete with its attendant inaccuracies. Cozolino’s origin myth makes an appeal
on behalf of psychology to the higher-status medical specialty of neurology, claiming that
psychology was initially rooted in neurology and therefore has a legitimate right to
reunite with that branch of medicine now that scientific methods such as neuroimaging
are providing proof of psychology’s theories. Cozolino implied that psychological
theories would be antiquated and unverifiable without the evidence of their relevance and
timelessness provided from brain research. Cozolino’s assertion is problematic in several
ways. He argued that Freud’s use of literature and anthropology, important elements of
psychoanalytic theory, were the equivalent of historical placeholders for a theory that was
actually describing the workings of the human brain. In other words, Cozolino extracted
psychoanalysis (and subsequent psychological theories that emerged to either expand or
supplant early psychoanalytic theory) from their connections with various humanities
disciplines by arguing that such an interdisciplinary theory was not Freud’s original
intention or preferred path. Cozolino also asserted that psychoanalysis has been criticized
because the language of literature and anthropology could not be subjected to the
empirical or observable methods of scientific study, thereby implying that neuroscience
provides ways of measuring human psychology that could verify psychoanalytic
accuracy. This assertion is problematic because it uses a certain depiction of the history
of psychoanalysis to discredit the significant and longstanding connection between
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psychoanalysis and the humanities, and to argue for a correction to the generally
understood purpose and rationale for psychoanalytic or psychotherapy treatment. His
interpretation of the history of psychoanalytic theory was used as a rationale for
combining brain research and human psychology into a single endeavor, yet he
overlooked ways in which psychology and neurology might have distinct goals or
represent distinct understandings of self.
The history of psychotherapy was similar to the history of other scientific
discoveries. In the following passage Cozolino asserted that psychotherapy was devised
through a process similar to the methodology of scientific experiments. He illustrated this
assertion with an example of how a psychoanalytic explanation for the effectiveness of
electroshock therapy has been deemed obsolete.
Like other scientific discoveries, psychotherapy developed from a combination of
trial-and-error learning, the intuition of its founder, and plain luck. Each school of
psychotherapy offers an explanation of mental health and illnesses as well as why
its strategies and techniques are effective. Fortunately, the effectiveness of an
intervention does not depend on the accuracy of the theory used to support it. For
example, there was a time when psychoanalysts attributed the success of
electroshock therapy to the need of a depressed person to be punished. The
treatment worked and still works despite the lack of a solid understanding of its
mechanisms of action. (p. 32)
Here Cozolino argued that scientific discoveries or advancements are products of
the individual genius of the researchers associated with those discoveries, thereby
implying that psychotherapy was inevitable or waiting to be uncovered based on
improving upon whatever scientific research or findings preceded it. He claimed that
effective therapy practices arose through “plain luck,” and he portrayed them as a set of
experiments or interventions that have been refined for efficacy over time rather than
discourses that embody cultural definitions of illness and health. His argument took for
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granted a modern era, progressive theory of truth (see Leahey, 1992). This view of
psychology as a progressive science is disputed by the interpretive turn in philosophy and
should not simply be taken for granted as an unquestioned truth (see Gadamer, 1975).
Also noteworthy was Cozolino’s statement describing how psychological
treatments have at times been recognized as efficacious or successful despite the
inaccuracies of psychotherapy theories used to explain successful treatment results. His
argument and subsequent example of electroshock treatment warrants discussion. Given
his understanding of self, his interpretation of the functioning of the human brain, and his
recommended therapy interventions drawing from psychoanalytic theory, it was
surprising that he criticized a psychoanalytic interpretation of a mental health treatment
without providing any alternative hypothesis about electroshock therapy’s success. He
seemed to subtly discredit the value of traditional psychoanalytic theory by implying that
a nonmaterial view of mood or personality has no value as one possible explanation for a
mental health treatment with an apparent physiological component. His statements also
imply that accurate explanations for psychological phenomena and treatments must be
provided by neuroscience research even if psychologists must continue to wait for that
research to be conducted. Further, since electroshock therapy is obviously a physiological
intervention that produces a reduction of symptoms of disorders typically classified as
psychological, the passage might convey that psychological theories have no relevant
place in the scientific quest for physiological explanations for apparently physiological
interventions. This is a noteworthy implication for a book that is branded as a
psychotherapy text.
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Psychotherapy has been a neurobiological intervention without therapists
knowing it. Throughout his book, Cozolino described psychotherapy interventions as
successful to the extent to which they change the functioning of the human brain. He
suggested that this has always been true yet recently has been proven through
advancements in neuroimaging technologies.
“It is my belief that the development of psychotherapy has always been implicitly
guided by the principles of neuroscience” (p. 31).
Over the last century, psychotherapists have demonstrated that many of the
brain’s shortcomings can be counterbalanced by the application of skillfully
applied techniques in the context of a caring relationship. Thus, in our ability to
link, attune, and regulate each other’s brains, evolution has also provided us a way
to heal one another. Because we know that relationships are capable of building
and rebuilding neural structures, psychotherapy can now be understood as a
neurobiological intervention, with a deep cultural history. In psychotherapy, we
are tapping the same principles available in every relationship to connect to and
heal another brain. (p. 306)
Cozolino argued that psychotherapy has always been a method of intervening on
the human brain in order to achieve whatever outcomes had been deemed desirable for a
mental health treatment. The rationale for his rhetoric was dependent on his
understanding of brain science as transcending the unique cultural and historical
circumstances from which psychotherapy emerged and developed over the 20th century.
It was unclear whether Cozolino intended to reappropriate the phrase “cultural history” to
mean that psychotherapy (now explained as a “neurobiological intervention,” a purported
correction to earlier understandings of human psychology and the purpose of
psychotherapy) has a history within a certain culture, since the phrase “cultural history”
also refers to the type of alternative history that situates phenomena within a specific
cultural context (e.g., the hermeneutic interpretation of brain-based psychotherapy texts
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presented here). If in fact he meant to align his work with a hermeneutic approach, he
failed. His use of neuroscience to explain the purpose and efficacy of psychological
treatments overlooked the important cultural and historical understandings of health and
illness from which psychotherapy theories emerged.
Overall, Cozolino’s depiction of the general history of psychotherapy suggested
an attempt to portray psychotherapy as a scientific endeavor through his use of the
common elements of standard science histories that rely on inevitability, linear progress,
and the attributing of advances to the individual genius of their creators or founding
theorists. These explanations stand in direct opposition to interpretive or cultural histories
of science that challenge the assumption that scientific advancements may be extracted
from the time and place in which they gained popularity and relevance. He achieved this
argument by appealing to the use of neuroscience as the higher-order field that validates
psychotherapy theory and practice, and he portrayed therapy as originally having
emerged from neurology before it strayed from its physical science origins. In this way
he simplistically portrayed theories of mind or psychological processes as descriptions
for human experience that could easily be mapped onto their rightful material substrates,
rather than as theories for understanding human experience that have a longstanding and
unique history which has contributed in important ways to the understanding of self in
Western cultures.
History of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this section I review Cozolino’s
statements about how and why he devised his theory, that is, his understanding of the
specific historical antecedents of his psychotherapy text.
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Revisiting the overlap between neurology and psychology now that the
relationship between mind and brain has been established as a unified process. Most
broadly Cozolino described his efforts as a reintegration between psychology and
neurology now that neuroscience research has highlighted changes in the human brain
that occur in response to psychological experiences and treatments.
How does the brain give rise to the mind? Where do the brain and mind meet, and
by what means do they interact with one another? These are difficult questions—
so difficult, in fact, that the common reaction is to focus on either the mind or the
brain and act as if the other is irrelevant (Blass & Carmeli, 2007; Pulver, 2003).
The problem with this approach is the barrier it creates to understanding that the
human experience of brain and mind is essentially a unified process (Cobb, 1944).
Neurology and psychology are simultaneously pushed apart by academic and
intellectual politics while being drawn together by their common
psychobiological foundation. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 1)
This was the opening statement of Cozolino’s book. He asserted that brain and
mind “is essentially a unified process,” citing a 1944 reference rather than recent
neuroscience research. As a reason for why people focus dichotomously on either mind
or brain, rather than noting the differences in the understanding of self or the
longstanding unique purposes between various professions or academic areas, he
provided the explanation that questions involving the relationship between mind or
psychological experience, and brain or physical matter, are complex and difficult. That
statement disregarded the possibility that people study one or the other because they
reject an assumed unity between mind and brain, or they question the rhetoric or methods
used to combine the separate areas of study, or simply that differentiating between mental
and physical aspects of human beings provides a broader scope of research and
understanding of human beings than attempting to unite those interests into a single field.
Cozolino did not clarify whose “common reaction” he was referring to with this
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statement. He noted “politics” as the reason why neurology and psychology remain
distinct professions but it was unclear why neurologists would benefit from focusing on
psychological issues amidst medical treatment of neurological disorders, and it was also
unclear why psychologists would benefit from redefining themselves through a kinship
with neurologists. With these opening statements Cozolino juxtaposed two separate
issues—the areas of overlap between neurology and psychology, and the correlations
between mental (mind) and physical (brain) processes.
Cozolino’s hope for an integration between the professions of neurology and
psychology seemed to be justified in part because of Freud’s initial training as a
neurologist. However, neurology is a branch of medicine that researches and treats
physical disorders of the brain and nervous system, whereas psychology is a broad
multidisciplinary field that draws from the humanities and is comprised of philosophical,
cognitive, behavioral, and mental health research and practice. Therefore, it is unclear
from these statements why the two fields should merge simply on the basis of Freud
having transitioned in his career from a physician treating neurological disorders to a
physician treating psychological symptoms or conditions through psychoanalytic or talk
therapy treatment. In fact, there are scholars who have argued that Freud’s shift from
neurology to psychology was well documented to be a conscious intellectual choice, not a
disguise or strategy (see Brothers, 2001; Orange, 2003).
Cozolino claimed that his book was a return to Freud’s initial intention to
understand human psychology through the workings of the brain. According to Cozolino,
Freud’s hope for a neurobiological study of human psychology is possible now that
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neuroimaging methods are available, and also because both psychology and brain
research are each widely respected.
Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would eventually be
integrated with its neurobiological substrates. . . . The time for such an integration
has arrived, and respect for psychological processes have taken a strong enough
hold within both the scientific community and general culture that we can avoid a
reduction of the mind to basic biochemical processes. On the contrary, an
appreciation for the structures and functioning of the brain by nonneurologists has
become the norm. It is in this spirit that we turn our attention to ways of thinking
about the brain that enhance our understanding of human experience. (p. 5)
“As we approached the 21st century, neuroscience began providing us with tools
to explore what happens in the brain during early development, and later in
psychotherapy. A return to Freud’s Project is finally at hand” (p. 12).
As noted above, Cozolino argued that psychoanalytic theory emerged when
historical circumstances dictated that Freud needed to devise descriptions and
explanations for human experiences that only appear to be nonmaterial, despite his initial
hypothesis that the mental or psychological experiences he was describing were actually
products of their neural underpinnings in the human brain. In this passage it was unclear
whether Cozolino’s statement “we can avoid a reduction of the mind to basic biochemical
processes” was intended to refer to readers of his book specifically, or to individuals in
contemporary culture generally when interpreting literature examining the relationship
between psychological phenomena and neurobiological processes. His understanding of
the historical antecedents of his book were also confusing because the phrase “on the
contrary” seems misplaced, since the subsequent statement, “an appreciation for the
structures and functioning of the brain by nonneurologists,” seemed more likely, not less
likely, to cause readers to interpret his text as evidence supporting a reduction of mind to
brain. Literature from a variety of fields including philosophy, history, and even
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neuroscience has studied the influence of neuroscience research on popular culture and
cautioned against the assumption that human psychology or mind can be easily
understood as a product of neurochemical processes. Given that Cozolino’s theory might
well be interpreted to be such a reduction, it is surprising that he dismissed so abruptly
the possibility that efforts to integrate neurology and psychology through mapping mind
or psychological theories onto brain might be interpreted as reductionism.
In sum, Cozolino described his efforts as picking up where Freud left off when he
realized that his initial goal of mapping psychopathology and the talking cure onto the
functioning of the brain was not feasible without the technological advances and a wider
appreciation for the brain that emerged later in the 20th century and which Cozolino is
now in the position to access. In this way Cozolino portrayed a great deal of psychology
and psychotherapy as a placeholder for brain-based theories of psychotherapy for which
his book was intended to serve as a foundation given its broad and theoretically
integrative scope. This justification was based on his origin myth. Although it is true that
an interest in brain science is popular, the implications of defining therapy in this way
warrant closer scrutiny.
Examples of established psychotherapies described by Cozolino. In this section I
provide examples of how Cozolino described psychotherapy theories that he identified as
either well known or otherwise already established.
Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies. In following passage Cozolino
explained how psychoanalytic theory actually describes the structures and functions of
the brain.
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Despite a conscious awareness that something may be wrong, the hidden layers of
neural processing continue to organize the world based on the prior experiences
that shaped them. As we will see in later chapters, the neural circuitry involved
with fear has a tenacious memory and can invisibly influence conscious
awareness for a lifetime. Part of psychodynamic therapy is an exploration and
uncovering of this unconscious organization of experience. Freud’s projective
hypothesis described the process by which our brains create and organize the
world around us. As the clarity of a situation decreases, the brain naturally
generates structure and projects it onto the world. (p. 34)
In this description of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies Cozolino
focused on a material explanation, localized in the brain, of what theorists refer to as the
unconscious, or aspects of experience for which a person is unaware yet may be
observable to therapists by the way patients respond to ambiguity or try to make sense of
the world. Cozolino argued that these unconscious elements of experience are indications
of how the brain works to project itself onto the world. In other words, Cozolino posited
the brain rather than the patient as the single, true object of analysis, thereby interiorizing
and reducing self to a physical organ.
Rogerian or client-centered therapy. In the following passage Cozolino described
the theory of pioneering humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers.
Over the last century, the therapist attributes suggested by Rogers and what we
have come to think of as the best possible attitudes for optimal parenting have
become essentially identical. Rogerian principles lead to a minimized need for
defensiveness and shame while maximizing expressiveness, exploration, and risk
taking. Rogers was likely describing the best interpersonal environment for brain
growth during development and neural plasticity in psychotherapy when he stated
that client-centered therapy “aims directly toward the greater independence and
integration of the individual rather than hoping that such results will accrue if the
counselor assists in solving the problem. The individual and not the problem is the
focus.” (Rogers, 1942, p. 28, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 37)
Cozolino argued that Rogers’ description of his client-centered psychotherapy
paradigm was unknowingly a description of the best relationship qualities to promote
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optimal brain development and change. Cozolino then cited Rogers’ explanation of
client-centered therapy as focused on the individual rather than focused on problems. In
other words, Cozolino subtly redefined individual as brain. In this passage Cozolino also
compared parenting and psychotherapy by arguing that the most favorable qualities for
child development are analogous to the qualities of the psychotherapeutic environment.
The connection between parenting and psychotherapy then became a primary issue in his
book (see also Analogy, pp. 175-178).
Cognitive therapies. In the following passage Cozolino explained how cognitive
therapy alters patients’ brains, and he also discussed how these modalities have been well
represented amongst psychotherapy studies that have used neuroimaging to evaluate
treatment efficacy.
“Cognitive therapies highlight the centrality of a person’s thoughts, appraisals,
and beliefs in guiding his or her feelings and actions” (p. 39).
Of all the different types of therapy, specific links have been found between
successful cognitive-behavioral therapy and changes in brain functioning. . . .
These findings strongly suggest that therapists can utilize cognition to alter the
relationship among neural networks in a way that impacts their balance of
activation and inhibition. In striving to activate cortical processing through
conscious control of thoughts and feelings, these therapies enhance left cortical
processing, inhibiting and regulating right hemispheric balance and subcortical
activation. The reestablishment of hemispheric and top-down regulation allows
for increases in positive attitudes and a sense of safety that counteract the
depressing and frightening effects of right hemisphere and subcortical (amygdala)
dominance. (Ochsner & Gross, 2008, as cited in Cozolino, p. 40)
“The inherent wisdom of this approach with depressed and anxious patients lies in
the fact that disorders of affect need activation of cortical executive structures”
(p. 41).
Cozolino identified cognitive therapy as the approach that has been most
validated by neuroscience research, and he noted the suspected neurobiological
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mechanism or process by which psychological interventions are purportedly effective.
This suggested that neurobiological changes spurred by other therapy paradigms have
been at least partly inferred from neuroimaging studies of cognitive therapy patients. His
claim that “the inherent wisdom” of cognitive therapy for depression and anxiety is the
need for “activation of cortical executive structures” implied that neuroimaging confirms
that therapists have unknowingly been impacting the structures and functioning of the
brain during treatment.
Systemic family therapy. In the following passage Cozolino argued that systems
theories actually describe how patterns in human relationships become embedded in brain
functioning of each individual in the system.
“Dysfunctional family patterns . . . sacrifice the growth and well-being of one or
more members (often the children) to reduce the overall level of anxiety in the
family” (p. 42).
Over time, the dysfunction becomes embedded in the personality and neural
architecture of everyone in the family and they collude to maintain the system,
because they now all require the status quo in order to feel safe. These
experiences become embedded into the their neural architecture and are carried
forward into adult relationships. (p. 42)
As in other forms of psychotherapy, the goal of systems therapy is to integrate
and balance the various cortical and subcortical, left and right hemisphere
processing networks. . . . In essence, Bowen is highlighting that the simultaneous
activation of cognition and emotion leads to neural integration. (pp. 42-43)
The first step in systems therapy is to educate the family about these concepts and
to explore the history of both sides of the family through the past few generations.
. . . Uncovering family secrets and reality testing around the myths and
projections of each family member allow for cortical processing of primitive and
unconscious defenses. (p. 43)
In his description of systems therapy Cozolino asserted that relationship dynamics
or patterns between family members become imprinted as neural patterns of each
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member’s brain, causing people to strive to maintain homeostasis to avoid the anxiety
caused by the threat of change. Cozolino’s fusion between systems dynamics and
individual brain patterns seemed contradictory and antithetical to systems theories’
challenge to mainstream psychology’s focus on the individual as the primary unit of
analysis or location of psychological symptoms.
Cozolino’s descriptions of these traditional therapy theories portrayed a
materialized intrapsychic self, persons as individual brains, physical locations of the
mechanisms of therapeutic efficacy, and individualized accounts of human relationships.
All of these brain-based descriptions of psychotherapy theories overlooked how the claim
of having discovered the material origins of longstanding psychological treatments is a
reinterpretation of theories in accordance with a neuroscientific understanding of self
rather than an uncovering of a true understanding of development, illness, and healing.
Cozolino’s brain-based depiction of family systems theory was especially striking given
that family therapy theories have viewed psychological problems and solutions as
residing between members rather than intrapsychically in the interior of any one person.
The use of a brain-based interpretation of systems theory illustrated how a brain-based
interpretation of social or relational theories might be contradictory.
Differences between Cozolino’s theory and established psychotherapy theories.
In this section I identify passages in which Cozolino described his psychotherapy theory
as a unique psychotherapy theory or practice, or as an original interpretation of alreadyestablished psychotherapy theories and practices.
Understanding the underlying neurobiology of effective psychotherapies rather
than creating a new one. Cozolino did not create a new psychotherapy theory or specific
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psychological treatment. Instead, he focused on a theoretical integration between alreadyexisting psychotherapy theories on the basis of a brain-based interpretation of several
well-known psychotherapies and common factors of effective psychotherapies.
From my perspective, the value of neuroscience for psychotherapists is not to
explain away the mind or generate new forms of therapy, but to help us grasp the
neurobiological substrates of the talking cure in an optimistic and enthusiastic
continuation of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. (p. 358)
In this statement on the last page of his book Cozolino denied that he intended to
promote a reduction of mind to brain, and he also denied that his book had been an
attempt to create a new therapy theory. Although he denied attempting to use
neuroscience to reduce mind to brain, he then described neuroscience as valuable for a
“continuation” of Freud’s initial intention for a brain-based paradigm explaining human
behavior or experience as neurobiological processes. This attempt to depict Freud’s
psychoanalytic theory as simply a placeholder for a psychotherapy-neuroscience
integration overlooked the substantial effects of psychological and psychotherapy
theories and practices on Western cultures, and Western cultural trends embodied by
psychotherapy theories during the intervening decades of the 20th century. The claim that
he was attempting to link his theory to Freud’s original intentions was part of Cozolino’s
origin myth strategy (see above).
Using neuroscience in support of, or as a means for psychotherapy integration.
Cozolino’s use of neuroscience as a means for psychotherapy integration was an
important premise of his book.
“Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness,
all forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration”
(p. 46).
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Cozolino’s statement suggested that various understandings of ideal therapy
outcomes are all descriptions or interpretations of neural network integration, and
therefore should be combined under the overarching field of neuroscience, rather than
combined according to psychological common factors or differentiated according to the
unique understandings of self that psychotherapy theories embody. In my review of
literature relevant to the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy (see
Chapter II) I discussed similar arguments put forward by other theorists and
psychotherapy authors. This proposal appears to offer hope for establishing with certainty
a set of best practices in psychotherapy that would transcend the contentious debates
among advocates of disparate psychological research methodologies about what
constitutes psychological change and successful treatment. However, forfeiting the
debate entirely in an effort to simply subsume the entire enterprise of psychotherapy
integration and psychotherapy outcome research under the higher-status domain of
neuroscience research is a rewriting of the purpose of psychotherapy treatment, and it is
reductionist. In the following passage, Cozolino described psychotherapy in exclusively
neuroscientific terms.
When theories of neuroscience and psychotherapy are considered side by side, a
number of working hypotheses emerge. First, given that the human brain is a
social organ, safe and supportive relationships are the optimal environment for
social and emotional learning. . . . Second, we appear to experience optimal
development and integration in the context of a mild to moderate level of arousal
or what we might call optimal stress. . . . A third hypothesis is that the
involvement of affect and cognition appears necessary in the therapeutic process
in order to create the context for integration of neural circuits with a high
vulnerability to dissociation. . . . Fourth, the co-construction of narratives between
parent and child or therapist and client provides a broad matrix supporting the
integration of multiple neural networks. (pp. 46-47)
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Cozolino argued that these four factors are common to effective psychotherapies
because they appeal to some core traits or characteristics of the human brain, thereby
activating networks in the brain in a certain way that makes therapy an effective
psychological treatment through promoting the optimal functioning of the brain. By
attributing neural integration to the combination of “safe and supportive relationships,”
“optimal stress,” “the involvement of affect and cognition” and “the co-construction of
narratives,” he described these important aspects of human psychology and development
as central to patient health and wellbeing because of the effects of these conditions on the
brain. This was one significant example of how he conflated personhood with the
individual brain, repurposing psychotherapy in addition to his stated focus of validating
already-existing practices. In other words, although Cozolino did not advocate for a
therapy process or series of psychological interventions that might outwardly appear new,
his re-visioning of therapy as effective for a brain rather than for an individual has
important implications for how therapists think about their role as clinicians, the purpose
of treating patients, and the proper area of study for psychological research methods.
In the following passage, Cozolino’s description of psychotherapy theories and
neuroscience as both “heuristics” was noteworthy because he used that concept to
describe both fields, and then he ascribed different qualities to each one.
Although each approach to psychotherapy is experienced as a fundamental truth
by its disciples, all modes of therapy are actually heuristics. Heuristics are
interpretations of experience or ways of understanding phenomena. The value of a
heuristic lies in its ability to organize, explain, and predict what we observe.
Neuroscience is another heuristic, one that we are using in the present discussion
to explain the mechanisms of action of psychotherapy; in other words how and
why it works. It is my belief that neuroscience is a helpful heuristic that will lead
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us to a fuller understanding of the process of psychotherapy and may also serve as
a rational means of selecting, combining, and evaluating treatment modalities.
(p. 33)
In this passage Cozolino seemed at first to claim that neuroscience, similar to
“each approach to psychotherapy,” might simply appear to be another paradigm
masquerading as a “truth.” However, a closer reading suggests that by describing the
heuristic of neuroscience as serving “to explain the mechanisms of action of
psychotherapy,” Cozolino implied some primacy or transcending quality of neuroscience
as an explanation of efficacy currently missing from psychotherapy theories. The way the
passage was worded implied that the value of neuroscience for all psychotherapies is
greater than the value of any particular psychotherapy since therapies are experienced as
“a fundamental truth” by the “disciples” or followers of that therapy. In other words, he
used the word heuristic to relegate all specific psychotherapy approaches to the status of
“interpretations” that are merely experienced as truth for the fans of that theory. Cozolino
claimed that neuroscience is a proper means of psychotherapy integration because of its
ability to explain contentious issues across modalities, rather than as a way to interpret
phenomena myopically as he accused discreet therapy theories (or at least their followers)
of doing. This seemed to be a roundabout way of advocating for psychotherapy
integration through reductionism.
My hope is that including neural network activity in our case conceptualization
may help to establish a common language for us to select, combine, and evaluate
the treatments we provide. It will, one hopes, help us to move past debates
between competing schools of thought to a more inclusive approach to
psychotherapy. (p. 353)
This was another statement advocating for neuroscience as a means of
establishing best practices from among a vast array of varying talk therapy theories. In
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this passage there was a general sense that neuroscience could offer the hope for
improving psychotherapy as a profession. The prediction that neuroscience will be used
as a uniting paradigm overlooked the absence of much agreement among therapists or
theorists about fundamental issues related to the meaning and nature of mental ills and
their treatment. It would also require a rather uncritical approach to the meaning and
nature of neuroscience. His claims in these passages were highly suggestive of a
reduction of psychology to neurobiology.
Predicting future involvement of neuroscience in psychotherapy practice.
Although he denied that his psychotherapy recommendations were meant to serve as a
new and unique psychotherapy practice, and instead argued that his efforts represented a
brain-based understanding of current psychotherapies and psychotherapy integration,
Cozolino’s predictions for the future involvement of neuroscience in psychotherapy were
bold.
As part of an initial assessment, [neuroimaging] could help therapists pinpoint
areas of neural activation and inhibition. Treatment planning will eventually come
to include specific psychotherapeutic and pharmacological interventions to
enhance the growth and integration of affected networks. Regular scans during the
course of therapy may someday be a useful adjunct to psychological tests, as ways
of fine-tuning the therapeutic process and measuring treatment success. (p. 345)
These predictions of a close relationship between psychotherapy and neuroscience
in Cozolino’s final chapter (titled “The Psychotherapist as Neuroscientist,” pp. 341-358)
were striking. Writing case conceptualizations in a neurobiology vernacular, or using
neuroimaging to monitor psychotherapy patients’ progress in treatment might sound
exciting to readers and appeal to an ideal of a more exacting, scientized future that is
drawing near. However, Cozolino neglected to describe further any specific details for
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how those plans would be widely implemented or why they might be helpful for patients,
or what would be the consequences of linking psychotherapy with neuroscience in such a
sweeping way.
In sum, Cozolino identified his theory as an attempt at psychotherapy theory
integration and he predicted a future in which the practice of psychotherapy will be
closely aligned with neuroscience. These were dramatic predictions and reductionist
interpretations that warrant examination in light of the criticisms that some scholars have
raised against the claims and rhetoric used to depict the relationship between mind and
brain. With all of these predictions Cozolino took for granted the significance of
neuroscience in popular culture and in the understanding of self in contemporary Western
cultures. Although techniques similar to those that he predicted are already practiced by
some specialized psychologists, his casual prediction for these practices to become
widespread assumed that these changes to typical psychotherapy practice could be
feasible or at least without reason for concern about the implications of turning talk
therapy practice into a technicized neuroscientific intervention as the standard for patient
care.
The tenets of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory. In this section I focus on
Cozolino’s broadest understandings or descriptions of the purpose of psychotherapy, the
general populations of psychotherapy patients or common reasons why people seek talk
therapy (as well as types of abnormal behavior or psychopathology that psychotherapists
treat), Cozolino’s understanding of self, mind, and brain (and the relationships between
those aspects of human experience), the neurobiological mechanisms of psychotherapy,
the psychological mechanisms that activate those corresponding brain processes, ways in
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which therapists should provide therapy so that those mechanisms are utilized, and
indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. (For quotes from Cozolino’s text for all
of the following subsections, see Appendix A, pp. 298-324).
The definition or general purpose of psychotherapy. In this section I examine
Cozolino’s broadest descriptions of psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy as a venue for neural integration. Cozolino defined psychotherapy
by its potential to restore neural integration or proper connectivity between brain regions.
He asserted that therapies are able to be distinguished on the basis of which neural
networks are involved, rather than on the basis of the tenets of the treatment, or the
underlying assumptions about human behavior, change, health, or the best way of life—
that is, aspects of self—constructed by an array of shared social and cultural values. He
instead reduced those broadly shared values to neural networks within an individual’s
brain that he believed to be specifically influenced or activated in response to the
“enriched environment” (p. 20) of therapy. In other words, he defined psychotherapy by
the neurobiological mechanisms of change suspected to be involved with treatment.
According to Cozolino, the neurobiology that confers upon humans the potential
to experience psychological problems is the same neurobiology that confers upon humans
the capacity to reverse or remedy those problems in psychotherapy. In that way, human
problems and their cures are highly individualized and the same process that explains the
existence or continuance of individual difficulties (lack of neural integration) is related to
the process that corrects those difficulties (establishing neural integration). This
explanation was accomplished through a highly reductive understanding of problems and
cures as physically localized and therefore able to be physically manipulated through the
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qualities of the nonmaterial relationship and discourse of talk therapy acting in a material
or physiological way on the human brain.
Psychotherapy as a relationship that is similar to other relationships that
facilitate neural integration. Cozolino equated therapy with other human relationships
that result in healing and corresponding brain change. His argument suggested that there
is nothing inherently special or unique about the psychotherapy relationship, since its
potential for healing exists in other relationships insofar as those other relationships
produce similar changes in an individual’s brain. This was a significant claim that could
contradict the unique philosophies and history embedded within the practice of
psychotherapy.
By viewing therapy as a venue for neural integration that is similar to other
relationships that facilitate healing through identical neurobiological change, Cozolino at
once reduced psychotherapy to technical interventions that alter the brain while subtly
implying that there is nothing inherently unique to the institution of psychotherapy or to
the outcomes it may confer upon patients.
General reasons why people seek psychotherapy. In this section I address the
broadest reasons that Cozolino provided for why people seek or attend psychotherapy,
such as general descriptions or typical populations of psychotherapy patients.
A lack of “optimal” neural functioning is implicated in the problems for which
people seek treatment with psychotherapy regardless of the severity or types of problems.
Cozolino asserted that all psychotherapy patients receive treatment for problems that are
manifestations of their underlying neurobiological correlates, regardless of the degree of
severity or symptomatology. In other words, he argued that whether a patient seeks
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therapy for treatment of mental illness or general life issues that do not warrant a
psychological diagnosis, there is some aspect of the functioning of the patient’s brain that
is relevant to the presenting problem and implicated when psychotherapy is successful.
He speculated that neuroimaging might confirm this if neuroimaging studies of
psychotherapy patients did not focus exclusively on treatment studies of specific mental
illnesses, but instead broadened to include patients whose general personal issues or
problems have not resulted in serious functional impairments. This materializing of all
psychological difficulties and stressors was a significant claim in its assertion that even a
lack of mental illness still implies that psychotherapy is a brain-based treatment.
Psychotherapy remedies problems that result because the human brain initially
develops in accordance with early childhood experiences. According to Cozolino, early
development influences later physiological and psychological wellbeing because brain
development is sensitive to early negative interpersonal experiences (as well as later
psychological traumas). He implied that individual functioning is determined early in the
lifespan because the brain is especially adaptable to its surroundings during that phase of
development. The brain was therefore portrayed as the source of individual personhood,
and parenting was portrayed as significant for its effects on neurobiological development.
Patients are often being held back in their potential to enact desired changes
because of the way in which their brains have constructed reality. Cozolino’s brain-based
psychotherapy integration was based on the premise that the human brain constructs
reality, guides an individual’s perceptions of reality, shapes personal identities, and in
many ways exerts a vast amount of control over human behaviors and experiences. By
redefining the unconscious mind as “hidden layers of neural processing” (p. 133),
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Cozolino provided a materialized or brain-based explanation for patients’ hindered
personal growth or inability to change in the way that they think they need or desire. This
reiterated the idea that changing oneself entails changing one’s brain, and that the task of
helping patients understand what is dissociated or outside of their awareness is a process
of revealing the workings of hidden parts of the brain whose distortions are knowable
only through patients’ perceptions, thoughts, or interpretations of reality. Because the
pertinent brain layers are allegedly hidden there seems to be faith required to believe that
these brain structures exist, or faith that neuroscience will eventually discover them
through continued advances in imaging technology. The hope that neuroscience will
provide explanations for human propensities, values, and behaviors is deeply tied to the
biomedical self described by scholars such as Vidal (2009) and Moreira and Palladino
(2005).
Psychological defenses (also described as the adaptations of neural networks) are
no longer effective for coping. Cozolino explained that patients seek treatment when the
usefulness of typical coping strategies have been exhausted. He mapped the
psychoanalytic concept of defense mechanisms onto “neural networks” (p. 34), noting
that people often seek treatment when their usual ways of dealing with their symptoms
have been rendered ineffective, and as a result they can no longer ignore or deny their
psychological distress or symptoms. Although people were described as the entity that
seeks treatment, neural networks were described as the entity that “adapts to cope with
emotional stress” (p. 34). In other words, Cozolino ascribed the flexibility or adaptability
of human beings to the neural networks in the human brain, thereby materializing an
intrapsychic view of self (see also Personification, pp. 209-211).
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All of these explanations for why patients attend therapy reduced the immense
array of psychological conditions and general life problems typically treated in talk
therapy to malfunctioning neural correlates. In general, even though Cozolino noted that
social factors such as early relationships with caregivers may contribute to later mental
problems, problems were typically depicted as individualized rather than systemic and
interiorized rather than relational.
The definition and etiology of psychopathology. In this section I highlight
Cozolino’s definition and descriptions of psychopathology or established mental
disorders, categories of abnormal psychology, or diagnosable psychological conditions.
Mental disorders are types of inadequate neural integration. Cozolino broadly
defined psychopathology as a lack of optimal neural network integration, and he provided
specific examples of mental disorders or conditions that neuroscience research has
confirmed as being “linked to deficits in the integration and balance among the cerebral
hemispheres” (p. 106). At times it was unclear whether he attributed the origins of an
individual’s psychopathology to the functioning of the human brain, or whether
psychopathology has simply been observed to have neural correlates in the human brain
(see also Ambiguity, pp. 171-178). Regardless, Cozolino paired the concept of mental
disorder with the concept of inadequate or imbalanced integration between brain
structures and functions. Through this understanding of psychopathology, mental or
psychological conditions were portrayed as internalized by mapping an array of
psychological symptoms onto individual neuroanatomy. This was significant because it
implied an understanding of human difficulties as intrapsychic rather than interpersonal.
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Humans have the potential to experience psychopathology because of how the
brain evolved. Cozolino’s understanding of psychopathology illustrated the centrality of
evolutionary theory in his book (see Themes, pp. 213-220). According to Cozolino,
psychopathology results from neurological processes that date back to the earliest human
history, yet in modern life those processes are now often understood to be inappropriate
or unreasonable psychological responses for the contemporary contexts or situations in
which individuals might experience them. He suggested that because of the advancing
complexity of the human brain over the course of human history, the experience of
anxiety, for example, is the same fundamental process regardless of the psychological
issue that is causing feelings of fear or worry, or the context in which those feelings are
experienced. For example, he illustrated this argument by equating a physiological reflex
resulting from an unexpected physical sensation with an “existential crisis” (p. 239) about
issues that are not immediately inflicting physical harm upon a person. In other words,
his understanding of all psychological distress as products of natural physiological
processes regardless of the circumstances in which they occur was a reductionist
understanding of problems of self, and exemplified his attitude of inevitability with
respect to psychological problems and treatments that he described as timeless and
natural occurrences.
The continuum of normality to abnormality represents a continuum of stress
responses. Cozolino described stress as essential for healthy childhood development and
later for effective psychotherapy when experienced in the correct amounts, yet quite
harmful psychologically when individuals become overloaded with it, asserting that
lasting anxiety and symptoms of psychological trauma often result from an
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overabundance of stress. Cozolino explained the severity of both psychological and
neurobiological indicators of trauma as correlating with the phase of individual
development in which the trauma occurs, and the duration of the trauma. He identified
neglectful, abusive, or otherwise harmful parenting as resulting in later psychological
difficulties while asserting that ideal parenting leads to a proper balance of stress
hormones in a child’s body and a proper integration of experience by a child’s brain. In
these passages Cozolino implied that on a continuum from normality to abnormality,
coherence among various aspects of human functioning (“sensation, perception, and
emotion”; p. 151) are made possible by neural integration while symptoms of severe
posttraumatic stress disorder indicate the most serious disruptions of neural integration
and the “experience of self” (p. 151). In other words, he used his focus on trauma and
dissociation to interpret psychopathology as a disruption in both neural integration and
coherency of self, thereby portraying a close association between brain functioning and
self.
Psychopathology resulting from nonsecure attachment experiences. Cozolino
equated secure attachment with psychological wellbeing, and he associated insecure
attachment with psychopathology. He claimed that a child forms a secure attachment
with attuned and caring parents, which influences the development of the brain in a way
that is likely to promote later mental and physical health. Cozolino reduced the parentchild relationship to the effects of that relationship on the child’s brain, thereby
technicizing and individualizing the parent-child relationship. Cozolino wrote that
attachment schemas are stored “within networks of the social brain,” (p. 198) thereby
attributing social aspects of humans to a hypothesized innate drive in the brain for
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attachment and the formation of relationships. The psychological concept of repeating
relationship patterns in accordance with early experiences was materialized onto the brain
and rewritten as “implicit” (p. 198) products of brain functioning that occur outside of
individual awareness. One passage in this section was especially noteworthy for
Cozolino’s assertion that aggressive and violent behaviors including acts of domestic
violence may result from how early nonsecure attachment impacts the developing brain
(p. 234). His simple and abrupt explanation overlooked the culpability of perpetrators of
these crimes, as well as broader cultural understandings that may contribute to violence
within relationships that is disproportionately committed against women and children.
Overall, these understandings of psychopathology mapped psychological
symptoms onto the human brain, naturalizing and reducing them in order to portray them
as disruptions in the coherent experience of self that results from inadequate neural
integration. Cozolino described trauma and dissociation by their intrapsychic effects that
he mapped onto the brain, thereby using that understanding to conflate the concepts of
neural integration and psychological integration. The focus on attachment and the brain
seemed to be an attempt at social or relational theory but was at best	
  an understanding of
self as emerging in a dyad or triad with parents, validated by a materialized interpretation
of intrapsychic processes rather than expanded with a broader understanding of the
fluidity between a broader cultural context and the private family unit.
The existence and definition of self. In this section I examine how Cozolino
defined or described the concept of self (aside from the relationship between self and
mind or self and brain).

136

Influenced by D.W. Winnicott, Cozolino described self as developing during
periods in childhood marked by calmness and being alone. Cozolino linked Winnicott’s
true self—false self dichotomy with secure and insecure attachment styles and general
psychological wellbeing. This was the primary psychological theory of self that Cozolino
used to link his interpretation of brain research with human psychological development.
Cozolino applied the Winnicottian theory to describe self in a way that emphasized the
need for children to develop a sense of independence from parents. He associated true
self with optimal emotional wellbeing and false self with maladaptive dependency on the
needs of others resulting from parents having failed to provide adequate personal space
for the development of individual identity and the ability to understand and care for
oneself. He implied that “self-reflective capacity” (p. 192) or the ability to be alone and
contemplative is a central gauge of proper child development and psychological health or
stability. Later in this section I discuss how Cozolino used Winnicottian theory as an
interpretation of ideal brain development.
Self formed through narrative. Cozolino argued that self is closely linked to
narrative, that is, the language or story that a person uses to describe oneself, especially in
regards to personal history. According to Cozolino, since language can be used in a
flexible or creative way, the flexibility or adaptability of human beings stems from the
vastness of possible narratives that individuals can construct. Cozolino suggested a
transcendent quality that narrative confers upon humans by describing it as the tool by
which a person can imagine alternate ways of being before attempting to implement
changes that are consciously desired. Cozolino also asserted that shared narratives link
individuals within a society. His statement that narratives link “feelings, actions, and
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others to the self” (p. 207) implied that feelings, actions, and other people are not inherent
to or inseparable from selfhood, but instead are detachable from the autonomous
individual. Cozolino’s ambitious use of narrative to depict humans as capable of grand
and imaginative changes seemed to be an example of what Cushman and Gilford (1999)
described as a misuse of interpretive or postmodern concepts by some recent
psychotherapy theories that inadvertently promote the idea of imagining quick and
unproblematic personal changes, consistent with consumer culture rather than the critical
philosophies that such rhetoric might at first appear to suggest. Later in this section I
discuss how Cozolino emphasized how narrative activates neuroplasticity and creates
lasting neural change.
Narrative or “stories of the self” enables affect regulation. In one statement
Cozolino argued that the consistency of memory about personal history is essential for
emotional regulation. He suggested that individuals regulate their affect through the use
of narrative because narratives engender a sense of stability and predictability.
Self and imagination. Cozolino linked the flexibility of self to the capacity for a
flexible and creative use of language and to the human imagination that this use of
language supports. He also emphasized how the capacity for imagination is facilitated by
the highly evolved human brain (see The relationship between self and brain,
pp. 143-151). As I discussed above with Cozolino’s description of the close association
between self and narrative, the assertion that subjectivity may so radically and
whimsically shift has been identified as a misuse of postmodern theories of self that often
encourages a decontextualized understanding of identity, moral relativism, and logical
contradictions (see Cushman & Gilford, 1999).
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Overall, these various understandings and depictions of self suggested a
combination of early-20th century psychoanalytic theory (which held a vision of self was
rooted in an interiorized and individualized personhood) with highly relativistic
portrayals of selfhood as easily and quickly changed based on imagination and narrative.
Of note, his uses of the concept of self implied a unitary rather than multiplistic vision of
self, as his understanding of integration and dissociation focused on various aspects of
individual human functioning (e.g., psychological and physiological) rather than
integration of multiple self states.
The existence and definition of mind. I this section I examine ways in which
Cozolino defined or described the concept of mind.
Mind is how Freud chose to describe the brain. Cozolino did not explicitly define
mind, although he intermittently described certain qualities or processes of the human
mind and the relationship between mind and brain (see below). Cozolino used his
simplified and ahistorical depiction of psychoanalysis as originating from neurology to
imply that the psychoanalytic theory of mind was used as a placeholder until recent
neuroimaging could establish the brain-behavior relationships that Freud initially and
correctly hypothesized. In other words, he used his origin myth of psychotherapy to argue
that human psychology and subjective experience appears nonmaterial but are now
objectively verifiable by brain science as products of physiological correlates.
The brain is what therapists have unknowingly been working with or describing
while calling it mind. As I discussed above (see General history of psychotherapy
according to Cozolino, pp. 112-117), Cozolino argued that in conducting psychotherapy
therapists have always been performing an intervention on the human brain. His
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statements exemplified how he combined the psychoanalytic concepts of conscious and
unconscious mind with the unique functions of the hemispheres of the brain. This implied
that the tenets of psychoanalytic theory (there are both conscious and unconscious aspects
of human experience and volition) and the interplay between the left and right
hemispheres of the human brain are two ways of describing the same phenomena of
human experience. Cozolino’s rhetorical strategy overlooked the unique histories of brain
research and psychoanalytic theory and therefore overlooked the unique goals, uses, and
purposes of those areas of study. This dismissed the important cultural and political fit
between psychological theories or treatments and the Western philosophical traditions
from which they have drawn, as well as the specific cultural circumstances embodied by
psychological theories. However, Cozolino also needed to insert a great deal of
speculative and ambiguous language when drawing conclusions about the relationship
between mind and brain (see Ambiguity, pp. 171-178; see Speculation language,
pp. 195-203), and at times he acknowledged that such arguments are not without
controversy and are potentially incapable of being considered objective findings rather
than interpretive claims (see Aporia, pp. 178-182).
In sum, Cozolino’s descriptions of mind depicted the study of human conscious
experience as an antiquated concept aside from its relationship to the brain and the
interpretation of mind or consciousness as the experience produced by neurobiology. He
used his origin myth strategy to assert that human experience is the result of material or
physical processes in the brain. This is a controversial position rejected by many experts
even within the field of neuroscience (see Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001; Noë,
2009).
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The relationship between mind and brain. In this section I examine ways in
which Cozolino explicated or implied a relationship between mind and brain.
Mind and brain are “a unified process.” Although Cozolino claimed to reject the
reduction of mind to brain, in the opening statement of his book he posited a unity
between the workings of the physical brain and the concept of mind. In that passage he
argued that mind-brain research has been stifled by interdisciplinary politics, and that the
complexity of these issues have turned many people away from trying to understand
them. These claims were surprising in light of research documenting the popular appeal
and academic prevalence of neuroscience research. Regardless, he responded by asserting
that mind and brain are “essentially a unified process,” (p. 1) quickly simplifying the
issue as if to assuage concerns that the mind-brain integration in his book might be
complicated. The meaning of that statement was unclear, and portraying the issue as a
matter of whether therapists can understand neuroscience seemed is a distraction from
broader issues such as the accuracy of his mind-brain synthesis, and more importantly,
the relevance of that theory for psychotherapy practice.
Mind is “embedded” within processes of the brain. Cozolino posited that
psychoanalytic theories have unknowingly described brain functioning and how mind is
“embedded” (p. 196) in brain processes. It was unclear what he actually intended to assert
with that statement. However, by suggesting that psychoanalytic theories are necessary
for understanding the relationship between mind and brain, or that those theories
correctly describe how human experience results from neural functioning, Cozolino
seemed to employ a fallacy described by Bennett and Hacker (2003) that states that one
cannot ascribe such psychological theories to the brain unless one was already seeking to
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find them, as there is no way to elicit from the brain a verification of whether the
psychological theory or principle correctly fits with its functioning. The use of
psychoanalytic theory in this way also seems to exemplify Brothers’ (2001) argument
that the field of neuroscience needs the field of psychology a great deal more than the
field of psychology needs the field of neuroscience since neuroscience requires the use of
established theories of mind to use as a vehicle for inserting its language into common
parlance.
Mind might emerge from the brain. In one statement Cozolino speculated that
mind might emerge from the brain (p. 132) but it was unclear whether he attempted to
imply that current research supports that claim, or that future research will likely provide
evidence in support of this finding. The use of the concept of mind and the intended
claim about it were both vague.
Certain states of mind might influence brain functioning. In one passage Cozolino
seemed to describe mind as conscious volition and he implied that it activates the brain in
ways that result in greater control over thoughts and behaviors. Although Cozolino
primarily used the concept of self and descriptions of brain functioning (rather than
descriptions of mind), here he implied that human intentionality or deliberately
cultivating a certain “state of mind” (p. 169) may influence brain functioning in a way
that fosters the type of self-control over emotions that is consciously desired. If Cozolino
intended to imply that mind and brain are not synonymous because states of mind impact
the functioning of the brain, then the reader may conclude from that passage whatever is
typically described as mind exists at least partially outside of the workings of the material
brain. However, since Cozolino also explicitly argued that the human brain creates and
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exerts tremendous influence over the perception of reality, it was not clear whether he
would contend that human intentionality as depicted in this passage is merely part of the
illusion of freedom or control produced by the brain (see also Aporia, pp. 178-182).
Cozolino did not discuss the possible contradictions, or the important implications, that
necessary follow from his phrasing.
Phrases that suggested mind and brain are not synonymous. In addition to the
passage described above that could imply that mind and brain are not synonymous or
identical, other passages contained descriptions of mind that implied a separation
between mind and brain. However, Cozolino did not provide sufficient clarification about
these phrases or elaborate on the implications of these statements. Although these
passages implied possible distinctions between mind and brain, this type of rhetoric was
infrequent in Cozolino’s book, and in the absence of any explicit definition of mind it
was not clear whether these passages were intended to refer to mind as human cognition
and intentionality broadly, or to some possibly nonmaterial entity with which individuals
are endowed. For example, in one passage he stated that over the course of human
history, some executive functions “were assumed by the mind” (p. 115), suggesting that
mind as at least partially separate from the brain. In another passage, the use of the phrase
“group mind” (p. 164) implied that some process or entity is shared amongst people and
related somehow to human social interactions. In another passage, his assertion that
“brain and mind have evolved” (p. 316) to allow for the physical and emotional
experiences of threatening situations also suggested a distinction between the two
concepts or entities. However, he did not elaborate upon the intended meanings of these
phrases.

143

Cozolino’s failure to provide a clear definition of mind caused his occasional use
of the concept to seem colloquial, and his intended assertions in these passages were
vague. Because his use of the concept of mind alongside descriptions of the brain resulted
in confusing statements, the intended relationship between mind and brain would
seemingly have to be inferred by the reader. This might unknowingly reduce the concept
of mind to brain functioning. In so doing, readers might unintentionally dismiss the
relevance of psychological concepts and experiences apart from their verifiable neural
correlates. Rather than simply overcoming a mental-physical dichotomy, this use of
grammar could negate the importance of subjectivity and agency associated with
psychological descriptions that inherently assume mental-physical holism and are thought
to mediate brain-behavior relations (see Brothers, 2001).
The relationship between self and brain. In this section I discuss ways in which
Cozolino explicated and/or implied a relationship between self and brain.
The extent of neural integration corresponds to the extent of psychological
integration or coherence of self. Cozolino described how neural integration enables a
seamless assimilation or coordination amongst various physical and mental aspects of
human functioning. He seemed to associate that seamless coordination of human
functions with the concept of selfhood or coherent psychological experience. In other
words, he equated neural integration with a coherent experience of self in order to imply
that self emerges from neurobiology. In one passage he first asserted that neural
integration leads to what has been described by psychoanalytic theory as ego, and then he
defined ego as the amalgamation of the psychological qualities associated with self
(“personality, affect regulation, coping styles, and self image”; p. 27). In another passage,
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based on his understanding of psychopathology as a lack of neural integration, Cozolino
stated that it is a “fact that the self is a fragile construction of the brain” (p. 286). In that
same passage he stated that the experience and location of self is flexible “within our
imagination” (p. 286), a claim I discussed earlier when examining Cozolino’s
understanding of self. These passages all demonstrated how Cozolino’s understanding of
the relationship between self and brain at times had to be inferred based on the recurring
ways in which it was used. Regardless, his uses of the concept of self alongside
descriptions of the brain implied a decontextualized, material, and individual selfhood
localized in the brain, and by happenstance or intuition had been described correctly by
psychoanalytic and other psychological theories. His individualized vision of self was at
once a physicalized self that can also utilize the properties of the brain to imagine
boundlessness and freedom from apparent limitations, in order to facilitate desired
personal changes.
Left and right hemispheres of the brain correspond to distinct aspects of self.
Cozolino emphasized how two remarkably specialized hemispheres of the brain are each
responsible for different aspects of human perception and experience, and that the
integration or coordination between the two regions is essential for a coherent experience
of self. In the passages I identified, Cozolino mapped aspects of the psychoanalytic
theory of mind onto the left and right hemispheres of the human brain. He asserted that
the right hemisphere of the brain operates in a way that is similar to how psychoanalytic
theorists describe the unconscious mind, while describing “the left hemisphere
interpreter” (p. 103) as the process by which a person’s brain knowingly and decidedly
chooses how he or she will form coherent perceptions, and then directs or portrays that
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person to other people. Cozolino then speculated that this function of the left hemisphere
is a possible explanation for psychological defense mechanisms as described by
psychoanalytic theory. The use of left and right brain hemispheres to describe the
localization (and ideally a balance) of distinct aspects of human beings highlighted
Cozolino’s use of the brain to support a veiled moral discourse whose origins were
attributed (and reduced) to brain structures rather than shared culture and historical
traditions that hold certain values and lifestyles in high esteem. For instance, by
attributing rational self-control to the left hemisphere and unbridled mental processes to
the right hemisphere, Cozolino naturalized a modern Western view of personhood that
results in what it typically understood to be an indicator of adequate social functioning
and general wellbeing. In other words, there are moral consequences to recommendations
that are disguised as objective or neutral scientific findings.
The parietal lobes of the brain contribute significantly to the experience of self.
Cozolino argued that the parietal lobes have been overlooked as a likely significant
contributor to the experience of self. The passages in this section exemplified the
underlying logic that Cozolino used throughout his book to link human psychology or
conscious experience with processes in the brain. Cozolino first described certain human
characteristics or abilities that he identified as most defining of self (and accurately
intuited by early psychoanalytic theorists) and then he localized those defining capacities
of self in the brain (especially the parietal lobes). He thereby implied that self emerges
from the brain and that early psychoanalytic theories happened to be correct in describing
the experience of self that the brain enables. As I discussed above, the circular logic used
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to attribute a theory of self or mind to the functioning of the brain warrants exploration in
light of challenges to this logic by scientists and other theorists.
Winnicott’s concept of true self describes neural integration and healthy
psychological development. As I discussed above (see The existence and definition of
self, pp. 135-138), Cozolino endorsed a Winnicottian vision of the emergence and
development of self. He then used this theory to describe the results of brain development
by speculating that the way in which an individual develops a self mirrors the way in
which his or her brain develops, and that this brain development reflects the “neural
organization” (p. 146) transmitted from parents to their children. With an attitude of
certainty Cozolino described the true self as “obviously” (p. 191) a description of self that
emerges from optimal development of neural networks. He described the concept of a
true self as one that is psychologically integrated or conscious of and able to cope with
negative feelings, and that the true self reflects proper mind-body integration. This is a
depiction of self as an individual material being whose specific neurobiology (and
therefore his or her mental or nonmaterial life) is formed primarily within the dyad or
triad of parent-child relationships and is identical to a Winnicottian developmental
scheme. This claim relied on the use of a psychological theory in a way that extracted it
from the cultural circumstance in which that theory emerged and gained favor, and
portrayed it as originally based on the intuition of the theorist who devised it, in order to
re-appropriate it for use in the current era as verification of how brain science correctly
explains the material origins of self.
Self and contemporary problems of the self both result from how the brain
evolved to allow for imagination. Cozolino argued that the cerebral cortex of the brain
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allows for the remarkable mental abilities that are unique to humans, such as the ability to
imagine oneself in alternative circumstances, or to care about one’s place in a complex
social order. He argued that the human imagination is also the cause of psychological
problems that stem from unrealistic fears and expectations. According to Cozolino,
because the human brain has advanced with the evolution of the human species, feelings
such as fear and worry, which originally were useful to ensure physical survival, are now
experienced as a result of concerns about psychological integrity that are often unfounded
or irrational. For example, he identified the human brain as implicated even in symptoms
such as malaise or worry resulting from a consideration of issues such as the finitude of
human existence, negative social standing, or catastrophes that are unlikely to happen.
Above I discussed some of the problems with reducing and naturalizing all psychological
experiences to material processes (see General reasons why people seek psychotherapy,
pp. 129-132).
The ways in which the brain interprets social interactions contributes to a sense
of self. Cozolino described how the human brain recognizes and interprets nuances during
interpersonal communication. He suggested that social aspects of selfhood result from
“automatic” (p. 189) brain processes. He implied that social reciprocity and shared
customs or ways of living are possible to the extent that the human brain receives input
from other people through circuits that synthesize this input and infer what other people
might be experiencing. This brain-to-brain explanation for human society is a highly
individualized and scientized depiction of human beings as inherently removed from
ideas about a shared world based on a moral tradition, that is, a shared understanding of
the good. In other words, his strategy for challenging modern isolated individualism
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exemplified a technical understanding of selfhood that could ultimately reinforce
individualism rather than adequately support social or relational visions of human being.
Neural integration enables self to be experienced as embodied. In at least two
statements Cozolino used neural integration to explain the human experience of
physicality. Cozolino depicted the connection between mind and body as occurring
through an integration of networks in the brain. This seemed to be an attempt to use
neuroscience to resolve the problems raised by the presupposition of doubt about physical
existence underlying the mind-body dualism central to modern era philosophy. This use
of brain research to link mind and body is problematic because it relies on materializing
rather than contextualizing human psychology, thereby replicating the interiorized
modern era vision of self it sought to rectify. Some psychotherapy theorists have applied
late-20th century sociocultural theories such as philosophical hermeneutics to
psychotherapy theories and practices that have addressed Cartesian dualism by rejecting
as a central concern the efforts to prove the existence of a material self, thereby
contextualizing therapy practice as a social and relational endeavor rather than
inadvertently reinforcing the interiorized and intrapsychic modern view of self (Kirschner
& Martin, 2010). Naturalizing the material view of self as a product of brain functioning
dismisses interpretations of embodied selfhood as a cultural and historical viewpoint
rather than a timeless truth regardless of the extent to which the idea of a physicalized
individual self currently appears to be intrinsic.
Language and narrative foster neural integration, thereby enabling a coherent
experience of self. As I noted above (see The existence and definition of self,
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pp. 135-138), Cozolino identified narrative or language as essential for the formation and
ongoing flexibility of self. He also posited that narrative facilitates neural network
integration that corresponds to the experience of self and emotional regulation. In doing
so he implied a correlation but not any specific directionality between psychological and
neurobiological processes. In other words, it was unclear whether neural integration
results from or produces the psychological experiences of emotional regulation and a
sense of self. His emphasis on the role of language and narrative or discourse in the
construction of self or the understanding of human beings seems to incorporate late-20th
century social and interpretive theory (such as hermeneutics) that have been influential to
contemporary psychotherapy theories. However, the idea that language joins people by
connecting brains seems to be an attempt to use relational thinking in the service of
reinforcing a materialized intrapsychic view of self.
Self-reflection facilitates neural integration. As I discussed above, Cozolino
argued that deep and calm personal reflection is essential for the emergence and
development of a coherent experience of self (see The existence and definition of self,
pp. 135-138). Cozolino also suggested a fit between this kind of reflection or
contemplation and neural integration. He argued that the development of an integrated
brain and an integrated self are dependent upon self-reflection, which facilitates
coordination between emotions, thoughts, and other aspects of human functioning. This
was an example of assigning qualities to the brain that he had also assigned to the self,
thereby linking self and brain using a rhetorical device rather than verifiable
neuroscientific findings. This argument illustrated how Cozolino’s view of self-contained
individualism as both emerging from and facilitating healthy brain development was a
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vision of acquiring self-control through a process of regaining power from the influence
of the brain that seemed more akin to early modern era philosophy than contemporary
interpretive understandings of human selfhood.
Narratives foster neural integration which enables affect regulation. Cozolino
asserted that the way in which a person reflects upon his or her life can facilitate affect
regulation or conscious control over mood and emotion. He also speculated that
narratives about personal history serve to “maximize” (p. 47) neural integration because
this fusion of memory and narrative supports affect regulation and predictable
psychological functioning. This use of memory as a link between psychotherapy and the
brain was an example of how Cozolino selected psychological theories and then
explained them as the products of brain functioning, effectively naturalizing a
philosophical discourse that has been seminal to the modern understanding of self in the
west.
The array of uses of the concept of self alongside interpretations of brain
functioning showed Cozolino’s emphasis on the relationship between self and brain. His
statements implied that the concept of self was intended to describe the coherence of
conscious experience through the integration of physical and psychological aspects of
functioning. He mapped that understanding of self onto the brain by describing a
relationship between neural integration and coherent or healthy psychological
functioning. This served to individualize and naturalize the concept of self, portraying
human beings as defined by the consistency of individual experience as allotted by and
processed through the brain. This inner view of self seemed contrary to contextual or
relational understandings of selfhood. Therefore the mapping of self onto brain seems to
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perpetuate a view of human beings that is reminiscent of Cartesian dualism and early
modern philosophy yet does little to foster an understanding of why these arguments
might seem appealing or even necessary for psychotherapy theory and practice.
The relationship between self, mind, and brain. In this section I examine how
Cozolino explained the relationship between self, mind, and brain by analyzing passages
in which all three of those concepts or entities were discussed.
Exemplary of his self-mind-brain integration was Cozolino’s depiction of the
relationship between the right hemisphere of the brain, the “unconscious” mind, and
physical and emotional aspects of self. Cozolino did not define mind and he seemed to
focus primarily on the relationship between self and brain rather than the relationship
between all three concepts. In one exemplary passage (see Appendix A, p. 311) he
included direct reference to mind, self, and brain. It was a good illustration of how
Cozolino depicted the human brain as the interpreter of context and the source of self,
while using the concept of mind primarily to illustrate how certain aspects of human
experience that have typically been discussed in psychological theories (such as the
unconscious in psychoanalytic theory) are actually localized in the brain. In that passage
mind was portrayed as an antiquated term, as Cozolino used the phrase “the unconscious
mind” (p. 97) to refer to how one region of the human brain exerts control over
perception and judgment and connects emotions and physicality to the experience of self.
This passage fit with Cozolino’s general strategy of focusing on the brain alongside
descriptions of human experience while requiring that readers infer arguments about the
relationship between mind and self through his portrayals of those concepts. This
ultimately seemed to perpetuate a reductionist view of human being that not only failed to
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account for the historical and philosophical differences between the study of mind and
the study of brain, but served to promote a discourse about humans based on fusing
neurobiological terms with human experiences and dismissing the use of mind as a
concept that is central to valuing subjective conscious experience. In other words, this
passage exemplifies the type of cognitive neuroscience discourse that Tallis (2004)
cautioned could be challenge to the existence of psychology.
Neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy. In this section I
identify some of the neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy that
Cozolino discussed throughout his book.
The ability to alter gene expression. According to Cozolino, experiencedependent gene expression explains neural plasticity or how the structures and functions
of the human brain develop based on the qualities of the early childhood environment and
retain malleability which enables neurobiological and psychological change during later
interpersonal relationships or experiences such as psychotherapy (see also Neural
plasticity, below). Cozolino explained that the adaptability of the human brain in
response to context is possible because the way in which certain genes are expressed is
not predetermined, but instead emerge based on context and experience. According to
Cozolino psychotherapy can “reprogram” (p. 65) or alter certain brain structures in order
to create or restore health because the brain adapts to social and physical environments.
This underlying argument for human selfhood and change showed a genomic
understanding of human beings while offering hope for proving the existence of human
agency and self-directness through confirmatory neuroscience research. This fits with a
biomedicalized understanding of self I discussed in Chapter I.

153

Neural plasticity. The adaptability or plasticity of the human brain was central to
Cozolino’s explanation for the effectiveness of psychotherapy. According to Cozolino,
human change is a process of learning and adaptation enabled by neural plasticity or the
capacity of neurons to connect, expand, and form in accordance with human experience.
This premise connected individuals to their broader contexts through brain functioning,
thereby naturalizing the moral discourse of change, improvement, adaptability, and
psychological healing.
Neural integration. According to Cozolino, successful psychotherapy or
psychological healing corresponds with neural integration or newly formed connectivity
within the brain. He provided examples of neural integration including integration
between left and right hemispheres, enhancing executive functions, and inhibiting the
activity of the amygdala. These passages (see Appendix A, pp. 312-313) highlighted
Cozolino’s use of neuroscience as evidence for a common factors approach to
psychotherapy integration, that is, an understanding of the curative elements shared
across various psychotherapies that are well established as effective psychological
treatments. In these passages he described all successful psychotherapies as facilitating
neural integration in the brains of therapy patients. Elsewhere he described how neural
integration is fostered by each of the established common factors central to his
psychotherapy integration (see Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological
mechanisms of effective therapy to occur, pp. 155-157). He furthermore listed
psychological symptoms and broad categories of abnormal behavior that have been
“linked to deficits” (p. 106) in integration between the left and right hemispheres of the
brain. With that claim, Cozolino did not specify whether deficits in neural integration are
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believed to cause, result from, or simply co-occur with these psychological symptoms. In
one passage he explained that a formerly narrow localized understanding of executive
functions has been replaced by an understanding that brain functioning is best understood
as integration between its many processes and regions. As an example of this he
described how brain research validates an understanding of emotions and rational
decision-making as not entirely separable from each other. This seemed to be a slightly
updated localization theory that is only slightly less decontextualized.
New learning alters the effects of memories on psychological functioning or
subjective experience. Cozolino suggested that memories are “encoded” (p. 16) or stored
in the brain, and psychotherapy often alleviates symptoms or distress by reducing the
impact of distressing or traumatic memories on later subjective experience. Cozolino
used this link between memory and psychotherapy as evidence for why psychotherapy is
a brain-based intervention. His statements were noteworthy because he specified a direct
relationship between the brain and conscious experience. He identified neural firing
patterns as first “sculpted by experience” (p. 16) before they are able to produce
“organized patterns of behavior and experience” (p. 16), thereby positing directionality
between mind and brain instead of simply providing a nonspecific description of
correlation. With these passages Cozolino described the process of modifying patients’
reactions to memories as an essential psychological mechanism by which psychotherapy
may be effective in reducing distress and changing the functioning of a patient’s brain. In
one noteworthy passage, after stating that the flexibility of memory is “an observable
manifestation” (p. 89) of neural plasticity because memory is encoded within or between
neurons, he used this as evidence that psychotherapy is a direct intervention on the
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human brain. These passages suggested an effort to depict individuals and personal
history as tangible and manifested in an observable form, thereby verifying nonmaterial
existence and explaining how it is physically alterable. These passages promulgated a
view of human beings as configured through a neurobiological selfhood and connected to
their broader environments and other people through the organ of the brain that functions
outside of conscious control yet may respond to human volition in a way that enables
human agency.
Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological mechanisms of effective
therapy to occur. In this section I survey the broadest aspects of psychological
experience that Cozolino claimed directly activate the neurobiological mechanisms I
discussed in the previous section. Specific therapy interventions and other
recommendations seemed to emerge from these broad psychological mechanisms, and I
discuss those in the next section.
Four general conditions common to successful psychotherapies. Cozolino argued
that four common factors—safety and trust in the therapy relationship, appropriate
amounts of stress, the use of both emotion and cognition, and creating new narratives—
are required for psychotherapy to be effective. He stated that neural change and
integration is the marker of success for every psychotherapy, and he then asserted that
neural integration is “enhanced” (p. 25) by these four psychological mechanisms. The
purpose of therapy was therefore depicted through descriptions of processes that alter
neurobiological mechanisms.
Language and narrative. Above I discussed how Cozolino identified language
and narrative as defining features of self, and he described how these human abilities
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provide a link between the experience of self and the functioning of the brain. Cozolino
also identified narrative and specific types of narrative or uses of language as significant
for psychotherapy and neural integration. He portrayed narrative as a primary means by
which therapists collaborate with patients in order to assist them with developing new
thoughts and behaviors, and he depicted narrative as a primary psychological mechanism
by which neural integration is activated. These statements were significant because he
described narrative as the means by which whatever was previously unconscious or
outside of a patient’s awareness becomes conscious and leads to changes in self.
According to Cozolino, narrative leads to increases in self-reflection and self-awareness.
He argued that this process may allow patients to appraise thoughts in ways that expand
choice and separate themselves from social expectations or expectations of other people
that might previously have appeared inflexible and prevented greater self-directedness.
According to Cozolino, self-reflective language integrates thoughts and emotions in a
way that may eventually foster a depth of understanding that facilitates a meditative state,
that is, a higher level of consciousness wherein a patient can “move beyond words”
(p. 171). It was unclear what that phrase meant but it seemed to imply some feeling or
experience of transcendence. In this way narrative was portrayed as a mechanized tool
that alters the brain and makes changes to psychological functioning that are potentially
permanent. This was a technicized and reductionist use of the concept of narrative.
Create a nurturing and supportive therapeutic relationship that facilitates secure
attachment. Cozolino argued that the therapy relationship itself guides gene expression in
a healthful way that confers psychological change, thereby positioning this relationship as
an instrument capable of activating the neurophysiological processes he identified as
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necessary for psychological change. This focus on the therapy relationship might appear
to challenge technicized ways of conducting therapy. However, it may instead perpetuate
instrumentalism or a technicized understanding of therapy practices by appealing to the
possible effects of human interconnectedness on the brain. This seems contrary to an
understanding that the relationship itself is a way of understanding human psychology
beyond the internalized physical effects to which interpersonal experiences are allegedly
reducible.
An appropriate amount of stress helps patients learn to regulate their own affect.
Cozolino described successful psychotherapy as requiring a balance between challenging
and supporting patients in order to establish an ideal setting for new learning and affect
regulation. Cozolino mapped the combination of supportive and challenging conditions in
therapy onto the human brain. He described this process as activating neural processing
and allowing a patient to internalize the stability of a therapist, sharing the therapist’s
capacity for self-regulation while the patient works to develop those abilities in order to
use them independent of the assistance of others. This was an example of a brain-to-brain
depiction of affect regulation and social selfhood.
Overall, these psychological principles were technicized as conditions that
activate desired brain changes believed to be the underlying mechanisms of
psychological change rather than unique or important experiences or ways of knowing
that are separate from the physical correlates of the psychological and interpersonal
processes.
How therapists should provide psychotherapy. In this section I highlight some of
the specific psychotherapy interventions that Cozolino recommended.
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Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate
neuroplasticity. In two exemplary passages (see Appendix A, pp. 316-317) Cozolino
listed examples of psychotherapy interventions. These lists present very brief and general
descriptions of a variety of typical therapy interventions. He argued that these therapy
strategies or techniques all stimulate patients’ brains in ways that lead to neural
integration. This was an example of a casual appeal to neuroscience as validation for
therapy integration and the understanding amongst many therapists that over the course
of therapy with any one patient, a therapist might incorporate a variety of strategies that
at one point were traceable to specific paradigms yet now may be identified as part of a
generalist psychotherapy approach. This reduced a psychotherapy trend that developed
over many years (and which also has cultural, historical, and economic factors) to a
simple explanation for the convergence of therapy interventions as an inevitable result of
the functioning or needs of the brain.
Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked
about. Cozolino argued that the brain generates and distorts each patient’s perception of
reality, and he recommended that therapists remember this and even inform patients
about this in order to provide evidence that their difficulties may stem from beliefs that
are inaccurate. He argued that conscious thoughts or mental processes are products of the
“left hemisphere interpreter” (p. 111), that is, the function of the left hemisphere of the
brain he described as actively choosing for an individual how he or she presents himself
or herself to other people. Cozolino used this understanding of brain functioning to
suggest that the process of identifying a patient’s dissociated experiences leads to an
integration of those experiences into consciousness, while also facilitating integration
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between brain hemispheres. In other words, pairing psychotherapy concepts with brain
regions allowed Cozolino to portray neural and psychological integration as simultaneous
processes.
Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize
them and to engender a sense of control for patients. Cozolino suggested that therapists
might build rapport and engender a sense of egalitarianism in the therapy relationship by
discussing how they share with patients the same potential for imperfections or
difficulties because they are also endowed, as all humans are, with a brain that distorts
reality. In this way patients might see difficulties and challenges as common occurrences
and feel relief after recognizing that their troubling experiences are not unique. Although
this recommendation was mentioned infrequently, it is significant to note because it
showed how Cozolino recommended directly incorporating a discussion of brain research
into the psychotherapy discourse, therefore illustrating the claims about self perpetuated
by a therapy discussion about the brain in accordance with his recommendation.
Identify the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect. Cozolino
suggested that recognizing the fit between a patient’s thoughts and feelings is a way to
identify the extent of that patient’s neural integration. He attributed the capacity for
conscious narrative to the left hemisphere of the brain and he attributed nonverbal
communication or affect to the right hemisphere, thereby portraying the effort to facilitate
congruence between thought and affect as an exercise in brain hemisphere integration.
This is an example of mapping onto the brain a cultural narrative or moral discourse that
describes a balanced or self-controlled manner in which a person should interact with
other people and live and work effectively. In other words, Cozolino appealed to a
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fascination with the brain to naturalize an understanding of modern social norms and the
good.
Using narratives in a way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional
regulation and a sense of control. Cozolino argued that accurately identifying feelings
and consciously rewriting stories about personal history builds self-efficacy, and enables
desired changes and healing in psychotherapy. He suggested helping patients as they
create narratives that contain a more “objective” (p. 161) understanding of whatever
issues are being discussed. These passages were noteworthy for how Cozolino depicted
the brain as creating a flexible self and the ability to change in accordance with personal
goals or aspirations (suggesting a subjective interpretation of reality), while paradoxically
also providing an objectively verifiable neural location of those attributes. This appeal to
a belief in the objectivity of science to validate human subjectivity in a highly reductive
and technicized way seemed to fit with the dichotomy between inner subjectivity and
external material reality that was central to early modern philosophy.
Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or
not being talked about. Some of Cozolino’s therapy recommendations drew from a
psychoanalytic approach re-envisioned as a brain intervention. In one passage Cozolino
asserted that patients reorganize their brains through becoming aware of unconscious
experiences that result from the functioning of “hidden layers” (p. 138) in the brain that
distort the perception of reality and lead to biases and irrational ways of thinking.
Cozolino described typical changes in affect when a patient is confronted with
unconscious or dissociated aspects of his or her experience, thus beginning “to fully
experience the emotions against which he or she was defending” (p. 295). In other words,
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Cozolino highlighted interventions intended to expose thoughts that patients are
defending against or avoiding, and he incorporated these therapeutic strategies into his
brain-based therapy theory.
In general, with all of the passages advising therapist how to practice
psychotherapy, broad and longstanding psychotherapy theories were first reduced to
obvious technical interventions and then repurposed according to their brain-changing
capabilities.
Indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes. In this section I identify
psychotherapy outcomes that Cozolino considered to be desirable and therefore indicative
of therapy efficacy or success.
Neural integration. Although neural change is not observable without
neuroimaging, the argument that neural plasticity allows therapy to activate the brain in
ways that support neural integration was ubiquitous throughout Cozolino’s book. As I
noted earlier, Cozolino predicted that psychotherapy will begin to routinely include
neuroimaging as a part of treatment planning, case conceptualization, and outcome
assessment (see Differences between Cozolino’s theory and established psychotherapy
theories, pp. 121-127). He also acknowledged that neuroimaging studies of
psychotherapy patients had not been conducted with patients seeking therapy for general
life problems rather than diagnosable mental illness (see also General reasons why
people seek psychotherapy, pp. 129-132). Cozolino therefore portrayed neuroscience as a
source of objective proof of psychotherapy’s efficacy and of the mechanisms through
which therapy is beneficial, but he noted that for some patient populations this remains
speculative.
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Less dissociation or greater integration. Cozolino used the concepts of
dissociation and integration in descriptions of both psychological and neurobiological
processes. At times he seemed to depict psychological and neurobiological integration as
concurrent processes, and at other times Cozolino implied a direct or causal relationship
between neural integration and psychological integration or coherent human experience.
For example, in one passage (see Appendix A, p. 322), Cozolino described the
integration of psychological aspects of human functioning such as thoughts and behaviors
as “an active neurobiological process" (Cozolino, p. 21). However, there he provided no
direct evidence supporting that assertion or its implication that psychological experience
emerges from human neurobiological processes. Cozolino’s use of the concept of
integration across psychological and neuroscientific descriptions of functioning and
wellbeing ultimately confused and conflated separate epistemologies or ways of
understanding human beings.
Symptom reduction. Cozolino recognized that some theories identify the purpose
of psychotherapy as an effort to reduce or alleviate specific psychological symptoms. He
implied that this description of a successful therapy outcome is equal to other theories’
descriptions of the purpose of psychotherapy (such as differentiation or ego strength)
because all of those are interpretations of the same neural change. In other words, he used
this indicator of successful therapy to argue that therapy theories offer quite different
interpretations of the same objective truth that brain research best articulates.
Affect regulation. According to Cozolino, affect regulation is closely tied to
secure attachment and a cohesive sense of self (see Secure attachment below). In one
statement he proposed that affect regulation is “the most important result” (p. 47) of
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therapy because psychological integration (coherence amongst various mental and
physical processes essential for mental health) is impossible without it.
Secure attachment. Cozolino described the psychotherapy relationship as
activating the brain’s innate drive for communication and social interaction in a way that
helps patients develop a secure attachment style. Cozolino described secure attachment as
synonymous with the ability to appropriately engage with other people in ways that help
regulate emotions and exert conscious control over psychological and physiological
reactivity.
Ego strength and higher-order defenses. Tenets of psychoanalytic or
psychodynamic therapies were prominent in Cozolino’s book, and in some passages
Cozolino used psychoanalytic concepts to describe successful psychotherapy. For
example, he described the quality and characteristics of an individual’s functioning as
dependent upon, or indicated by which defenses are used, rather than whether defenses
are used, thereby implying that psychological defenses are indispensible in human life. In
another passage, secure attachment and ego strength were combined as measures of
psychological wellbeing that he described as coinciding with more adaptive
psychological defenses (for passages, see Appendix A, p. 323).
Self-reflective language. According to Cozolino, self-reflective language is
indicative of an increased capacity for self-awareness and understanding, and suggestive
of positive changes in psychological functioning. Elsewhere in his book he described
self-reflective language as an important indicator of healthy psychological development
and the emergence of self, and he implied that therapy may serve as a corrective
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intervention for patients whose parents or caregivers did not facilitate the development of
this type of language during early childhood.
Earned autonomy and avoiding pathological caretaking of others. According to
Cozolino, appropriate psychological separateness and boundaries with other people
(especially family members) are indicative of psychological health. Further, these
qualities would ideally have developed during childhood through parenting that
adequately respected this developmental need. He described a lack of autonomy between
a child and his or her parents as a cause of the tendency to form relationships later in life
in which the emotional needs of others is placed above one’s own emotional needs. The
values of independence and self-directedness were essential to Cozolino’s understanding
of self or ideal development and functioning.
In sum, Cozolino supported a variety of ways to identify therapy success that
represented the tenets of several psychotherapy theories and a variety of interpretations of
mental health and wellbeing. This probably served to maintain a broad appeal for his text,
and incorporating a variety of indicators of psychological functioning seemed to further
repurpose a multitude of therapy theories as unknowingly describing the same underlying
neuroscientific phenomena or material truth. This is also an explanation for the popularity
of his work.
Case vignettes from Cozolino’s psychotherapy practice. I located 13 case
vignettes throughout Cozolino’s book, nine of which described his outpatient
psychotherapy treatment of individual adult patients (of note, one of those nine cases
involved a patient whom Cozolino had treated for one month in a hospital setting with
individual and group therapy, and it was unclear whether the patient attended more than
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one outpatient therapy session because that case vignette was brief and it was used to
explain symptoms of Capgras syndrome (a serious mental disorder) rather than a course
of treatment). With the remaining four vignettes, one described psychotherapy with a
child patient, one described psychological assessment and treatment recommendations
with a child rather than psychotherapy, one depicted family therapy with an adult brain
injury survivor that involved cognitive rehabilitation strategies such as education about
head injuries and support during a transition to appropriate community services (such as
vocational rehabilitation), and one described a single consultation session with a patient
experiencing severe flashbacks of childhood trauma in which Cozolino unexpectedly
performed a crisis intervention. The vignettes were dispersed throughout the book and
ranged from approximately two to six pages in length, with almost all of them being less
than three pages long. In this section I examine two of Cozolino’s psychotherapy case
vignettes. I provide the demographics of each patient and I outline the presenting problem
and course of treatment that Cozolino described. The purpose of this section is to
examine the ways in which these case vignettes illustrate some of his broader
understandings about human psychology and recommendations for conceptualizing and
treating psychological problems. I selected these vignettes because they were
representative of some of his general understandings about self, illness, and change.
Sandy. Sandy, a patient in her mid-40s, sought treatment for “the usual concerns
about relationships, family, and career” (p. 148). After some initial therapy sessions
Cozolino realized that Sandy experienced intermittent depressive episodes characterized
by irritability and feelings of hopelessness. He spent time trying to discover a possible
genetic, medical, lifestyle, or developmental origin of these episodes, but he eventually
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recognized a behavior cycle wherein Sandy’s mood swings tended to precede recurring
sinus infections. In an attempt to relieve Sandy’s anxiety and feelings of self-doubt, and
to help her create a narrative about the origins of her mood swings and practice
behavioral changes to avert them, Cozolino attributed the mood swings to her pattern of
physical symptoms.
We decided to anticipate her next dip in mood with a new plan. We agreed that
she would stop evaluating her life on days that she lost her will to live. She was
not allowed to think about leaving her husband or her job, or assess her worth as a
person. Instead, the mood dip would be a cue for her to go to the health food
store, buy vitamin C and zinc tablets, and rearrange her schedule to reduce stress.
. . . Sandy had to remain mindful of the possibility that what she experienced as
negative emotions was really a result of biological changes related to a physical
illness and not a collapse of character or impending global catastrophe. We
worked on developing a safe internal place for her to retreat to at these times,
where she could soothe and comfort herself and focus on healing. Over time, the
association between sinus infections and mood changes held up—we had created
a new narrative with far more explanatory power than the one it replaced. For
some unknown reason, Sandy’s biochemistry reacted to infection with a sharp
drop in mood, most likely related to drops in serotonin and dopamine. The
psychological depression experienced as a result of these changes led her to
reinterpret, in a negative way, the value of all aspects of her existence. By being
mindful of this process and using her frontal and parietal executive functions to
associate experiences with new meanings, she was able to engage in different
behaviors and create a better outcome. We had converted what usually led to an
existential crisis into a trigger for enhanced self-awareness, self-care, and medical
management. Sandy needed to learn how to pay attention to her feelings, reflect
on them with past experiences in mind, and follow a new plan of action contrary
to old reflective patterns. (pp. 149-150)
Cozolino speculated that Sandy’s depressive episodes were caused by
neurochemical changes that accompanied sinus infections, and he also stated that this
physiological explanation might not have been supported by established medical theory.
With his case formulation he disregarded any psychological or psychosocial origin for his
patient’s depression, favoring instead whatever physiological explanation was plausible.
He incorporated his preferred psychoanalytic theory of the emergence of self

167

(encouraging Sandy to develop “a safe internal place for her to retreat”) into a behavioral
approach that focused on improvements in practical coping skills to reduce the
occurrence of mood swings rather than helping Sandy understand the possible
significance of her thoughts and emotions during depressive episodes. It was noteworthy
that Cozolino discounted the possibility that Sandy’s thoughts and impulses during her
depressive episodes might in fact be related to unmet needs, legitimate concerns, or
difficulties with her family or other aspects of her life. Cozolino replaced psychological
insight with information about how the interactions between neurobiological and other
physical processes might cause symptoms of depression. His preferred explanation
suggested that if physical processes can be identified as the cause of psychological
symptoms, then the symptoms should be explained as such and treatment should proceed
accordingly. His justification for this approach was that the narrative he created was
helpful for explaining symptoms and providing implementable solutions.
Sheldon. Sheldon, a Holocaust survivor in his late 60s, sought treatment for “his
many anxieties and fears” (p. 89). His family members perished during the genocide
while he survived in hiding.
As a child, his parents had hidden him from the Nazis in a storage room behind
the home of family friends. . . . Describing these days, Sheldon recalled
alternating states of terror and boredom, during which he would either sit and rock
or ride his tricycle around in slow tight circles. . . . 60 years later, he still found
himself reflexively rocking or walking in small slow circles when he became
frightened. His life felt like one long, fear-filled day. (pp. 89-90)
Cozolino intervened by asking Sheldon to imagine that as a child he had been able
to escape from his confinement on his tricycle rather than having ridden it in circles in the
storage room where he was forced to hide during the war.
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One day, I asked him for permission to change his memories just a bit. . . . I asked
him, “What would you do if this was a magic tricycle and it could take you
through walls without getting hurt?”. . . . Sheldon said, “I would ride right
through the house and out onto the sidewalk”. . . . I felt that an imaginative task
like this was not only accessible to him but would also serve the purpose of
bridging the positive affect from his grandchildren to his lonely and frightened
experiences as a child. Imagining he was making up the story for his
grandchildren might also help him cope with the embarrassment of doing this
with another adult. (p. 90)
Over the next few months, whenever Sheldon experienced his childhood fears and
anxieties, we would revisit his story and modify different details. These changes
seemed to grow more detailed and more vivid in his mind. His imagination gave
him the power to master many of his past fears. . . . Sheldon was a very special
man who was able to take advantage of the malleability of memory to make his
inner world a safer place. Nothing had changed about his childhood except that
now, when he remembered his hiding place, he also remembered his magic
tricycle. (p. 91)
With his creative exercise Cozolino helped Sheldon practice coping with
symptoms of trauma-related anxiety by pairing elements of the traumatic memories with
an imagined escape from his forced hiding during childhood. Cozolino used this
imaginative activity in order to illustrate how psychological reactions to anxietyprovoking memories are alterable because of the plasticity of the brain in which the
memories are stored. This vignette was striking. In the description of his treatment of
Sheldon’s psychological trauma Cozolino never discussed Sheldon’s experience as a
member of a major religious group that was targeted for total eradication. Sheldon’s
experience of trauma was described as a curable set of materialized symptoms rather than
a part of his cultural heritage that may have been exacerbated by acculturation stressors
during resettlement in the United States. Culturally sensitive and relevant psychotherapy
for psychological trauma following ethnic persecution might have included a discussion
of whether Sheldon sought sanctuary amidst his religious community in the United
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States, and why he might or might not have experienced such religious and community
involvement as helpful.
The two case vignettes discussed above were exemplary of some of the recurring
therapy recommendations and general themes in Cozolino’s book. In the first vignette,
Cozolino alluded to his preferred psychoanalytic theory of the development of the self
when suggesting that his patient, Sandy, needed to learn to cope with depression by
spending time alone to develop a safe, “internal” place to turn to during stress. He placed
that recommendation alongside behavioral changes that seemed to dismiss the importance
of the patient using her difficulties with mood to learn about herself or to evaluate the
context in which those symptoms emerged. His case conceptualization relied on a
possible behavior cycle that Cozolino admitted might be tenuous, and his subsequent
treatment approach dismissed any relational or depth-oriented course of therapy. With
Cozolino’s treatment of Sheldon, his creative role-play intervention decontextualized that
patient’s history of surviving genocide, reducing it from an experience shared by millions
of people with the same religious history to isolated symptoms portrayed as curable by
imagining a different personal history. His approach with both cases rested on a brainbased explanation for why creating a new way of thinking and talking about a situation
can lead to a reduction in presenting symptoms.
Summary of primary content. In The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing
the Social Brain, Cozolino (2010) used the origin myth that psychotherapy originated
from neurology to portray his text as an inevitable return Freud’s intended brain-based
explanations of human psychological experience or mind now that neuroimaging
technology has advanced quite remarkably. This suggested an attempt to argue that the
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concept mind (especially as delineated in psychoanalytic theory) has been a historical
placeholder for brain functioning rather than a culturally significant and very different
understanding of human selfhood than the reductionist understanding of mind often
associated with cognitive neuroscience. Cozolino described traditional therapy theories in
terms of their proposed underlying neural correlates, and he stated that rather than an
original psychotherapy theory, his text was intended as an integration of the common
factors of the most well-known therapy theories based on the understanding that all
effective therapies foster neural integration. Passages defining mind and self, and
depicting a relationship between mind, self, and brain, were noteworthy for their
generally unclear (and altogether infrequent) use of the concept of mind aside from the
assertion that Freud’s tripartite theory of mind can be thought to represent three parts of
the human brain that have evolved over the course of human history. Although
Cozolino’s text incorporated a wide array of psychotherapy concepts, psychoanalytic
concepts were especially represented in discussions of self, therapy interventions, and
indicators of successful therapy outcomes, and those concepts were often mapped on the
brain. For example, he described the experience of the self as the extent of neural
integration. Cozolino’s case vignettes often used descriptions of brain functioning to
justify the efficacy of an assortment of talk therapy interventions. The vignettes I
reviewed showed Cozolino’s use of creative role-play exercises, as well as attributing
psychological symptoms to physiological processes rather than a combination of
personality characteristics and psychosocial stressors. Throughout my interpretations of
passages related to these primary content categories, I noted ways in which Cozolino’s
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text was often reductionist and scientistic, and based on ahistorical and materialized
claims about human mind or self.
Rhetorical Strategies and Elements of Writing Style
In this section I provide examples of rhetorical strategies or devices in Cozolino’s
(2010) text. I primarily reference the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (Baldick,
2008) in my descriptions of these devices and strategies.
Ambiguity. Ambiguity refers to statements that may be interpreted in two or
more distinct ways, or statements for which the meaning in general was unclear.
Examining ambiguous statements was important for revealing how Cozolino’s rhetoric
might have led readers to confuse or conflate separate concepts because he did not
sufficiently differentiate them. Ambiguity in a mind-brain integration project is also
significant because this rhetoric blurs psychology and neuroscience, thereby equating
them through obscured sentence structure and word choice rather than clear supportive
evidence.
Statements that were unclear about the directionality or relationship between
mind and brain. In the following statements it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to
portray mind or human volition as initiating changes in neurobiology, or if he intended to
portray the brain as influencing or controlling human psychology.
“The ebb and flow of emotion over the course of therapy reflects the underlying
neural rhythms of growth and change” (p. 46).
In this passage it was unclear whether “neural rhythms” cause changes in emotion
or whether emotions and neural rhythms are co-occurring phenomena. In other words,
Cozolino did not specify the relationship between the brain and human experience.
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The following two passages also contained phrases that caused ambiguity about
the relationship between mind and brain.
These processes of mind, which insecurely attached children often lack, reflect
the utilization of narratives in the development of self and self-identity. They also
point to a more sophisticated ability to metacognize (think about thinking), that
represents a high level of neurolinguistic self-regulation. (p. 208)
“The popularity of this game reflects the development of these systems as well as
a way to exercise voluntary control over impulses” (p. 130).
In these passages, the phrases “point to,” “represents,” and “reflects” were
seemingly used to describe a relationship between mind and brain but the specific
relationship or order between psychological and neurobiological processes was unclear.
In the passages above, readers are left to either assume the correct relationship
between mind and brain, or to simply conflate the two processes if they appear to be
simultaneous.
Statements in which it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to describe an
animal or a human. Throughout his book, Cozolino described animal experiments for
which findings were portrayed as relevant for human psychology and neuroscience.
However, in some passages it was unclear whether he attempted to use those experiments
to draw a conclusion about humans.
Mother rats lick, nurse, and retrieve their pups when they roll out of the nest.
These three behaviors are easily observed and counted by willing undergraduates,
and correlated with behavioral and biological variables in the brains of both
mothers and children. (p. 217)
Here it was unclear whether “behavioral and biological variables in the brains of
both mothers and children” was intended to refer to human mothers and children or rat
mothers and children.
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“Even virgin rats who are given pups to care for experience increased dendritic
growth and neuronal excitation. . . . Thus, just as in children, interpersonal contact
changes the brains of parents” (pp. 224-225).
Here it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to conclude that human children
and parents or rat children and parents experience brain changes through interpersonal
contact.
Because it was unclear whether the conclusions in those passages were intended
to apply to animals or humans, it was unknowable whether Cozolino intended to infer,
accurately explain, or speculate about the relevance of animal neurobiology to the
understanding of human functioning.
Statements in which it was unclear whether Cozolino intended to describe
humans or brains. These statements were noteworthy for ambiguity that might cause
readers to conflate the concept of self or personhood with the brain.
Only through trial-and-error learning are early clumsy movements slowly shaped
into functional skills. Children and their brains intuitively know this and will
resist being held back or helped too much. When we attempt to help, a child’s
impatient protest of “Let me do it!” reflects instinctual wisdom of the importance
of trial and error learning in the growth of neural networks. (p. 69)
It was unclear whether “instinctual wisdom of the importance of trial and error
learning in the growth of neural networks” was intended to imply that children possess
instinctual wisdom about the brain’s need to have growth of neural networks, or, that
instinctual wisdom is stored within neural networks and therefore activated by the growth
of those networks. Further, if Cozolino’s intention was to describe instinctual wisdom of
children, then it was unclear whether he posited that a child has innate wisdom from the
brain about the way the brain needs to grow, or that a child has wisdom about how he or
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she needs to grow, and therefore the growth of neural networks is simply spurred by the
child’s subsequent actions.
The exploration of human consciousness is a vast new frontier for neuroscience
where there may always be more questions than answers. We know consciousness
exists; we just have no idea of how it emerges from the functioning of the brain.
An inherent challenge to this exploration will always be the conflict of interest
involved when something is studying itself with all the bias and distortion that
interferes with objective observation. There is no easy way around this. (p. 150)
The phrase “when something is studying itself” could imply that the brain is
studying itself through directing humans to study it, or it might imply that humans are
studying themselves through studying the brain.
Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting their own perspective to
looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation
once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and
dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective
of a life situation. (p. 161)
It was unclear whether therapists “guide” clients or guide the two regions of the
brain (“ompfc and dlpfc”).
An exaggerated reliance on intellectual defenses, overemotionality, or a negative
attachment experience can become established as self-perpetuating patterns that
lead to social isolation and underperformance. All of these suboptimal lifestyles
are most likely reflected in biased patterns of neural activation, which become the
focus of psychotherapy. (p. 163)
It was unclear whether “suboptimal lifestyles” or “biased patterns of neural
activation” become the focus of psychotherapy.
“When verbal interactions include references to sensations, feelings, behaviors,
and knowledge, they provide a medium through which the child’s brain is able to
integrate the various aspects of its experience in a coherent manner” (p. 207).

175

In that statement it was unclear whether the phrase “various aspects of its
experience” was meant to imply various aspects of the child’s experience or various
aspects of the brain’s experience.
Like the attachment system described earlier, the development of this engagement
system and the fine-tuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect appear to depend
on the quality of attachment relationships in early childhood. This allows us to
internalize what we learn from experience with caretakers into moment-tomoment somatic regulation. (p. 234).
It is unclear whether the “development of this engagement system,” the “finetuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect,” the “quality of attachment relationships,” or
some combination of all three enables individuals to “internalize” whatever is learned
from experience.
Ambiguity in the passages above was noteworthy because readers may interpret
the focus of psychotherapy as the brain rather than the patient, and neurobiological and
psychological concepts may be read as interchangeable. This obfuscated the purpose of
psychotherapy, as well as the differences between theories that typically have focused on
explaining the concept of mind and those explaining the functioning of the brain. Further,
a lack of clarity could create suggestibility about the relationship between mind and
brain, and detract from readers considering how the everyday understanding that a person
is integrated mentally and physically does not translate easily into integrating distinct
psychological and neuroscientific methods of inquiry.
Analogy. An analogy is a comparison between two sets of phenomena that is
based on a logical argument (rather than a figure of speech such as metaphor that
compares unrelated objects or concepts based on a similar quality and often in an
illustrative fashion; see p. 206 below). Cozolino used analogy to compare various human
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endeavors or types of relationships, often by asserting that the same neurobiological
processes underlie both relationships. The use of neuroscience as a tool for explaining the
interdependence of valued social institutions was noteworthy for how it overlooked
longstanding and shared cultural traditions that those institutions embody.
The theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny refers to the concept that the
evolution of the species is recreated in the gestation and development of each
individual. To use Maclean’s terms, we pass through the reptilian and
paleomammalian stages before we develop into a fully human being. (p. 8)
In this passage Cozolino compared the evolution of the human species to the
lifespan development of each individual on the basis that both processes manifest an
incremental progression or maturing of the human brain. He implied that the phases of
personal development are accelerated versions of the epochs in which humans gradually
evolved from lower life forms to the dominant yet civilized species characteristic of its
current form.
At the heart of the interface between neuroscience and psychotherapy is the fact
that human experience is mediated via two interacting processes. The first is the
expression of our evolutionary past via the organization, development, and
functioning of the nervous system. . . . The second is the contemporary shaping of
our neural architecture within the context of relationships. (p. 12)
In the passage above, Cozolino turned the analogy between evolution and lifespan
development into the central component of his brain-based psychotherapy book. In the
following passage he used analogy to compare brain and self.
We have equated psychological health with optimal neural network growth and
integration. Both the brain and the self are built in a stepwise manner by
experience. The nervous system is made up of millions of neurons while human
experience is constructed within countless moments of learning. (p. 31)
In this passage Cozolino compared the relationship between the nervous system
and neurons to the relationship between human experience and the single moments that
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comprise it, on the basis that the nervous system and human experience are both very
complex and constructed from large numbers of their smaller components. Cozolino did
not propose a specific relationship between self and brain in this passage, and the strategy
of analogy enabled him to use a comparison between human psychological and
neurobiological development to portray a relationship between brain and self without
specifying how the concepts are directly related.
Neuroscientists already possess the perfect model for understanding
interdependency—the individual neuron. We know that neither the individual
neuron nor the single human being exist in nature. Without mutually stimulating
interactions, people and neurons wither and die. In neurons, this process is called
apoptosis, while in humans, it is called anaclitic depression. (p. 179)
Here Cozolino compared the relationship between a person and a group of people
to the relationship between a neuron and a group of neurons on the basis that both
relationships imply interdependency among members or parts of a larger functioning
group or system. Because the concepts are juxtaposed, readers might infer a relationship
between neuron functioning and psychopathology even though Cozolino did not actually
argue that cell death leads to depression. In the following passage Cozolino used analogy
to compare psychotherapy to other relationships.
Relationships are our natural habitat, while the isolated brain is an abstract
concept. Thus, understanding the brain requires knowledge of the person
embedded within a community of others. Therapists, teachers, and parents
intuitively grasp this profound reality just as laboratory scientists often do not. We
are now in a position to help research scientists know where to look as they
explore how the brain grows, learns, and changes throughout life. (p. 179)
This passage implied that therapists and patients, teachers and students, and
parents and children are all comparable relationships insofar as each necessitates the
person in the helping or leading role to understand the significance of interdependence or
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community. The two sentences were noteworthy for how Cozolino seamlessly
interchanged the concepts of “relationships,” “person,” and “brain” by first ascribing to
human relationships the quality of naturalness and then criticizing the idea of an isolated
brain instead of criticizing the idea of an isolated human. This may convey that people
interact with the brains of other people, or that brains interact on behalf of people, or the
passage may simply lead readers to assume synonymity or interchangeability between
descriptions of people and descriptions of brains.
All of these analogies were significant because they portrayed relationships
between humans and brains or might even have suggested direct arguments about mind
and brain, yet the rhetorical device suggested that Cozolino linked self and brain through
sentence structure and word choice in those passages rather than through a coherent
philosophical argument.
Aporia. Aporia is an admission of doubt (in this case by an author) about the
ability of a text to resolve a dilemma or answer a question that the text has raised.
Examples of aporia were significant because they raised doubts about the usefulness of
integrating mind-brain research into psychotherapy theory, or at least about the ways in
which that research had been applied in Cozolino’s book. These were noteworthy not
only for the implications of how Cozolino addressed possible contradictions or other
flaws in his arguments, but also because he typically admitted little doubt about the
importance of his efforts aside from these statements.
Because of the nature of neural processing, it might not be possible to ensure
objectivity in the interpretation of brain research. Consistent with his argument that
human psychology or experience arises from the functioning of an imperfect and biased
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human brain, Cozolino acknowledged that this premise implies a glaring fallibility for
any attempt to objectively interpret brain research.
The exploration of human consciousness is a vast new frontier for neuroscience
where there may always be more questions than answers. We know consciousness
exists; we just have no idea of how it emerges from the functioning of the brain.
An inherent challenge to this exploration will always be the conflict of interest
involved when something is studying itself with all the bias and distortion that
interferes with objective observation. There is no easy way around this. (p. 150)
With this passage Cozolino acknowledged that by following his own argument
that each individual’s brain distorts his or her perceptions of reality, he must contend with
the possibility that neuroscience research cannot be objective because it is a study of that
organ and therefore subject to the “biases” and misperceptions that are among its defining
qualities. Therefore it might be impossible to understand brain research in a way that is
free of those factors. If humans cannot study the brain objectively, it becomes
questionable why it is helpful for psychological theories and psychotherapy modalities to
be linked to neuroscience research. Cozolino ends discussion of this issue entirely with
the final statement “there is no easy way around this.” He did not further discuss the
important dilemmas that necessarily follow from acknowledging that integrating
psychological and neurological language is a questionable or possibly inadequate way of
describing a singular unified process.
Denying responsibility as the author if readers interpret his book as supporting
a reduction of mind to brain. Cozolino began his book by denying that reductionism was
likely to result from it, yet he concluded his book with a statement claiming that he was
blameless if such an interpretation resulted.
And while I dislike reductionism as much as the next person, doesn’t a tendency
toward reductionism say more about the thinker than the nature of natural
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phenomena? Our knowledge of neuroscience highlights the fact that we primates
have complex and imperfect brains and should remain skeptical about what we
think we know. In other words, primates would be wise to doubt their beliefs and
remain open to new ideas. (p. 357).
Here Cozolino denied responsibility for the possible impressions or conclusions
that audiences might draw from his mind-brain integration efforts, which was noteworthy
for a book that relied heavily on neuroanatomy or other scientific terminology. In fact, he
seemed to blame the reader for any improper interpretations of his text. This draws on a
particular understanding of text interpretation. Further, the example set for therapists by
abdicating responsibility for the effects of a book that could be influential also warrants
highlighting, as he seemed to display indifference toward the broader historical
contexts—both professional and societal—that are likely to make a brain-based
psychotherapy book appealing. The passage was a surprising demonstration of an
apparent disconnection between the claims of the text and an understanding of the
broader cultural values that would make it appealing.
Appealing to neuroscience but rejecting the authority of neuroscience
“experts.” In Chapter 4 Cozolino proposed, “the question for therapists is: How
amenable are these established structures to modification? This is a topic we will come
back to again and again in later chapters” (p. 71). With that statement he seemed to imply
that answering this question would be a central purpose of his text. In Chapter 11 he
appeared to directly respond to this question, first by noting a shared interest among
legislators, adoptive parents, and therapists in being able to identify which survivors of
psychological trauma are likely to respond positively to psychological treatment or
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reparative attachment efforts. However, he responded to the question by rejecting its
premise rather than offering a neuroscientific answer.
Getting to the heart of the issue, the true question becomes: Who is worth seeing
as a client, adopting as a child, or investing public funds in for rehabilitation? In
my mind these are moral rather than scientific questions. I have become very
skeptical of “experts” who think they have found answers to any issue in
neuroscience. My bias is to trust in plasticity and our own ingenuity to discover
new solutions to these problems. (p. 210)
Cozolino’s response to this question (which he earlier had identified as an
important issue, and which would seemingly be paramount to the entire purpose of his
book) is surprising in that he responded by rebuffing or declining to address the issue
altogether. Several possible implications of his response warrant discussion. First, his
refusal to address the issue raises the possibility that neuroscience may be unable to
determine with precision which individuals can experience a reduction in psychological
symptoms or behavioral change. In that case this issue would be better addressed by
psychological rather than neurological research methods, as would the understanding of a
therapy patient’s presenting problems and progress in a psychological treatment. His
answer therefore casts doubt on the idea that neuroscience is sufficient for the purpose of
devising, practicing, and studying mental health treatments apart from whatever
psychological or other relevant concepts are connected to the study of the human brain.
Importantly, Cozolino also avoided answering the question that he had raised
earlier by arguing that the question is a moral rather than scientific one and therefore
cannot be answered by neuroimaging research. While the question does indeed raise
moral issues, he seemed to be trying to appeal to the sentiments raised by that premise
without exploring the possibility that psychological research and treatment could admit
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that they are inextricably linked with issues of morality. However, by sidestepping the
issue through acknowledging the limitations of neuroscience research, readers may also
come to believe that the issue would be inadequately addressed by the psychological
methods that are intertwined with brain research in the book. Therefore the doubt
Cozolino cast on neuroscience with this statement serves a twofold effect. His response
detracts from readers’ ability to consider the ways in which psychology and
psychotherapy research may actually be better suited to answer questions about mental
health and individual change without neuroscience research. Moreover, his response
discourages readers from considering ways in which they could engage in a more
meaningful discussion about the role of morality in psychology and psychotherapy
research (see Cushman, 1995; F. C. Richardson et al., 1999).
All of these examples of aporia raised questions about the extent to which human
psychology can be correlated so closely with physiological underpinnings. It was
noteworthy that Cozolino raised these significant issues and then backed away from
engaging in any further discussion of them. This demonstrated that the way in which he
managed or wrestled with the important societal implications he raised was inadequate
and warrants further interpretation.
Diction. The following were examples of Cozolino’s use of diction or word
choice. Close attention to diction revealed how Cozolino attempted to integrate fields of
study (primarily psychology and neuroscience) by combining or juxtaposing terminology
from these unique fields. This subtle use of language to integrate epistemologies may not
be apparent to many readers. In other words, in many passages his choice of words
warrants close examination because they highlight how rhetoric was used to assimilate

183

mind and brain rather than a careful survey of the nuanced scientific and philosophical
issues that brain research raises.
Integrating and synthesizing epistemologies. Cozolino’s use of language was
noteworthy for the various ways in which he synthesized neurobiological and
psychological concepts by intertwining the terminology of separate fields of study in the
same sentences. At times he acknowledged his integration of theories and at other times
he seamlessly combined the vernacular or terminology from various fields without
informing readers of the distinct fields of study or paradigms represented within single
phrases or passages.
Synthesizing the purpose of psychotherapy with the effects of psychotherapy on
the brain. These were examples of how Cozolino combined terms from distinct fields
without informing readers that he had done this. This strategy was used to portray
psychotherapy as a process of directly providing brain-based interventions through
psychological or noninvasive means. For example, early in his book Cozolino defined
“hidden layers” (p. 16) of the brain as the deepest levels of neural organization that are
unobservable yet recognizable by the distortions and biases they project in the service of
coherently organizing perception and behavior. Shortly therefore, he wrote,
“Based on observations of all levels of the client’s behavior, the therapist attempts
to bring the processing of the hidden layers to the client’s conscious attention”
(p. 35).
With the statement above, Cozolino described psychotherapy as the process of
interpreting the hidden layers (presumably the hidden layers of the brain as he elsewhere
discussed). In other words, instead of describing the purpose of therapy as revealing
unconscious aspects of human experience, he described therapy as the process of
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revealing the functioning of underlying neurobiological correlates of those unconscious
experiences. In this passage the reader was not specifically informed about the integrative
use of language, and therefore the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious mind was
presented as inseparable from or interchangeable with an understanding of the human
brain.
The following passages were also exemplary of this mind-brain synthesis
strategy.
“As therapists we intuitively work to regulate stress and integrate neural
networks, a process that is essentially the opposite of the dissociation observed in
reaction to trauma” (p. 21).
The organization of autobiographical memory that includes input from multiple
neural networks enhances self-awareness and increases the ability to solve
problems, cope with stress, and regulate affect. This integrative process is what
psychotherapy attempts to establish when it is absent. (p. 207)
Successful psychotherapy for anxiety, fears, and phobias has been shaped by the
necessity of integrating fast and slow circuits, taxon and locale systems, and affect
and cognition. Educating patients about panic leads to increased participation of
the cortex during anxiety states. (p. 258)
“On another level, the therapist serves as an external neural circuit to aid in the
integration of networks left disconnected during development” (p. 283).
“The safe emergency of psychotherapy activates dissociated neural networks and
attempts to reintegrate them in the service of decreased arousal and improved
functioning” (p. 284).
Psychotherapists are trained to use their social brains as a tool to connect to and
modify the brains of their clients. Through interpersonal neurobiological
processes, therapists serve as an external regulatory circuit to help reestablish the
optimal flow of energy and information. (p. 322)
With these passages Cozolino implied that by effectively providing mental health
treatment, psychotherapists have unknowingly been utilizing neuroplasticity in order to
restore or create healthy brain functioning. By portraying vocabularies typically used to
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describe either mind or brain as interchangeable, these statements implied that mind and
brain themselves are in fact interchangeable.
Reappropriating psychological terms as neurobiological concepts without
directly informing readers of this strategy. At times Cozolino inserted psychological
terms into descriptions of brain functioning without acknowledging the original uses of
those concepts.
The statement “explicit memory is the tip of our experiential iceberg; implicit
memory is the vast structure below the surface” (p. 77) was a good example of how
Cozolino used a phrase with longstanding ties to the psychoanalytic metaphor for the
unconscious (“iceberg”) in Freud’s theory of the topography of mind. Cozolino
reappropriated the term for the purpose of mapping a psychoanalytic concept onto the
human brain. Further, he implied that the concept had always referred to its underlying
neurobiological substrate and that recent advances in neuroimaging are simply
confirmation or objective proof of this claim.
Cozolino also referred to “the tripartite division of the brain” (p. 59), another
reference to an early psychoanalytic concept of the three-tiered or tripartite mind
comprised of id, ego, and superego. In the following statement, Cozolino used the
psychoanalytic concept of enactment in a description of how the brain integrates visual
perception with knowledge of language.
“While there is overlap of activation during picture naming, the nature of the
visual image triggers brain areas relevant to what is depicted. Thus, memory is a
form of internal enactment of whatever is being recalled” (p. 80).
In the statement above, Cozolino reappropriated the psychotherapy concept of
enactment in his interpretation of a neuroimaging study in which researchers found that
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the same part of the human brain that stored memory for the names of hand tools was the
same part of the brain involved in the physical control over hands. In other words,
through the misuse of a psychotherapy concept Cozolino portrayed the brain as the
location of integration between physical and psychological aspects of human beings.
These examples were important because Cozolino did not inform readers of his
synthesizing of two epistemologies, so some readers might not immediately recognize his
efforts or their implications. In the next section I show how Cozolino acknowledged his
integration between psychological and neuroscientific epistemologies.
Explaining one field of study from the perspective of another field of study. At
times Cozolino described how one field of study (i.e., psychotherapy) could be
interpreted by another field of study, putatively demonstrating how a single human
phenomenon or activity may be described in equally helpful ways by separate fields of
study (i.e., neuroscience).
“Remember, from the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapists are in the
brain-rebuilding business” (p. 33).
“From the standpoint of neurobiology, most of Freud’s work addressed the
discontinuities and dissociations between networks of conscious and unconscious
processing. Freud focused on the role of overwhelming emotion as the cause of
unintegrated neural processing” (p. 33).
In the second example above, Cozolino acknowledged that he was providing a
neurobiological interpretation of Freud’s work, and then provided an example of the
argument using direct or matter-of-fact language, as if the argument was no longer an
interpretation. The effect on the reader may be a blurring of epistemologies that uniquely
embody aspects of the historical eras from which they separately emerged, or an
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interpretation of history (especially the history of science) as linear, inevitable, and
removable from the circumstances that gave rise to their discourses and their appeal.
Freud believed that a fundamental goal of therapy is to make the unconscious
conscious. From the perspective of rebuilding the brain, this goal can be described
as increasing the interconnection and integration of neural networks dedicated to
unconscious and conscious memory. This process makes understanding the
evolution, development, and functioning of the various systems of memory
crucial to conceptualizing and treating psychological distress and mental illnesses.
(p. 74)
Here Cozolino provided a neuroscience interpretation of the psychoanalytic
concepts of conscious and unconscious mind. He then used this to argue that it is
“crucial” for psychotherapists to understand the brain systems related to memory in order
to understand and provide treatment for psychological conditions. It was unclear from
this passage why knowledge of neurobiology is necessary for providing psychological
treatment.
In the passages above, the importance of neuroscience as confirmatory research
for psychological theories was taken for granted. This underlying assumption led to
Cozolino’s use of assertions instead of arguments, since arguments are based on a
structure of logic that builds to a plausible conclusion or understandable theory. Theorists
and historians such as Canguilhem (1977/1988) have criticized this type of ahistorical
understanding of science whereby current findings or paradigms are portrayed to explain
or correct earlier theories from other fields of study.
Incorporating neurobiology into the definition of a psychological concept. The
following passages suggested a rewriting of traditional psychological conceptualizations
of mental experiences as neurobiological processes. The implication of these statements
was that brain research serves as proof of a timeless truth, rather than brain research
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being portrayed as a contemporary or recent revision to concepts typically under the
domain of psychological theories.
“Freud’s projective hypothesis described the process by which our brains create
and organize the world around us. As the clarity of a situation decreases, the brain
naturally generates structure and projects it onto the world” (p. 34).
“Early relationships become encoded in networks of sensory, motor, and
emotional learning to form what dynamic therapists call inner objects” (p. 41).
“Early brain development is highlighted by periods of exuberant neural growth
and connectivity called sensitive periods triggered by the interaction of genes and
experience” (p. 70).
“Estimating reward value is a joint operation between the ompfc and the
amygdala (Dolan, 2007; Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Much of this
analysis occurs out of conscious awareness and is commonly called intuition”
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 127).
Cozolino suggested that certain key words in psychological discourse are
shorthand for descriptions of the neurobiological processes from which they result.
Although physiological processes are present in any human experience, emphasizing that
fact shifts the primary understanding of what it means to be human or to have a
subjective experience away from the psychological and toward the physiological. For
example, by asserting that object relations theory has been proven by neuroscientific
research, Cozolino created a materialist explanation for structuralism.
Although the combination of neuroscientific and psychological vernaculars might
seem to legitimate psychological and psychotherapy concepts by pairing them with
material correlates, Cozolino’s uses of these diction strategies also suggest an effort to
validate neuroscience, since the psychological concepts are part of common parlance and
important aspects of Western culture. Therefore, although neuroscience is already
popular and appealing (see pp. 23-24), synthesizing neurobiological and psychological
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concepts in the way that he has done seems to introduce a discourse centered on a
neuroscientific understanding of self into everyday language.
Repetition. Cozolino used recurring words across a variety of contexts in order to
subtly portray themes or bolster arguments. Here I provide several examples of this
rhetorical device and the subtle implications of the varied uses of key words.
“Best guess.” Cozolino used this phrase to describe neuroscientific speculation
about the brain, and to depict the brain itself as engaging in speculative thinking (see also
Personification, pp. 209-211).
“Although these movements may look random, they are the brain’s best guess at
which movements will eventually be needed” (p. 68)
“What do we inherit, and what do we learn from experience? Our best guess is
that almost everything involves an interaction between the two” (p. 64).
Our understanding of the brains of individuals with ADHD is still limited. . . . The
best guess at this point is that individuals diagnosed with ADHD likely reflect a
number of subgroups with different types of brain involvement. (pp. 131-132)
“Our best guess is that larger and more complex brains allow for more diverse
responses in challenging situations and across diverse environments” (p. 214).
By using the same phrase to describe both the brain and current neuroscientific
hypotheses about the role of brain functioning in human development, Cozolino
portrayed a similarity between the tendencies of the brain and the tendencies of humans
who study it.
“Bias.” Cozolino used this word to describe personal beliefs (including his own
beliefs), common beliefs or tendencies among individuals, and tendencies or typical
processing in the brain.
“These connections, and their bias toward the right hemisphere, are associated
with extremes of emotional processing” (p. 121).
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“The consistency of many perceptual and cognitive biases across individuals
reflects our shared neural organization and functioning” (p. 136).
“I have become very skeptical of ‘experts’ who think they have found answers to
any issue in neuroscience. My bias is to trust plasticity and our own ingenuity to
discover new solutions to these problems” (p. 210).
The word bias was used to imply that humans and the brain both have opinions.
By reducing the concept of an opinion to a guess, Cozolino reaffirmed the privilege of
objective quantitative studies. This implies that for now such guesswork is the best that
can be done until progressive science provides conclusive proof for whatever is being
studied (e.g., the relationship between brain function and human experience).
“Complexity.” Cozolino used this word to describe brain functioning that is
capable of facilitating the multifaceted psychological processing necessary for the range
of behaviors required for adequate functioning in modern civilization. He also used the
word complexity to describe psychological functioning, and to generally describe
intricate systems that emerge from their constituent parts.
“To accomplish the complexity required for behavior, neurons organize into
neural networks” (p. 14).
Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that
promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and processing
complexity” (p. 20).
“A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal
functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of
growth, integration, and complexity” (p. 25).
“Although redundant hemispheres provide certain benefits, such as a backup
system in case of injury, hemispheric specialization via natural selection promotes
neural complexity” (p. 94).
The focus on integration exists at each level of nature’s complexity from neurons
to narratives to nations. As systems become more complex, it takes more
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sophisticated mechanisms and increasing amounts of energy to support their
continuing interconnection and homeostatic balance. (p. 174)
“Because increasing complexity requires greater interdependency, our brains have
come to exist more and more profoundly within a matrix of other brains” (p. 216).
“The very complexity of the development and functioning of the brain is also
what makes it such a fragile structure” (p. 321).
Cozolino’s use of the word complexity implied a connection between the
properties of the human brain and the advancement of civilization, and equivalence
between the goals of psychotherapy and the findings of brain research. Importantly, in
these passages the word complexity substitutes for a delineated, logical explanation for
how the brain creates reality, facilitates a coherent perception and interpretation of that
reality, and correlates with the advancements of human societies. The assertion that
mental processes are complex is not a substitute for an argument.
“Fragile.” Personal identity, the self, and the brain were all described as fragile.
“Stories connect us to others prop up our often fragile identities, and keep our
brains regulated” (p. 163).
“Pathological states highlight the fact that the self is a fragile construction of the
brain” (p. 286).
“The very complexity of the development and functioning of the brain is also
what makes it such a fragile structure” (p. 321).
Together these passages implied that self and brain have similar qualities, and in
the second passage above Cozolino directly suggested that self is generated by the brain.
By using the word fragile in a variety of contexts Cozolino substituted a comparison or a
use of rhetoric for a coherent argument about how self emerges from the brain. Although
brain disease and injury can certainly alter psychological experience and identity, the use
of the word fragile in descriptions of self and brain cannot substitute for an articulate
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explanation of how understanding typical experience as the product of brain functioning
is scientifically accurate or a helpful paradigm for therapists and general audiences.
“Plasticity.” Cozolino discussed the plasticity of the human brain as the quality by
which the brain changes or adapts in relation to the environment in which a person exists.
He also used that word to describe the self.
“Neural plasticity refers to the ability of neurons to change the way they are
shaped and relate to one another as the brain adapts to the environment through
time” (pp. 56-57).
“Patients with multiple personalities are perhaps the most complex example of the
plasticity of self, because they generate many different subpersonalities associated
with different experiences and emotional states” (p. 287).
Because neural plasticity was a central concept for Cozolino’s brain-based
psychotherapy theory, the assertion that the self also has plasticity suggested a use of
rhetoric to either conflate self and brain or to imply that self emerges from the
functioning of the brain.
“Primitive.” Cozolino used the word primitive to describe the early development
of the brain, maladaptive psychological defense mechanisms, and traditional or relatively
less-advanced societies.
Freud argued that in order to understand who and what we are, we need to
understand the primal unconscious elements of experience. He called this the id—
the primitive and uncivilized life energy that we share with our reptilian and
mammalian ancestors. (p. 3)
“The more primitive or immature the defense mechanism, the more reality is
distorted and the more functional impairment occurs” (p. 34).
“Evolution has shaped the primitive areas of our visual brains to recognize and
react quickly to threats from possible predators” (p. 80).
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“Winnicott defined the early and intense focus on the baby as primary maternal
preoccupation, and understood it to include the mother’s absorption into and
attunement to the experiences with her baby’s primitive developmental state”
(p. 189).
Co-constructed narratives form the core of human groups, from primitive tribes to
modern families. The combined participation of caretakers and children in
narrating shared experiences organizes memories, embeds them within a social
context, and assists in linking feelings, actions, and others to the self. (p. 207)
Stress impairs or downgrades the functioning of the locale system, causing us to
fall back on the more primitive organization of taxon (amygdaloid) systems. From
a psychoanalytic perspective, this process may be understood as regression to
more primitive self states and defense mechanisms. (pp. 257-258)
“The most primitive subcortical fight-or-flight circuitry, shared with our reptilian
ancestors, interacts with the most highly evolved regions of the cortex” (p. 289).
The recurring use of the word primitive described a linear and hierarchical
transition process for a brain, a psyche, and a society. How these concepts are
interrelated, aside from Cozolino’s use of evolution to vaguely connect them all, was
unclear. Regardless, his use of evolutionary theory to substantiate differences between
industrialized and pre-capitalist societies overlooked the well-known controversies
associated with the use of evolutionary theory as an explanation for differences in
cultural and economic arrangements that overlooks the impact of global war and
colonialism over the past several hundred years.
“Trial and error.” Cozolino used this recurring phrase to describe human
learning, the effects of learning on the brain, and the history of psychotherapy during the
20th century.
“Learning within neural networks occurs as a result of trial and error” (p. 16).
“Like other scientific discoveries, psychotherapy developed from a combination
of trial-and-error learning, the intuition of its founder, and plain luck” (p. 32).
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Only through trial-and-error learning are early clumsy movements slowly shaped
into functional skills. Children and their brains intuitively know this and will
resist being held back or helped too much. When we attempt to help, a child’s
impatient protest of “Let me do it!” reflects instinctual wisdom of the importance
of trial and error learning in the growth of neural networks. (p. 69).
The use of this phrase in these three contexts implied similarities between the
processes of brain growth and development, childhood development, and the
development of the important cultural institution of psychotherapy. Collectively, these
passages scientized human development and cultural institutions such as psychotherapy.
“Worlds.” Cozolino used the term worlds to describe various aspects of
psychological experience, change, and the features of self that explain and facilitate the
potential for change.
“Our imaginations can simultaneously create exciting new worlds, as well as the
fears that prevent us from living in them” (p. 10).
“These unconscious memories organize our inner worlds when we are with others
and when we are alone” (p. 41).
“The cortex is experience dependent, which means that it is shaped through
countless interactions with our social and physical worlds. In this way we grow to
adapt to the particular niche into which we are born” (p. 59).
“In the middle of the second year, a growth spurt occurs in the left hemisphere
and an explosion in language and locomotion launches children into the broader
physical and social worlds” (p. 95).
“From a psychodynamic perspective, these patients seem trapped in secondary
process thinking, disconnected from their inner physical and emotional worlds”
(p. 107).
“Dorsolateral areas exhibit an initial lag and then growth spurt with the
development of language and the exploration of our physical and conceptual
worlds” (p. 122).
“In essence, both inner and outer worlds need to be balanced and adequately
regulated for optimal functioning” (p. 128).
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Cozolino used the term worlds in varying contexts in order to portray individuals
and social phenomena as existing in separate realms or realities. This implied a
dichotomous private and public existence, a move that reinforces the early modern value
of innerness. Although psychological theories have traditionally been based on modern
era philosophy and its vision of a self or subjectivity that is separate from the neutral and
scientized material world, the language in the passages above were especially
contradictory of mind-body integration that Cozolino seemingly used neuroscience as a
way to overcome. In other words, the statements above suggest mind-body dualism.
In sum, the examples of repetition in Cozolino’s text suggested a subtle way of
portraying important concepts or entities as related or even quite similar, either without
formal arguments or as a way to unsuspectingly reinforce arguments he had posited. Over
the course of a reading of his book it might be easy to overlook the covert yet persuasive
effects of this rhetorical strategy.
Speculation language. Cozolino’s use of language that implied a finding or
argument to be only potentially true was ubiquitous. He also used this rhetorical strategy
to predict future neuroscience discoveries. At times Cozolino juxtaposed speculative
statements with statements that suggested certainty.
Speculation about the fit between neuroscience findings and general
psychological phenomena. The following statements exemplified uncertainty about mindbrain integration.
“What Charcot and Freud called dissociation and hysteria could well have been
the result of inadequate integration and coordination among these different,
cohabiting brains” (p. 6).
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“By activating processes involved in secure attachment, empathic attunement
likely creates an optimal biochemical environment for neural plasticity” (p. 46).
“The emotions, images, and thoughts that emerge in conditions of low stimulation
(or the absence of distraction) may hold clues to the workings of our brains and
the aftereffects of early learning” (p. 88).
“Perhaps the left hemisphere interpreter may explain why we are all above
average in our own minds” (p. 103)
“The momentary bubbling up of feelings or images, which are then quickly lost,
may reflect one aspect of the intrusion of right hemisphere processing into left
hemisphere control” (p. 104).
Given that we use our internal expressions as implicit models for how we
understand others, it could be that what Freud called the defense mechanism of
projection is actually a simple byproduct of how our brains interweave our
automatic theories of others’ minds with understandings of ourselves. (p. 314)
Speculation about the fit between neuroscience and psychology or psychotherapy
theories implied hope or expectation that future brain research will confirm or deny
hypotheses about the relationship between mind and brain. Scholars (e.g., Brothers, 2001;
Uttal, 1999) have cautioned that this rhetorical strategy in cognitive neuroscience
literature is likely to cause audiences to mistake a faith in future scientific studies for
actual scientific facts, thereby ignoring the flawed logic underlying many studies trying
to ascertain neurobiological correlates for psychological concepts. In other words, this
rhetoric is likely to cause some readers to confuse the goals of neuroscience with the
established findings of neuroscience, which mistakenly reinforces a possibly unfounded
synthesis between brain functioning and the concept of mind or mental states.
Speculation about evolution. Cozolino’s central premise was that evolutionary
theory is an explanation for human neurobiology and therefore for psychology,
psychotherapy, and contemporary human societies (see also Themes, pp. 213-220).
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However, he acknowledged that some of the claims generated by evolutionary theory are
hypothetical.
The portion of the visual system activated by pictures of animals is an area
involved with very early stages of visual processing. This may be a reflection of
how evolution has shaped the primitive areas of our visual brains to recognize and
react quickly to threats from possible predators. (Cozolino, p. 80)
“This model of laterality may have reflected an intermediate evolutionary stage
between having two modes of conscious awareness and our current bias toward
right hemisphere inhibition” (p. 109).
“It is likely that evolution has used these core visual-spatial networks to serve as
an infrastructure for language” (p. 143).
Spoken language is sound, which primitive fear circuitry is able to silence.
Perhaps those early prehumans who hung around for conversation and negotiation
with predators didn’t fare well enough to pass down as many genes as did those
who either kept quiet, fought, or ran away. (p. 278)
Cozolino’s speculation about evolutionary processes that were quite central to his
brain-based psychotherapy theory raises a broader uncertainty about his mind-brain
integration efforts altogether. In other words, speculative rhetoric about human evolution
naturalized psychotherapy and psychological problems by depicting them as products of
intrinsic physical processes and suggested that his integration project may be more of a
precarious effort than the frequent use of scientific terminology and a steadfast attitude
toward the subject matter might otherwise suggest. The rhetorical strategy could therefore
serve as a way for Cozolino to circumvent criticism about his weighty claims about
human functioning and the relationship between mind or self and brain.
Speculation about the history of psychotherapy. In Cozolino’s introductory
chapter he described the purpose of his book as building on Freud’s original intention of
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a brain-based explanation for human psychology (see General history of psychotherapy
according to Cozolino, pp. 107-110; see History of Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory,
pp. 113-117). However, Cozolino acknowledged some uncertainty about relevant
historical details.
“Freud started out as a rebel, a neurologist curious about the mind. I suspect he
was frustrated with the mind-brain partisanship of medical school, and longed to
work with others who shared his interests” (p. 1).
In Charcot, Freud sought a teacher who was well-established, confident, and
unafraid of the no-man’s-land between mind and brain. One can imagine Freud’s
excitement as he walked the streets of Paris on his way to meet the great man, a
possible kindred spirit (p. 2).
“Perhaps Freud kept the Project to himself because he feared that it would be
relegated to the same sort of obscurity as the case of Phinneas Gage” (p. 4).
“Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would eventually be
integrated with its neurobiological substrates” (p. 5).
Cozolino’s speculations about the history of psychotherapy cast doubt on the
purpose of his text as building upon Freud’s original intention of a brain-based
understanding of human experience as Cozolino initially explained. Speculative rhetoric
in these passages suggests an attempt to hedge on these historical claims, circumventing
criticism about the use of an origin myth (claiming that psychotherapy emerged from
neurology) to justify a merger between the two fields now that neuroimaging technology
has advanced dramatically.
Speculative language alongside language implying certainty. At times statements
that were speculative were placed alongside statements in which Cozolino’s choice of
language denoted a significant amount of certainty.
The early interpersonal environment may be imprinted in the human brain by
shaping the child’s neural networks and establishing the biochemical set points in
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circuitry dedicated to memory, emotion, safety, and survival. Later, these
structures and processes come to serve as the infrastructure for social and
intellectual skills, affect regulation, and the sense of self. (p. 10)
In this passage Cozolino first speculated that early relationships have a role in
organizing structures of the brain that have been implicated in a variety of psychological
experiences (memory, emotion, safety, and survival) and he then asserted that these brain
structures are related to psychological aspects of human functioning (intellectual skills,
affect regulation, and the sense of self). Therefore he drew a conclusion based on a
hypothetical argument. In the following passages he also used this strategy.
In taking a sample of general theoretical approaches to psychotherapy, we will
look for common elements among them, and how these elements may relate to
neural network development. Remember, from the perspective of neuroscience,
psychotherapists are in the brain-rebuilding business. (p. 33)
Here Cozolino speculated that common factors of psychotherapy theories are
related to underlying neural integration, and then stated with certainty that therapy is a
“brain-rebuilding” task. This rhetorical strategy implies that a strong belief in therapy as a
brain intervention may suffice for conclusive evidence supporting that claim or
explaining its relevance. The passage is therefore noteworthy because it shows how
confidence in brain research and in the assumption that brain and selfhood are closely
linked (or even interchangeable concepts) is such a powerful belief that speculating about
the specific science that could support this claim is permissible.
“Earned autonomy is convincing evidence that early negative experiences can be
reinstated and repaired later in life. Personal growth has the ability to heal because
the social brain remains plastic” (p. 209).
With the phrase “convincing evidence,” Cozolino first speculated that individuals
are able to overcome the negative effects of early experiences, yet he then stated with
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sureness that healing is enabled by neuroplasticity. This was surprising because it would
seem that the capacity for psychological change has been well established, in fact,
probably more established than the neuroscience thought to underlie the types of healing
experiences Cozolino described. This juxtaposition of speculation and certainty was
noteworthy because it suggests unnecessary doubt about psychology amidst possibly
unfounded certainty in the ability of neuroscience to attenuate that doubt by serving as a
material truth about psychological concepts and the cultural values that they embody. In
other words, by juxtaposing speculation and certainty in the passage above, Cozolino
privileged recent scientific research (and the assumption of objectivity in that research)
over a longstanding psychological theory (attachment theory). Because it is unclear why
psychologists would need neuroscience to prove the relevance or accuracy of this theory,
the passage reinforces the model of a higher-order or higher-status science confirming
that a psychological concept or paradigm is an accurate understanding of human
functioning.
Like the attachment system…the development of this engagement system and the
fine-tuning of the vagal brake to regulate affect appear to depend on the quality of
attachment relationships in early childhood. This allows us to internalize what we
learn from experience with caretakers into moment-to-moment somatic
regulation. (p. 234).
In this passage Cozolino first speculated that the development of brain structures
that are related to affect regulation is dependent upon the quality of early relationships,
and then he concluded with an attitude of certainty that these developmental processes
explain how self-control of the body is facilitated by formative early relational
experiences. This passage highlights a significant contradiction because he at once
claimed that scientists know and do not know that brain research explains how the quality

201

of early relationships is related to later psychological functioning and stability. Similar to
the previous examples of this rhetorical device, this passage is noteworthy because it
shows how Cozolino assumed or relied on a strong belief amongst readers in a
relationship between self and brain to obfuscate the lack of clear evidence for a direct
relationship between affect, attachment, and brain functioning.
In sum, the examples of placing speculation language alongside language
implying certainty were noteworthy because they exemplify a reliance on a strong
convictions of a relationship between mind or self and brain in order to assert conclusions
about the brain based on claims that remain unproven.
Predicting future discoveries. At times Cozolino suggested that continued brain
research will eventually answer some of the difficult yet important questions about
human mind and consciousness.
In the case of the imagined memory, the prefrontal area also becomes activated,
reflecting its role in processing the instructions, staying on task, and accessing
imagination. How neural networks in the prefrontal cortex know how to do this is
as yet unknown. (p. 80)
How does the brain achieve conscious awareness? Where is the seat of
consciousness? The answer to both of these questions is that we don’t yet know.
At this point, we must be satisfied with discovering pieces of this complex puzzle
of consciousness that will be assembled sometime in the future. (p. 140)
“Although this research has yet to be done with humans, the behavioral and
neurobiological parallels between rats and humans are striking, making rats very
helpful in understanding the interpersonal aspects of neurobiology” (p. 214).
“As the dialogue between psychotherapy and neuroscience continues to evolve,
an increasing number of scientific findings will be applied to both theory and
clinical practice” (p. 342).
With these statements Cozolino used speculative rhetoric to portray the discovery
of the neurobiological locations of mind or human experience as inevitable. Cozolino’s
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predictions for a confirmed material understanding of human psychology may generate
excitement, yet this view is not without scientific and philosophical controversies, and
seems to have little to do with improving the practice and profession of psychotherapy. In
Chapter I, I discussed the widespread optimism about neuroscientific advances
contributing to the alteration of life on a genetic and molecular level that scholars believe
to be a firmly engrained aspects of contemporary Western selfhood (see Rose, 2007), the
well-documented criticisms of the use of this optimism as a rhetorical strategy in
cognitive neuroscience literature (see Brothers, 2001; Vidal, 2009), and the arguments
against the neuroscientific efforts to localize consciousness within the brain (see Bennett
& Hacker, 2003; Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2004). In light of those critical perspectives, the use
of a psychotherapy text as a venue to perpetuate neuroscientific speculation should be
brought to the attention of psychotherapists studying this material or applying it to
clinical practice.
Cozolino providing personal speculations. In several passages, Cozolino (2010)
provided personal (and therefore unconfirmed) interpretations of neuroscience research.
“I strongly suspect that left-right integration is an experience-dependent process”
(p. 109).
“In my mind, the parallels as well as the tendency for evolution to conserve such
mechanisms form a strong case for the theory that what Meaney and his
colleagues are finding in rats is at work in humans” (p. 223)
What might be happening in the brain during and after an accurate and well-timed
interpretation? Each interpretation that hits home is like the death of a small
aspect of the false self. My suspicion is that it begins with seeing past the products
of the left hemisphere interpreter, which disinhibits the activation of subcortical
circuits containing negative memories. (p. 295)
“I suspect that telling the story builds circuitry, which contributes to amygdala
inhibition and the dissipation of fear” (p. 307)
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These speculative statements demonstrated how Cozolino (2010) expressed
personal interest or investment in neuroscience research by proposing his own
interpretations of it. This strategy implied that with sufficient interest in the integration of
neuroscience and psychology, one individual may impact popular beliefs about the
relationships between brain functioning and human psychology or self. In fact, the final
chapter of his book (“The Psychotherapist as Neuroscientist,” pp. 341-358) begins with a
quote (see Epigraph below) by seminal neuroscience researcher Eric Kandel about this
field of study: “Unlike other areas of science, it is still possible for an individual or small
group to make important contributions” (p. 341). With the passages above Cozolino
illustrated those exact efforts and he depicted an interest in neuroscience as a way for
psychotherapists to contribute to a grander and epochal scientific endeavor. This is
significant because the depiction of psychotherapists as brain science enthusiasts
represents a departure from the generally understood purpose of therapy and the
professional identity of therapists.
These statements are also noteworthy because they exemplify the problems with
cognitive neuroscience that Brothers (2001) highlighted in her discussion of how authors
are able to creatively permeate cognitive neuroscience with tenuous claims about human
experience and the brain that are actually disguised cultural discourses, since cognitive
neuroscience lacks a central organizing theory against which to test hypotheses (a
defining characteristic of other scientific disciplines), the brain is extremely complicated
and contemporary brain science is relatively new, and the vernaculars of psychology and
brain science might be fundamentally incompatible (see also Bennett & Hacker, 2003).
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Epigraph. Cozolino started every chapter and each subsection of every chapter
with an epigraph, that is, a short quote from any one of a variety of historical figures,
scientists, authors, psychotherapists, and others. The quotes represented a wide array of
statements on topics ranging from scientific issues to general human concerns. The
variety and placement of the quotations suggested that they were intended to link mindbrain research with psychotherapy and broader values or principles with which readers
may find solace. In other words, they were used to depict brain-based explanations for
psychotherapy and human psychology as being intuitive, natural, and highly relevant to
nearly any endeavor to which neuroscience is applied.
For example, Chapter 11 (“Building the Social Brain: Shaping Attachment
Schemas”) begins with the quote, “Experience is a biochemical intervention” by Jason
Seidel (p. 197). To introduce Chapter 7 (“The Executive Brain”), he quoted Virginia
Woolf, “My own brain is to me the most unaccountable of machinery—always buzzing,
humming, soaring roaring diving, and then buried in mud. And why? What’s this passion
for?” (p. 115). To introduce Chapter 14 (“Trauma and Neural Network Dissociation”), he
quoted Virginia Woolf again, “The beauty of the world has two edges, one of laughter,
one of anguish, cutting the heart asunder” (p. 262). In Chapter 12 (“The Neurobiology of
Attachment”), to start the subsection titled “The Human Social Brain,” Cozolino quoted
the French Renaissance philosopher Montaigne, “It is good to rub and polish our brains
against those of others” (p. 227).
By providing such a large number and variety of quotes from important figures
likely to be regarded as wise, daring, or socially impactful, Cozolino implied that there is
a broad societal significance to each chapter and subsection, and showed that the
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significance of neuroscience research transcends specific historical eras because it
confirms whatever was observed or suspected about humans beings generally and the
social arrangements humans have formed. Because the epigraphs that Cozolino selected
were short and used without further elaboration, they seem to support especially a sense
of universality of his efforts. In other words, epigraphs supported the argument that much
of human culture, history, successes, and problems are explainable by the evolution of the
brain, and that over time many great figures realized this. The quotes set a frame for his
chapters and subsections as supporting a vast array of disciplinary efforts through the
expansive scope and incisiveness of epigraphs that preceded each one. By placing his
chapters and subsections alongside quotes from prominent and insightful figures,
Cozolino might also be regarded as bold or revolutionary for tying brain research to
psychology and therapy in such a comprehensive effort.
Figures of speech. The following were examples of figures of speech in
Cozolino’s book that are disguised forms of persuasion (for further examples of
Cozolino’s use of this rhetorical strategy, see Appendix B, pp. 325-328).
Apposition. Examples of apposition (that is, the use of a phrase consisting of a
noun used to modify or describe another noun), included “attachment circuitry” (p. 211,
p. 210, p. 184), “familiarity circuits” (p. 153), “social brain” (p. 8, p. 244), “social
engagement system” (p. 233), “social neural networks” (p. 182), and “social synapse”
(p. 179, p. 180, p. 195, p. 182, p. 187, p. 189, p. 196).
Apposition synthesized neurobiological and psychological or colloquial concepts,
thereby identifying a typical subjective experience by emphasizing its neurobiological
origin. These phrases easily insert neurobiological terms into common descriptions of
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subjective experience, thereby encouraging a discourse that perpetuates a reductionist and
mechanical vision of self through a disguised form of persuasion.
Metaphor. Cozolino used metaphor (that is, a comparison between two objects or
concepts without using the words “like” or “as”). The metaphors he selected for
describing the brain represented several recurring categories of objects or themes.
Human development metaphors used to describe the brain. Cozolino often
compared the development of the brain to the physical and psychological development of
a child.
“Consequently, many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences
are organized and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our
awareness and distorted by our immature brains” (p. 9).
“In contrast to the brainstem and limbic system, the cortex is immature at birth
and continues to develop throughout adulthood” (p. 68).
“The maturation and sculpting of so much of the cortex after birth allows for
highly specific environmental adaptations” (p. 72).
“During the first 2 years of life, the right hemisphere has a growth spurt” (p. 95).
“In contrast to the amygdala, the hippocampus is a late bloomer, continuing to
mature into early adulthood” (p. 231).
These metaphors paired images of human maturation with descriptions of the
brain, implying an association between developmental stages and the growth or
expansion of the brain during each stage. Cozolino’s use of developmental metaphors had
the effect of humanizing the brain and naturalizing human development concepts. By
unproblematically sharing psychological and neuroscientific discourses, these metaphors
foster a vision of human development that is synonymous with, or reduced to brain
development. This vision reproduces the understanding that the brain is the only entity
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needed for the self, or as Vidal (2009) noted, the brain and the self become
“consubstantial” (p. 7).
Technology metaphors. Cozolino often described the structure and function of the
brain as a computer or other communication and information processing device.
“Although we usually think of the cortex as a giant hard drive capable of storing
huge amounts of data, another primary role of the cortex is inhibition” (p. 22).
“In order for a neuron to survive and grow, it must wire with other neurons in
increasingly complex interconnections” (p. 67).
“Because these neural networks are sculpted during early interactions, we emerge
into self-awareness preprogrammed by unconsciously organized hidden layers of
neural processing” (p. 72).
“Early memories stored in circuits of the amygdala and right hemisphere can
intrude into adult consciousness in a variety of ways” (p. 87).
“Although redundant hemispheres provide certain benefits, such as a backup
system in case of injury, hemispheric specialization via natural selection promotes
neural complexity” (p. 94).
“Genetic expression is programmed by experience” (p. 217).
“We have seen a great deal of evidence of the impact of early nurturance on the
shaping of the social brain and its emotional circuitry” (p. 227).
“In fact the human brain is criss-crossed with neural networks dedicated to
receiving, processing, and communicating messages across the social synapse”
(p. 227).
“Since the networks connecting the ompfc and the amygdala are shaped by
experience, our learning history of what is safe and dangerous, including our
attachment schema, is thought to be encoded within this system” (p. 231).
These metaphors were noteworthy because they equate the brain with
contemporary machinery, thereby also equating the functioning of the self with the
functioning of modern devices devised by applied science. In other words, this figure of
speech reduces human mentation to machine processes.
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Building and infrastructure metaphors. Cozolino characterized the structure and
functioning of the brain by comparing it to architectural design and infrastructure.
“A therapist attempts to restructure neural architecture in the service of more
adaptive behavior, cognition, and emotion” (p. 9).
“The neural architecture of the brain comes to embody the environment that
shapes it. You could also think of our neural architecture as a tangible expression
of our learning history” (p. 19).
The way we organize and understand ambiguous stimuli gives us clues about the
architecture of the hidden layers of neural processing (how our unconscious
organizes the world; p. 34).
“This process most likely enhances the growth of ompfc and dlpfc systems, while
building new brain networks to bridge the two for higher level awareness”
(p. 161).
“The hippocampus is constantly remodeled in response to new information”
(p. 310).
By describing the brain as a physical structure that manifests self and personal
history, Cozolino portrayed psychological changes or changes in self in a highly reified
and materialistic manner.
Earlier (see pp. 9-16) I discussed examples of historical research about
neuroscientific endeavors that suggested ways in which the brain has been used in
popular culture to depict a materialization of mind or psyche in accordance with various
Western cultural and societal movements during the 19th and 20th centuries. The
metaphors above suggested ways in which Cozolino replicated that trend. In the context
of a book promoted as a psychotherapy text, these metaphors extract self (and therefore
valuable concepts such as insight and agency) from social context and instead place self
in a discourse of instrumentalism and materialism regardless of the appeals to visions of
self as inherently social, or initially formed within the context of relationships, which also
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appear in his text. This produces a basic contradiction in Cozolino’s argument that works
against his professed ideals.
Personification. Personification is the attribution of human abilities to nonhuman
objects. Cozolino used personification to depict the brain as possessing qualities or
capable of performing tasks typically associated with human beings.
“A brain which is challenged comes to be more complex, active, and robust”
(p. 19).
Our cortex then provides us with rationalizations and beliefs about our behaviors
that help keep our coping strategies in place, possibly for a lifetime. These neural
and psychic structures can lead to either psychological and physical health, or
illness and disability. (p. 23)
“The very way that the brain has evolved to successfully cope with immediate
threat appears to have created a vulnerability to longer term psychological
distress: Enter psychotherapy” (p. 25).
“The neural circuitry involved with fear has a tenacious memory and can invisibly
influence conscious awareness for a lifetime” (p. 34).
After birth, newborns continue to move all parts of their bodies, allowing them to
discover their hands and feet as they pass in front of their faces. Although these
movements may look random, they are the brain’s best guess at which movements
will eventually be needed” (p. 68).
“This confabulatory and positive self-bias. . . . also reflects the brain’s basic
instinct to engage in explanatory behavior for things it cannot understand”
(pp. 103-104).
“The posterior parietal regions weave together sensory information about our
physical environment with networks of organized motoric actions and intentions
which (along with the frontal lobes) create goal-directed action plans” (p. 142).
“The brain’s ability to take our physical experience and use it metaphorically is
the basis of imagination” (p. 146).
“Thus, if our neurons become depressed so do we” (p. 220).
“So, by the time we become conscious of others, our brain has already made
decisions about them” (p. 244).
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“The amygdala can learn, throughout life, to pair any stimulus (even physical
affection or praise) with fear” (p. 245).
“The existence of these sophisticated social neural systems reflects the millions of
years of natural selection that have been refining our brain’s ability to read the
emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others” (p. 314).
Personification of the brain was significant because it suggests that the brain has
its own volition independent of individuals that influences and asserts control over
behavior and thinking. The portrayal of the brain as a source of human experience and
functioning implies an understanding of human selfhood as extracted from sociocultural
expectations and reduces experience to an observable location within the human body.
Since this rhetorical device renders agency, identity, and choice as concepts that are best
studied through a scientific study of the brain, the understanding of human selfhood
becomes greatly dependent upon however brain research is interpreted.
These statements evoke an understanding of human beings that is consistent with
an interiorized yet materialized self, similar to the challenge to the idea of a “ghost in the
machine” posited by philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949). This view understands the brain to
be the source of the mind and human behavior, thereby attempting to reconcile the
problems of mind-body dualism based on the idea that mind is a nonmaterial entity
(comparable to a ghost) inhabiting the physical body. Personification of the brain in these
passages therefore establishes human agency as a matter of influencing or controlling
brain functioning to gain control over one’s life, and it implies that without recent
neuroscientific advances it would be unknowable why humans think, behave, and interact
with each other in the ways that they do. As Vidal (2009) summarized, even when
neuroscientific literature states an objection to reducing mind to brain, if personification
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is used to describe brain functions, the result is a twofold reductionism: First, a reduction
of self to brain, and second, a reduction of psychology or social knowledge to
neuroscientific information.
Prosopopoeia. Prosopopoeia is a type of personification in which human abilities
are ascribed to a nonmaterial entity or concept such as mind or emotion rather than a
physical object such as brain.
“As affect is repeatedly brought into the therapeutic relationship and successfully
managed, the client gradually internalizes these skills by sculpting the neural
structures necessary for autoregulation” (p. 21).
“Flashbacks, memories from traumatic experiences, likely reside in amygdaloiddriven memory networks” (p. 86).
“Language within significant relationships has shaped the brain during evolution
and continues to do so throughout our lives. (p. 343)
Narratives embedded within an emotionally meaningful relationship (like
psychotherapy) are capable of resculpting neural networks throughout life”
(p. 343).
“The pathways containing these traumatic memories become hyperpotentiated,
meaning that they are more easily triggered by less severe subsequent stressors”
(p. 249).
This type of personification was significant because it was used to explain how
individual subjectivity is connected to the material or external world (which includes the
human body itself) by depicting the brain as receiving nonmaterial experience and storing
information or memories. Integrating the external world and private experience by
describing the brain as a connective organ within the body assumes a split between public
and private or social and individual realms in a way that perpetuates dualist philosophy.
Summary of rhetorical strategies and elements of writing style. In The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain, Cozolino (2010) applied a
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variety of recurring rhetorical strategies that were noteworthy for how they fused mind
and brain through his use of language. For example, some statements were ambiguous or
unclear with regard to whether they were intended to refer to brains or to humans; other
statements suggested (but did not clearly articulate) a relationship between brain
functioning and mind or subjective experience. Further, Cozolino used analogies to imply
specific relationships between human experience and neurobiology, yet often those
statements also lacked any clearly delineated arguments. Cozolino’s infrequent, brief, yet
very important statements casting serious doubt on the entire premise of his book seemed
to be what literary experts call aporia, and the dismissive and inadequate discussions
about those doubts seemed to annul any genuine concern he might have had with those
problematic aspects of his book.
Cozolino used diction (word choice) to redefine or reappropriate psychological
terms as neuroscientific concepts, thereby synthesizing psychology and neuroscience
through the use of rhetoric rather than through scientific argument. This obfuscated the
boundaries between neuroscience and psychological or psychotherapy theories instead of
directly defining those boundaries or giving good reason why they should be combined in
such an unproblematic way. Epigraphs (quotes preceding chapters and subsections of the
book) were ubiquitous and suggestive of an attempt to universalize Cozolino’s
neuroscience-psychotherapy integration and to portray brain research as providing
evidence that confirms the legitimacy of timeless observations about humans and human
society. Figures of speech were also frequent and they included metaphors (such as
technological and child development metaphors for the brain), and personification of the
structure and functioning of the brain. The figures of speech suggested reductionist and
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scientized depictions of relationships between unique concepts or fields of study without
adequate discussion about the implications of these discourses. In general, Cozolino’s
book was heavy with rhetoric in a way that is noteworthy in light of the criticisms leveled
against cognitive neuroscience literature with regards to language that could be
obfuscating or misleading despite appearing to many readers as legitimate and truthful
scientific evidence that mind or self is easily studied through brain science.
Themes
In this section I discuss themes that emerged from recurring topics or arguments
throughout Cozolino’s book.
Evolution as a central organizing principle. This appeared to be Cozolino’s
overarching theme. He used evolution or Darwinian theory of natural selection to argue
that the human brain is responsible for human development, psychology, self,
psychological problems or illness, the emergence of psychotherapy as a mental health
treatment, and physiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy.
The evolution of the human brain explains the growth and advancement of
human societies. Cozolino argued that humans organized into groups because doing so
enhanced survival, which in turn supported the evolution of a brain capable of complex
language and thinking abilities necessary for the advancement of societies.
“Using evolution as an organizing principle, we begin with the assumption that
our highly social brains have been shaped by natural selection because banding
together in groups enhances survival” (p. 177).
As social groups grew even larger, more cortical geography was needed to
process increasingly complicated social information. This coevolution of
relationships, language, and brain allowed for the development of higher levels of
symbolic and abstract functioning. In other words, early caretaking and intimate
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relationships are a fundamental building block in the evolution of the human
brain. (p. 178)
In these passages Cozolino argued for a co-occurring and interdependent
relationship between the progression of the brain across the history of the human species,
and the advancement of human societies into their vast and complex manifestations. In
other words, he asserted a correlation between changes in the brain and changes in human
society but he evaded phrasing that would have posited a causal relationship. This
naturalized culture, human relationships, and social order.
The evolution of the human brain explains human culture. Cozolino speculated
that a variety of human abilities, endeavors, and shared traditions result from the
evolution of the human brain.
Because of the evolutionary links between motor behavior and cognition, some
theorists consider cognition to be a derivative of motor behavior (Wilson, 1998).
Support for this idea may exist in that much of our symbolic and abstract thinking
is organized by the visceral, sensory, and motor metaphors that permeate our
language. (Johnson, 1987, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 117)
According to Cozolino, the fact that some common metaphors use descriptions of
physical abilities or sensations to illustrate abstract or nonmaterial concepts might be is
evidence that mind or cognition emerges from bodily processes. His argument extracted
nuances of contemporary language such as figures of speech from their social and
historical context and depicted them as illustrative of inseparability between mind and
body. In other words, rather than embodying a shared way of communicating and
understanding within a culture or social group, Cozolino instead portrayed certain
metaphors as a means by which the human brain projects some primitive knowledge
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about how the human species was adept at physical development and survival prior to its
advanced psychological functioning.
“When we think of the human cerebral cortex, we may think of the
accomplishments of music, art, and culture—products of cortical and especially
prefrontal evolution” (p. 119).
This passage suggested that higher-order thinking abilities such as planning,
organizing, mental manipulation, and abstract thinking, which have been associated with
the functioning of the outer layers of the human brain, explain or are necessary for the
remarkable human developments of “music, art, and culture” and the uniquely human
way of creating and appreciating these social practices. While it is true that humans
require brains for devising and sharing phenomena such as music and art, Cozolino made
an assertion about the evolution of the brain (especially the cortex that he valorized)
instead of building a coherent argument about how brain functioning explains societal
institutions and their significant historical purposes. This is problematic because his
assertion ambitiously conveys a reduction of social traditions and practices to the brain
without providing a clear understanding for why this vision of human beings is accurate.
Our brains allow us to fashion clothing, build houses with heating systems, and
create sophisticated farming techniques that allow us to expand our habitats and
sources of food. But does this explain why we have relationships? We know that
the expansion of the cortex in primates correlates with increasingly large social
groups. (pp. 214-215)
With this passage Cozolino argued that the brain rather than societies facilitated
the progression of civilization toward effectively functioning and providing physical
sustenance to multitudes of citizens. He then used that argument to compare
technological advancements to human relationships by asserting that both phenomena are
enabled by the way in which the human brain evolved and the human cortex expanded.
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Although complex social groups and complex human technologies may have emerged
together, Cozolino’s deemphasizing of human relationships or shared historical traditions
exemplified how it is problematic or at least incomplete to apply Darwinian theory as an
explanation for every aspect of human life. As with the passages above, his assertion
cannot adequately substitute for a properly delineated argument.
The evolution of the human brain explains the emergence of self. In the
following passage Cozolino attributed some of the defining features of self to the parietal
lobes of the human brain, thereby using the evolution of the human brain as an
explanation for the accuracy of the psychological theories of self that he favored.
The parietal lobes’ interconnections with the rest of the cortex allowed for the
integration of working visual memory, attentional capacities, and bodily
awareness necessary for these imaginal abilities. This suggests that our selfawareness was likely built in a stepwise manner during evolution through a series
of overlapping “maps”—first of the physical environment, then of self in
environment, and later of self as environment. Thus, the growth of imaginal
abilities allowed us to create an increasingly sophisticated inner topography.
(p. 141)
Cozolino emphasized the concept of an inner world as a necessary and defining
feature of self. With this concept Cozolino differentiated between public and private lives
and the need to balance personal space or tolerance for being alone with interpersonal
involvement or emotional attunement with other people. He portrayed the balance
between these aspects of contemporary human beings as possible because of the way that
the brain supports those competing and complementary needs. In other words, social
artifacts such as the concept of the self are reduced in an ahistorical and scientized
manner to neurological products. His passage naturalizes and materializes the concept of
an inner world or inner self, and therefore also reduces psychology to neurology.
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Psychoanalytic theory of mind was actually a description for how the human
brain evolved and generates human experience. Cozolino described traditional
psychoanalytic theory of mind as a description of the functioning of the human brain.
“Maclean described the human brain as a three-part system that embodies our
evolutionary connection to both reptiles and lower mammals” (p. 5)
“What Charcot and Freud called dissociation and hysteria could well have been
the result of inadequate integration and coordination among these different,
cohabitating brains. MacLean’s description…roughly parallels Freud’s distinction
of the conscious and unconscious minds” (p. 6).
Cozolino argued that Freud’s theory of a tripartite division of mind was
unknowingly a description of the brain, which Cozolino understood to be comprised of
three parts that produce competing needs and other aspects of human beings that Freud
described. Earlier (see pp. 106-110) I discussed how this claim was a major premise for
Cozolino’s mind-brain integration in the context of psychotherapy. These passages
illustrate how a reduction of mind to brain entails a reduction of psychology to neurology
and other neuroscientific disciplines, and Cozolino acknowledged that this broad
disciplinary reduction was one of the purposes of his book.
The evolution of the human brain explains contemporary problems of self.
Cozolino depicted a close relationship between brain and self, and he concluded that
psychological problems are a disruption in how the brain facilitates the human experience
of a coherent sense of self. In the following passage, he attributed many emotional and
psychological problems to irrational thinking caused by human imagination.
With the expansion of the cerebral cortex and the emergence of imagination, we
have become capable of being anxious about situations we will never experience.
We can now worry about monsters living under our beds and the incineration of
the earth resulting from the sun’s expansion. Because our imaginal capabilities
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have allowed for the construction of the self, we can also become anxious about
potential threats to our psychological survival. (p. 240)
In this passage Cozolino argued that imagination is a defining characteristic of
selfhood and it is enabled by the complexity of the brain. This is one of the primary ways
by which Cozolino linked brain and self, and he used that connection to describe many
contemporary problems of self as products of imagination or irrational thinking caused by
the brain. This was a remarkably reductionist and asocial vision of human self.
Psychopathology inhibits fitness or survival of the species. The following
passage described the effects of childhood trauma using evolutionary rhetoric.
“When children are traumatized, abused, or neglected, they are taught that they
are not among the chosen. They grow to have thoughts, states of mind, emotions,
and immunological functions that are inconsistent with well-being, successful
procreation, and long-term survival” (p. 206).
Some readers might overlook the association between phrases such as “successful
procreation” and “long-term survival” as components of Darwinian theory because
Cozolino insufficiently outlined evolutionary theory before applying it and referencing it
in such a sweeping and connective way throughout his book. The implication that typical
psychological functioning and wellbeing or the absence of psychological illness supports
evolutionary theory is a rather scientized and limiting view of psychological health and
illness that stands counter to a view of health and illness as social constructs which are
certainly important for many Western cultures but not at all universal across human
societies.
Psychotherapy emerged because of how the brain evolved. Cozolino argued that
the brain evolved so as to develop in accordance with a person’s environment and the
quality of relationships and is negatively affected by the developmental limitations in the
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immature brain. According to his theory, early childhood development is formative for
psychological health, yet because of the plasticity that the brain retains throughout the
lifespan, change is possible after early childhood. This implied that psychotherapy
happens to correct or heal difficulties that arise from these characteristics of the brain.
Many of our most important socioemotional learning experiences are organized
and controlled by reflexes, behaviors, and emotions outside of our awareness and
distorted by our immature brains. To a great extent, psychotherapy owes its
existence to these artifacts of evolution and development. (p. 9)
Evolution’s legacy is a complex brain, vulnerable to a variety of factors that can
disrupt the growth and integration of important neural networks. The field of
psychotherapy has emerged because of the brain’s vulnerability to these
developmental and environmental risks. (p. 11)
The human brain is an amazing organ, capable of continual growth and lifelong
adaptation to an ever-changing array of challenges. Our understanding of how the
brain accomplishes this mandate increases with each new theoretical development
and technological advance. At the same time, we are uncovering some of natural
selection’s more problematic choices. If necessity is the mother of invention, then
evolution itself has created the necessity for psychotherapy by shaping a brain that
is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties. (p. 306)
These ahistorical passages placed psychotherapy as a corrective intervention for
natural problems caused by or manifested in the functioning of the human brain (see also
General history of psychotherapy according to Cozolino, pp. 106-113). By explaining
psychological difficulties as inevitable products of the brain, Cozolino implied that
mental problems and disorders are ahistorical phenomena that would have appeared
regardless of however else societies and cultures developed over the course of human
history. This was a reductionist and scientized understanding of selfhood and problems of
the self.
In sum, Cozolino used evolutionary theory to portray a relationship between the
advancement of the human brain and the advancement of human societies, as well as the
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emergence of culture and selfhood. He applied evolution as an all-encompassing theory
that is able to link neuroscience and psychology generally, and mind and brain
specifically, through materializing psychological problems and the curative mechanisms
of psychotherapy. The passages above suggested that Cozolino used evolutionary theory
to portray an ahistorical and scientistic vision of human beings, culture, and psychology.
Synonymity and convergence between academic disciplines, areas of study,
and types of human relationships. Another primary theme of Cozolino’s book was the
integration between various fields of study and human relationships. He positioned
neuroscience research as evidence that neural functioning is the common underlying
factor uniting disparate fields or social institutions that might otherwise be considered as
fundamentally separate.
Reducing various fields of study to molecular biology. In the following passage
Cozolino argued that molecular biology is the newest field of research that might unify a
variety of psychological and medical disciplines by reducing the findings and practices of
those disciplines to underlying gene expression that they each may actually be describing.
Research in psychoanalysis, epidemiology, developmental psychology, and
psychiatry have all supported what we think of as common sense: A good
childhood is better than a bad one; positive parental attention is important; and
less stress early in life is a good thing. Of course, each field explains these
findings from its own theoretical model and tends to see other perspectives as
secondary. Recent research in molecular biology offers us a groundbreaking view
into the underlying mechanism of the effects of early experience on genetic
expression, that is, how early experience triggers gene expression to guide our
brains onto particular adaptational trajectories. (p. 213)
With these statements Cozolino first criticized a number of fields of study for
disregarding what he portrayed as equally valid points of other fields in regards to ideal
qualities for childhood development. He then grouped all of those fields together and
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argued that they are secondary to the study of how genetic predisposition and human
experience interact to form the totality of a human being. Instead of integrating the
epistemologies by broadening them to include an understanding of the larger cultural
context in which they are all fighting for primacy, he reduced them all as secondary to the
“underlying mechanisms” of gene expression researched by the field of molecular
biology. Neuroscience, he proclaimed, is the master science. However, an assertion is not
a solid argument.
Recent advances in mind-brain research suggest that psychology and neurology
should be integrated into a single field as Freud intended. Earlier (pp. 107-110) I
discussed how Cozolino claimed that psychology emerged from neurology because Freud
(who first trained and practiced as a neurologist) was the founding psychoanalytic
theorist. Cozolino identified the split between the two fields as having emerged when
Freud gave up on his early interest in exploring a brain-based explanation for human
cognition and psychopathology in favor of a theory of a nonmaterial mind after realizing
that a mind-brain connection would have received little acceptance among the medical
establishment, and would lack scientific evidence without the advances in neuroscience
developed later in the 20th century (see General history of psychotherapy according to
Cozolino, pp. 106-113). In those passages Cozolino asserted that the differences between
psychology and neurology are artificial because the two fields both provide treatment for
conditions that arise from the brain.
However exciting the goal of merging psychology and neurology may seem to
some readers, the rationale underlying that vision was a historical inaccuracy about
Freud’s intentions which, even if it was true, seems irrelevant to the tenuous argument
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that self or mind is actually brain and therefore neurology and psychology should be
combined even though each field serves extremely different yet significant purposes. The
effect of advocating for an integration between the two fields was a further blurring
between mind and brain. His advocacy for integration might just be a justification for
how he does it.
Psychoanalytic theory, Buddhist philosophy, and neuroscience all reach the
same conclusions. Cozolino asserted that Buddhist philosophy (which he identified as a
personal longstanding interest) and psychoanalytic theory both contend that the
perception of reality is illusory or highly subjective, even though it appears certain to
individuals. He asserted that this area of convergence convergence is further supported by
the findings of brain research.
Although controversial, the way in which the brain generates consciousness,
including its many distortions, may have been subject to the pressures of natural
selection. . . . You will soon see that the take-home message from psychoanalysis,
Buddhism, and neuroscience is to be a skeptical consumer of the offerings of your
mind. (pp. 133-134)
With this passage Cozolino posited that Buddhist philosophy and psychoanalytic
theory share a common interpretation of the relationship between individual human life
and the external world, and then he claimed that neuroscientific research explains and
offers proof for why those two worldviews are both correct in valuing a skeptical outlook
about the world. He also treats the mind as separate from the individual since it offers
things to the “consumer.” This reinforces a view of self as an individual that has little
control over his or her psychological experiences yet gains agency by learning that the
findings of neuroscience confirm that reality is illusory, perceptions of truth are
questionable, and identity is ultimately flexible. The use of neuroscience to support a

223

highly ideological view of reality presents possible philosophical contradictions between
the alluring prospect of scientific objectivity and the assertion that a shared truth may
ultimately be absent.
Using neuroscience to integrate psychotherapy theories. Earlier (pp. 121-126) I
discussed Cozolino’s use of neuroscience to promote what is called a common factors
approach to psychotherapy. According to this integration, therapy tends to be effective
when several core qualities or principles are all present. Cozolino argued that each of
these common qualities or factors represents a specific type of neural integration, that is,
a syncing or coordination between areas of the brain required for coherent psychological
functioning and wellbeing. With his explanation of the purpose and efficacy of
psychotherapy, Cozolino asserted that therapy utilizes the neurobiological property of
neuroplasticity in a way that coincides with intended psychological change. In other
words, therapy modalities facilitate the corresponding or underlying neural integration
processes, as confirmed by the findings of recent neuroimaging studies used in mindbrain research. I discussed the ways in which this argument is reductionist and relies on
neuroscience to resolve contentious debates in professional psychology about the
standards of patient care and the best ways to assess of psychological healing.
Neuroscience provides psychotherapists with an explanation for how and why
therapy is effective. The following two statements were exemplary of Cozolino’s claim
that neuroscience shows physical correlates for what had previously been assumed to be a
nonmaterial or nonphysical psychological or relational process.
Social relationships have the power to stimulate the neural plasticity required for
new learning. The interpersonal and emotional aspects of the therapeutic
relationship, referred to as a nonspecific factor in the psychotherapy outcome
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literature, may be the primary mechanism of therapeutic action. . . . These
nonspecific factors are, in fact, quite specific, as early maternal care has been
linked to increased neural plasticity, emotional regulation, and attachment
behavior. (p. 38)
What is it that allows us to become self-aware, generate explanations, and modify
long-standing ways of being? How do we expand conscious awareness in ways
that allow us to change? Obviously, something has to change in the way our
brains process information when we benefit from psychotherapy. (p. 140)
With these statements Cozolino positioned psychotherapy as a physiological
restructuring that he claimed is observable through neuroimaging. He stated that
“nonspecific factors” (p. 38) or the broad qualities necessary for successful therapy
outcomes yet not necessarily tied to specific techniques or interventions are now
measurable as brain changes that coincide with positive therapeutic results. In other
words, by reducing therapeutic processes to brain functioning Cozolino believed he had
provided a straightforward and concise explanation for an issue that has been the subject
of much research and debate in psychotherapy. Earlier (p. 125) I discussed how this
attempt at psychotherapy integration is simplistic, assumes that agreement is possible
among competing psychotherapy scholars and their often-disparate approaches, and
would furthermore require an uncritical acceptance of neuroscience as a true and unifying
institution in psychology and psychotherapy.
Equating parenting and psychotherapy. Cozolino compared parenting and
psychotherapy on the basis that each relationship alters gene expression in the same way.
“The idea that psychotherapy is a kind of reparenting may be more than a
metaphor; it may be precisely what we are attempting to accomplish at the level
of the epigenome” (p. 227).
Cozolino speculated that parents may influence the brains of children in a way
that is identical to how therapists influence the brains of patients, thereby proving that
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therapists re-parent patients. This was an example of reducing a cultural metaphor (and
the moral discourse it represents about the origins of illness and healing) to a physical
organ that has the capacity to recognize and respond to the qualities of ideal parents
regardless of the unique purpose or boundaries of the relationship. In other words,
Cozolino appealed to brain research as identifying the similar functions of valued societal
institutions such as therapy and parenting. This exemplified how reductionism might
overlook important cultural nuances in an effort to depict unique relationships as
significant insofar as they use technical means to confer physiological change upon a
person in times of growth or healing. This is also an understanding of psychotherapy as a
process of re-parenting that infantilizes patients and draws from a romanticism
philosophy that ideas such as innerness and authenticity, replicating an individualized
view of self as extractable from its broader context and striving toward a knowable
personal potential or ideal (see Sass, 1988).
In sum, Cozolino portrayed a convergence among various areas of study and
concepts within those areas of study, and between types of human relationships. For
example, he suggested that psychoanalytic theory, and theories of human development
and psychopathology are all observations of genetic inheritance (and the environmental
malleability of that biological predisposition). In his book he also argued that psychology
and neurology should be reunited now that neuroimaging can evaluate the legitimacy of
Freudian theory. Cozolino used neuroscience as the basis of psychotherapy integration,
and he suggested that neuroscience confirms a highly subjective view of reality (he stated
that psychoanalysis and Buddhism each value such a philosophical position). He also
argued that psychotherapy leads to changes in patients’ brains in ways that are similar to
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how parents support healthy neural development in children. Throughout his book, these
efforts at disciplinary integration often suggested reductionism of unique fields of study,
and significant aspects of human development and experience, to the same material
explanations or origins.
The brain as an inexact controller of perception. According to Cozolino, the
human brain organizes and controls perception in accordance with what it learned about
relationships and the world during early childhood. He explained that over the course of
human history the brain evolved to function in this way, thereby making each person’s
experience of the world unique and based on personal biases or expectations even when
individuals believe that they are experiencing an objective or truthful view of the world.
Despite the appearance of personal control and volition, the brain dictates
individual functioning and experience of the world. Cozolino described how the brain
evolved to exert a great deal of control over individual functioning. He also asserted that
the brain has “hidden layers” that function outside of awareness and drive subjective
psychological experience and functioning. In other words, he discussed the hidden layers
of the brain as if they are the location of the unconscious mind—that is, they cannot be
observed yet their existence can be ascertained by how they cause people to behave and
think.
“Although we tend to think of our brains as processing information from the
environment, the vast majority of the input to the cerebral cortex comes from
what is already inside the brain” (p. 135).
“By now it is clear that our brains are in the business of constructing rather than
conveying reality” (p. 138).
We actually live about 500 milliseconds after the moment and our past learning
severely limits our free will. The illusion of free will and control have obvious
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survival advantages, foremost of which is the ability to be assertive and confident
in complex situations. (p. 313)
This projection onto the screen of our Cartesian theater is actually generated
within the hidden layers of our neural architecture prior to conscious awareness.
This leads us to assume that the world of our experience and the objective world
are one and the same. We also tend to believe that we have all the necessary
information we need to make choices. In truth, we often have little or no access to
the information or logic upon which we base our decisions. (p. 135)
These passages were all exemplary of Cozolino’s claim that humans are generally
under the control of the brain while remaining under the “illusion” that they have volition
or “free will.” In these passages Cozolino explained that an individual’s brain makes
decisions without his or her input. For example, his claim that “the illusion of free will
and control have obvious survival advantages, foremost of which is the ability to be
assertive and confident in complex situations” (p. 313) implied that brains deceive
individuals (rather than individuals deceiving themselves) in order to adapt to stressful
situations and perform tasks well under pressure. From this premise it would seem that
learning about the brain is a necessary step in a process of regaining a sense of control or
self-directedness. His assertions draw from a vision of self that is consistent with the
problems of the “ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949); it is an attempt to overcome the
Cartesian illusion by materializing the mind, which requires taking for granted the
compartmentalized view of personhood and the personification of the brain as the source
of human beings that this materializing and localizing of self necessarily requires. This
appears to be a form of cognitivism (which is common to many psychotherapy theories;
see Cushman, 1995) although it is at once dressed up and justified by neuroscience. The
implication is that we must take control over our lives by taking control over our brains.
The implications of the use of personification in these passages is a good example of
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Vidal’s (2009) argument that even when neuroscientific literature states an objection to
reducing mind or self to brain, personification of the brain often implies mind-brain
reductionism anyway—not only of mind to brain, but also a reduction of psychology to
neuroscience. For example, since the hidden layers of the brain were suggested to be the
source of the Freudian unconscious, the concept of the unconscious mind might be
inferred to be a historical placeholder for a neurobiological concept rather than an
corresponding location (or an alternative explanation) for it. As I discussed earlier (see
Aporia, pp. 178-182), Cozolino briefly acknowledged this important issue, and then he
responded by abdicating responsibility as the author for how readers might interpret his
text.
Cozolino’s concept of hidden layers mapped unconscious experience onto the
human brain, and this warrants some discussion. He stated that the hidden layers organize
experience outside of individual awareness and therefore produce defenses that emerge
spontaneously, thereby causing disorganized and immature reactions to distress, which
then impairs psychosocial functioning. In other words, as therapists we recognize the
workings of the hidden layers by observing how patients adapt, cope, and function, but it
was unclear whether Cozolino intended to imply that these neural layers are hidden
because they are unobservable by current neuroimaging techniques, or whether they are
hidden from humans yet observed by neuroimaging. Regardless, with this concept
Cozolino established a reason for individuals to be skeptical of what they think is reality,
yet he also encouraged readers to trust that the functioning of the brain is the reason why
that skepticism or uncertainty is warranted. This is a disguised ideology or moral
discourse. Cozolino valorized an attitude of skepticism about the external material world
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(which would seemingly suggest a loss of self-directedness or personal control), and then
he implied that a person may regain that control over his or her life because the amount
of freedom or agency that individuals possess may be ascertained by learning about the
internal physical location of that control and recognizing how to influence and change it.
in this view one way to change the hidden layers is through psychotherapy, which I
discuss in the following subsection.
The therapeutic correction to the distortions of the hidden layers of neural
processing. Cozolino explained psychotherapy as a process that corrects problems caused
by the brain by counteracting the brain’s decisions and reorganizing is functioning.
Based on observations of all levels of the client’s behavior, the therapist attempts
to bring the processing of the hidden layers to the client’s attention. Repeated and
skillful attention to unconscious material via interpretations, confrontations, and
clarifications results in a gradually expanded awareness of unconscious processes
and the integration of dissociated top-down and right-left processing networks.
(p. 35)
Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light of conscious awareness on
belief perseverance and attribution biases, and undermine the conservative nature
of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep exploration of the dynamic
unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states. By encouraging clients to
be open to new ideas, explore the connections within their hidden layers, and take
responsibility for positive change, we challenge them to reorganize the neural
networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138)
Once we wake up to how our brains work, what do we do? How can we overcome
or at least cope with our distortions, impulses, and unconscious drives in
constructive and healthy ways? Fortunately, our brains contain structures and
networks that allow us to counteract some of the hidden layers. (pp. 138-139)
In these passages Cozolino described therapy as a means of coping with and
counteracting the brain. This was suggestive of cognitivism. Since he equated the
material brain with the psychological mind, his theory is an extraordinary effort at
reductionism. Cozolino argued that patients must remain open to new ways of thinking
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and take responsibility for changing, and through those steps patients alter the
functioning of their brains in ways that makes these changes permanent. This is similar to
an early modern era understanding of madness and sanity (see Cushman, 1995; Foucault,
1961/1988; Scull, 1975) and it fails to explain how humans are to think rationally in order
to doubt the reality produced by the brain if it is through the brain that humans think. As I
discussed earlier (see Aporia, pp. 178-182), Cozolino explicitly acknowledged this
problem but refused to even address it, thereby raising doubts about the purpose and
meaningfulness of the entire text. It hints at the disguised ideology of skepticism or doubt
about the external material world.
Neurobiological functioning explains many typical human experiences.
Cozolino provided numerous examples of neuroscientific explanations for how humans
commonly think, act, and talk about themselves and the world.
For example, Cozolino described the game Simon Says, and the
neurophysiological systems needed to participate in it, by noting, “The popularity of this
game reflects the development of these systems as well as a way to exercise voluntary
control over impulses” (p. 130). Cozolino linked the psychological experience
(“popularity”) of a common children’s activity to the development stage at which they
are able to participate in it. Of note, it was unclear how the popularity of a children’s
game (rather than the ability of children to perform the tasks required for it) reflects
neurophysiological development.
The brain’s ability to take our physical experience and use it metaphorically is the
basis of imagination. For example, jumping down a slide may serve as a sensorymotor metaphor for falling in love. The child’s experience of emerging from
under the covers into the light of day provides a metaphor for religious
enlightenment later in life. The balance provided by the vestibular system may be
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the model for psychological and emotional stability, and ultimately for leading a
more balanced life (Frick, 1982). Physical metaphors provide a contextual
grounding in time and space that helps us grasp our experience and may serve as
an infrastructure of higher cognitive processes. (Cozolino, 2010, pp. 146-147)
This passage exemplified Cozolino’s argument that cultural traditions and shared
descriptions of them emanate from certain desires or intentions of the brain itself, which
people happen to have in common because of the way the brain evolved over the history
of the species. In the passage above, Cozolino asserted that the brain recognizes when
certain meaningful human experiences (such as falling in love or having a spiritual
awakening) produce similar feelings as certain physical sensations, and then it decides to
compare the physical and psychological experiences using the figure of speech of
metaphor. Because members of a society share colloquial or idiomatic expressions (and
therefore share the moral understandings that are implicated in those cultural
expressions), the passage naturalized those values and discourses by identifying them as
products of the material world that are produced by the brain in order to coordinate
bodily processes. The passage was noteworthy because it illustrates how the reduction of
mind to brain can lead to an individualized material reduction of the social or shared
understanding of the good. This a good example of how the use of evolutionary theory
and neuroscience to explain social traditions seems to primarily reinforce a modern era
understanding of the self as a detached, private, and somatic individual.
“Most of us have felt the firing of these familiarity circuits in an exaggerated form
when we unexpectedly run into a friend in an unusual place” (p. 153).
In this passage Cozolino described the feeling of familiarity or recognition of
other people as the experience of having “felt” the neurobiological process that is
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believed to correspond or coincide with that social experience. Cozolino rewrote an
important yet typical human experience in terms of neurobiology.
“Many new mothers report an increasing need during the first year to get out into
the world of adults or back to work. This need may parallel a shift back to
previous levels of left-right hemisphere balance” (p. 190).
This brain-based explanation for why women often find themselves returning to
work soon after childbirth was quite surprising. By depoliticizing this issue Cozolino
entirely overlooked the broader political and economic issues related to inadequate
workers’ rights and family services that have been associated with this issue. Further, it
was also unclear how new mothers are removed from “the world of adults” simply
because they have spent time with an infant. Yet it is characteristic of his overall strategy
of naturalizing cultural phenomena by attributing them to common neurobiological
functioning (in this case neurobiological functioning that is assumed to be gender
specific), thereby implying that typical experiences such as these are evidence that the
behavior is generally desirable (rather than compulsory by economic circumstances or
cultural prescriptions), controlled by brain functioning, and somehow present across
cultures and historical periods. This passage was important because it illustrated an
overreach by Cozolino in his use of neuroscience to explain this particular trend as
somehow natural, ahistorical, and apolitical.
To summarize, a main premise of Cozolino’s book is that the brain exerts a great
deal of control over behavior and conscious experience, and therefore individual volition
and agency are more illusory than they might seem. He used this foundation to describe
how psychotherapy allows individuals to regain self-directedness by exerting influence
over the brain’s engrained processing. This implies that without neuroscientific research,
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humans would be unaware of whether valued beliefs about freedom and agency actually
exist. He also reduced cultural phenomena to brain functioning, thereby removing
customs and social norms from their broader historical traditions and shared context. I
showed one noteworthy example of how this type of thinking led Cozolino to the
apolitical conclusion that many women currently return to work following childbirth
because of the natural needs of their brains, rather than economic conditions or public
policy.
Integration. Cozolino described various types of integration, ranging from mindbody integration to various examples of the integration of psychotherapy theories.
Mind-body integration via the brain. Cozolino frequently described the
integration or convergence of physical and psychological aspects of human life through
the integration of their corresponding neural correlates.
“A therapist attempts to restructure neural architecture in the service of more
adaptive behavior, cognition, and emotion” (p. 9)
“Healthy functioning requires proper development and functioning of neural
networks organizing conscious awareness, behavior, emotion, and sensation”
(p. 21).
These top-down networks provide the pathways for inhibiting reflexes and
bringing the body and emotions under increasing cortical control…Thus, a vital
aspect of the development of the cortex is inhibitory—first of reflexes, later of
spontaneous movements and even later of emotions and inappropriate social
behavior. (p. 69).
“Cells in the parietal lobes respond to hand position, eye movement, words,
motivational relevance, body position, and other factors relevant to the integration
of experience” (p. 100).
“The learning of these skills in therapy occurs in the context of emotional and
cognitive integration, requiring the participation of both hemispheres, reflective
language, feelings, sensations, and behaviors” (p. 111).
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These statements illustrated how Cozolino portrayed various aspects of human
psychology and physiology as converging within the human brain in ways that allow for
a coherent experience of objective reality and self-control over physical and emotional
functioning. Further, he implied that because of this convergence within the brain,
psychological and physiological aspects of experience are inextricable during typical
functioning. This explanation of the connection between mind and body through the brain
is similar to early modern era theory that stressed the importance of rationality over
emotion (see Cushman, 1995; Taylor, 1989). Therefore, Cozolino’s descriptions of the
brain as the source of cognitive and emotional coordination are indicative of an
underlying moral discourse about standards of normativity and the best way of life.
The co-occurrence of neural integration and psychological integration. The
following passages exemplified how Cozolino described psychological integration as the
observable manifestation of neural integration.
A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal
functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of
growth, integration, and complexity. On a neurological level, this equates to the
integration and communication of neural networks dedicated to emotion,
cognition, sensation, and behavior and a proper balance between excitation and
inhibition. On an experiential level, integration is the ability to live life—love and
work—while employing a minimum of defensiveness. (p. 25)
“Ultimately, psychological, interpersonal, and neural integration are different
levels and manifestations of the same process” (p. 43).
“The three nonsecure patterns of attachment research all reflect lower levels of
psychological and neurological integration” (p. 205).
With these statements Cozolino implied that psychological integration and neural
integration are processes that are inseparable, because psychological integration is the
experience that results from neural integration. These statements also suggested that both
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types of integration described the extent of typical functioning and therefore may be used
interchangeably. In the third statement above, psychopathology was portrayed as a
breakdown or deficiency in the integration of both psychological and neurobiological
realms although it is commonly described as insecure attachment (see also The definition
and etiology of psychopathology, pp. 132-135). The use of the concept of integration to
describe both psychological and neurological functioning was central to Cozolino’s
theory and illustrative of the use of rhetoric to portray concepts with a possible
relationship as closely related and even alternate descriptions of the same objective truth
or reality.
Human experiences and relationships shape neurobiology and contribute to
health and wellbeing. These passages exemplified how Cozolino described human
experience as tangibly represented by how they impact the brain or its early development.
“You could also think of our neural architecture as a tangible expression of our
learning history” (p. 19).
“So as we show affection and kindness to our children, we may be building more
resilient brains, an expression of genetic variation” (p. 218).
“Perhaps caring for our children and grandchildren may be more supportive of
health and longevity than cholesterol medication and treadmills” (p. 226)
These statements illustrated how Cozolino depicted the brain as the
materialization of human experience. For example, with the first statement above, he
described a person’s learning history as “tangible” through how this history shapes the
brain. The second and third statements above exemplified his argument that the
experiences of family life can be useful for maximizing the genetic potential for brain
health or other biomedical indicators of wellbeing. These types of statements suggested
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an attempt to overcome the mind-body problem by identifying ways in which personal
history and seemingly nonmaterial experiences manifest as observable physiological
changes. Despite the relatively recent emergence of remarkable scientific advancements,
the underlying focus on finding scientific (especially neuroscientific) evidence for how
individuals are connected to a broader context (and to each other) personifies brain
functioning and replicates mind-brain dualism instead of providing an alternative to
Cartesian philosophy (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). In their critiques of the logic of
cognitive neuroscience or mind-brain research, scholars (e.g., I. Gold & Stoljar, 1999;
Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2011) have argued that the portrayal of neuroscience as a revolutionary
endeavor that disproves dualism overlooks how an assumed relationship between mind or
self and brain has in fact been a hallmark of Western culture for many centuries, while
the excitement generated by neuroscientific research and technologies masks the flawed
logic that underlies much of the research seeking to explain conscious experience in
terms of its neural correlates.
Psychotherapy theory integration via neuroscience. Earlier (see pp. 121-127) I
discussed how Cozolino portrayed neuroscience as a field of study that can transcend the
differences between psychotherapy theories by explaining how effective psychological
treatments all enable neural integration. I also showed (see p. 126) how his use of brain
science to validate this common factors approach to psychotherapy assumed both an
uncritical stance toward neuroscience, as well as a belief that competing therapy theories
will easily surrender their differences in favor of adopting a new explanation for the
effectiveness of therapy and the best ways to measure that efficacy.
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Throughout Cozolino’s book, integration was a primary theme. Aside from the
disciplinary integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy, he also used
neuroscience to integrate psychotherapy theories on the basis of their common factors or
shared aspects that explain the efficacy of various treatment approaches. Further, through
these disciplinary integrations, he integrated psychological concepts with brain
functioning, thereby linking mind and brain or mind and body. The use of neuroscience
to resolve the Cartesian split or explain the connection between individuals and their
broader context reinforces dualism by personifying the brain and assuming a need to find
scientific evidence to contradict the idea of a mind-body split.
The progression of neuroscience. Cozolino supported a socially-minded yet
personally applicable interpretation of neuroscience through his taken-for-granted belief
in the inevitability of progressive achievements in science.
The transition from neuroscience to social neuroscience. Cozolino discussed the
late-20th century transition within the field of neuroscience from its use of neuroimaging
to study the neural correlates of individual behavior to its use of neuroimaging to study
social behaviors.
“The notion of the brain as a social organ emerged in neuroscience during the
1970s as animal researchers slowly began to appreciate that neuroanatomy,
neurochemistry, and social relationships are inextricably woven” (p. 178).
Lessons learned during a century of dynamic psychotherapy may have important
neuroscientific implications. The most basic is that we are born into relationships
and come to our individual identity while resting upon social connectivity.
Another is that social interactions affect everything from our biology to our
intellectual abilities. Neuroscience researchers are slowly coming to the
realization that the scope of their scientific observation needs to expand to include
relationships. (pp. 178-179)
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In this passage Cozolino praised the field of social neuroscience and he supported
a continued effort within neuroscience to continue its research in this direction. He also
argued that psychotherapy theories have described a social emergence of selfhood and
therefore those theories have unknowingly described a social brain. In this passage the
reduction of psychology to neuroscience leads to a reduction of social selfhood as
important insofar as its effects on biology are measured. The use of a material or physical
location of self to explain the emergence of human communication and
interconnectedness might be fundamentally incompatible with the idea of a social or
relational self that it purportedly proves because this vision emphasizes a somatic
individual self defined by a materialized inner world.
Individuals or groups of individuals can impact the paradigms of neuroscience
research. In the following passage Cozolino suggested that one role for therapists,
parents, and teachers is to advocate for interpretations of neuroscience research that focus
on human interdependence.
Relationships are our natural habitat, while the isolated brain is an abstract
concept. Thus, understanding the brain requires knowledge of the person
embedded within a community of others. Therapists, teachers, and parents
intuitively grasp this profound reality just as laboratory scientists often do not. We
are now in a position to help research scientists know where to look as they
explore how the brain grows, learns, and changes throughout life. (p. 179)
In this passage, Cozolino suggested a role for parents, teachers, and therapists as
advocates for directing brain research toward an understanding of how humans are
interconnected and dependent upon each other, especially during periods of learning,
personal growth, healing, and early development. He described parenting, education, and
psychotherapy as tasks or roles that have resulted from personal intuition, rather than
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social institutions or shared traditions that have emerged over many centuries. This
reduction of traditional social roles to intuition appears to justify his implication that such
intuition is now able to initiate hard science research that will determine definitively and
objectively what is and is not real. His claim that therapists and other nonscientists can
now contribute to the work of higher-order scientific research might generate excitement
that the value of non-scientific endeavors will be demonstrated by science, but it
ultimately serves to mask the disciplinary reductionism in the passage.
In this passage it is also noteworthy how Cozolino switched back and forth
between descriptions of social experiences and descriptions of the brain, thereby
portraying brains instead of people as the entities that are either thought to be isolated or
social. The passage builds to a conclusion that brains learn, grow, and change. The
reduction of mind or self to brain that results from the rhetorical device of personification
in this passage further reinforces a reduction of cultural institutions such as therapy and
parenting to neuroscience under the guise that therapists, teachers, and parents could help
broaden neuroscience and reverse its reductionist tendencies. Finally, it was unclear how
exactly therapists and other nonscientists might go about participating in this progressive
neuroscientific movement. Readers might simply be left with feelings of excitement or
gratitude that Cozolino advocated for finding neuroscientific evidence for why teachers,
parents, and therapists exist. Or, readers might be inspired to talk about neuroscience and
the brain more in their daily life or careers. Regardless, the passage perpetuates an
understanding of self as brain.
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Personalizing neuroscience. In some passages Cozolino discussed how his
knowledge about neuroscience has impacted his understanding of his own thinking and
behavior.
For example, in the following passage Cozolino described how he used his
understanding of brain functioning in order to understand why people habituate to
patterns and are unable to perform random behaviors.
I remember being surprised to find a table of random numbers in an appendix of
my college statistics textbook. . . . This finally makes sense to me based on neural
network organization: We are unable to engage in random actions because our
behaviors are guided by patterns established through previous learning to which
we automatically return. (p. 16)
In the above example Cozolino identified the predictability of human beings as
the habituation of the brain to early experiences. In the following passage Cozolino
described his insight into the origins of his struggle with dieting as an adult, and how this
struggle resulted from what his brain had learned when he was a child.
I was a young boy of 5 or 6 standing in my grandmother’s kitchen and had just
expressed being upset about something. . . . Without saying a word she pivoted
around, opened the freezer, took out a large box of Neapolitan ice cream. . . .
There was no memory of discussing how I felt. Whatever bad feelings I may have
been having quickly dissolved in a haze of glucose. The similarity of this memory
to my experience in my adult life was striking. My hidden layers had learned a
pattern—feel tired, sad, stressed, or disappointed; get lots of calories; watch TV;
and the feelings pass. (p. 139)
In this passage Cozolino attributed his ongoing dieting failures to his
grandmother’s use of food to soothe him during childhood. However, rather than
presenting this interpretation as a solely psychological or behavioral cycle, he posited that
his brain had learned a pattern that became permanent until he gained insight into the
origins of the behaviors. In the following passage Cozolino recalled a childhood
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experience that he identified as essential to the development of self, and he speculated
that the parietal lobes were significant in that process.
As a child I had an imaginary retreat. I would close my eyes and picture the back
of my grandmother’s closet, always piled high with shoe boxes. Behind these
boxes was a hidden door just large enough for me (but not an adult) to squeeze
through. . . . This was a safe place for me—quiet and private—where I could
imagine other worlds, reflect on life, and fantasize about the future. The evolution
and expansion of the parietal lobes were likely essential to the emergence of this
kind of imaginal self. (p. 146)
In this passage Cozolino demonstrated his understanding of Winnicottian theory
by using it to understand his own psychological development and emergence of self
during his childhood. He then concluded that the parietal lobes of the human brain
facilitated the development of self in the way described by psychoanalytic theory. In the
following passage Cozolino demonstrated his brain-based understanding of a startle
response.
I walked into my garage one day to look for a tool when, out of the corner of my
eye, I saw a small brown object near my foot. . . . I immediately jumped back, my
heart rate increased, my eyes widened, and I became tense, ready to act. . . . My
peripheral vision saw the object and my amygdala appraised it in an
overgeneralized fashion to be a threat. My amygdala activated a variety of
sympathetic responses including startle, increased respiration, and avoidance.
(p. 244).
While there are obviously physiological processes occurring during experiences
such as the abrupt scare that Cozolino recalled above, he demonstrated a rather scientized
and reductionist understanding of self and behavior.
By explaining personal experiences in terms of the physiology and neurobiology
correlated with those experiences, Cozolino used the narratives above to illustrate the
relevance of neuroscience for explaining common human behaviors and daily life. His
statements also implied that his book was an endeavor born from his life experiences and
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personal interests, and exemplified how he incorporated neuroscience into those personal
interests.
Criticism of reductionism and other tenets of Western science. In some brief
passages Cozolino criticized reductionism in neuroscience and the use of scientific
approaches for solving human problems.
For example, in the following statement Cozolino criticized the lack of
appreciation for how psychological wellbeing may aid in improving physical wellbeing.
“Perhaps caring for our children and grandchildren may be more supportive of
health and longevity than cholesterol medication and treadmills” (p. 226).
With that statement Cozolino leveled a fair criticism against individuality and loss
of close familial bonds in the United States. He then supported that criticism with claims
that spending time with family can positively impact physiological wellbeing and
biomedical indicators of health or disease prevention. Cozolino’s argument placed
cholesterol medicine and exercise equipment alongside time spent with family as equally
viable healthcare options. He furthermore overlooked the paradox of viewing social
interactions as valuable for strengthening individual health, since a concern for individual
enhancement could undermine the priority of social good and family commitment. In
other words, there is a worthwhile argument that spending time with family solely for the
purpose of trying to lower one’s blood cholesterol might inadvertently subvert the sense
of history and tradition that contribute to the sustainability of the institution of family. In
other words, Cozolino’s argument is built on a contradiction.
In the following passage Cozolino criticized the scientific method for using
individuals rather than relationships as its unit of analysis.
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Despite the fact that our brains are social organs, Western science studies each
individual as a single, isolated organism rather than one embedded within the
human community. This way of thinking leads us in the West to search for
technical and abstract answers to human problems instead of looking at day-today human interactions. Take, for example, how physicians responded to the high
mortality rate among children in orphanages during the last century. Assuming
that microorganisms were to blame, they separated children from one another and
ordered their handling to be kept to a minimum . . . . It was not until children were
held and played with by consistent caretakers and allowed to interact with one
another that their survival rate improved. (Blum, 2002, as cited in Cozolino 2010,
p. 178)
In this passage Cozolino began by asserting that humans cannot be scientifically
studied in isolation because the human brain is a social organ (in his book he identified
the brain as intrinsically seeking attachment relationships and social interactions,
especially during the formative early childhood years). This was an example of using a
philosophical claim about the nature of human selfhood as an interpretation of natural
brain functioning. He then criticized the effects of a scientific understanding of human
life by proving an example of children who died from lack of attention when it was
wrongly assumed that they were dying from a contagious disease. He suggested a
relationship between interpersonal human experience and physical wellbeing using
evidence that children had died from lack of care rather than physical disease, which
itself seems to be a scientized understanding of that tragedy. Cozolino was correct to
caution about the effects of using the scientific method as a model to study human
interrelatedness and subjective experience. However, rather than proposing a way to
study relational selfhood that is extricated from the scientific method, he seemed to
advocate instead for a revised science that studies the effects of social relationships on
physical health (and elsewhere he praised the efforts of social neuroscience). Throughout
his book, regardless of whether he was advocating for either scientists to change their
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thinking, or therapists and general audiences to interpret neuroscience findings in a more
progressive or contextual way to support human science theories, the option to question
entirely the helpfulness of brain-based understandings of self was never an option.
In the following passage, Cozolino challenged the comparison between the brain
and technology, asserting that the brain creates reality (often problematically) whereas
technology functions in accordance with human demands and has no volition.
By now it is clear that our brains are in the business of constructing rather than
conveying reality. This perspective is in sharp contrast to the modern Western
notion of the brain as a combination camera, tape recorder, and computer. If our
electronic equipment really did function like our brains, we would replace them at
the first opportunity. (p. 138)
It was noteworthy that Cozolino decried the comparison between the brain and
electronic equipment despite his frequent use of metaphors for the brain that suggested
that the brain is very much like an electronic device, albeit an electronic device with a
volition or will of its own (see Metaphor, pp. 206-209). The passage above actually
suggested a criticism of the brain itself for causing misinterpretations, irrational beliefs,
and distorted perceptions (see also Personification, pp. 209-211, and my discussion of the
implications of this rhetorical strategy for the understanding of human selfhood).
Criticism of reducing psychological symptoms to single brain structures. In
some passages Cozolino criticized the reduction of psychological symptoms to single
brain regions or processes and advocated instead for an understanding that symptoms are
caused by multiple and interacting processes in the brain.
Due to the interconnectivity between left-right and top-down neural networks,
examining integration from either the vertical or horizontal dimension alone is
overly simplistic. Studies of metabolic activity in specific areas of the brain in
pathological states reveal differences in both cortical and subcortical structures on
both sides of the brain. (p. 28)
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The common explanation from psychiatrists to parents is that their children have a
lag in frontal lobe development that results in a disinhibition of impulses from
lower in the brain and difficulties with tasks that require sustained
attention…while this is a good anecdotal explanation, the underlying mechanisms
and etiology of ADHD are likely much more complicated. Functional imaging
research comparing ADHD to non-ADHD subjects reveals a variety of patterns of
higher and lower levels of activation throughout the brain. (pp. 129-130)
These statements were noteworthy because Cozolino’s initial tone or attitude in
these passages suggested a criticism of reductionist thinking, yet he attempted to
overcome reductionism with only a broader view of the human brain that still suggested
that it is the location of psychological symptoms or disorders.
In his portrayal of the relevance and applicability of neuroscience, Cozolino
described neuroscience as a field that accurately studies the origins of social phenomena,
and he portrayed non-scientists as possible contributors to this exciting endeavor.
Cozolino demonstrated this participation by applying descriptions of neurobiology to his
own insights about his early development, daily behaviors, and understandings of human
nature. Further, in his descriptions of how human physicality and wellbeing are
connected to broader social factors, he portrayed neuroscience as a field that counters the
problems caused by Western individualism and the scientism valued in this way of life. I
noted how materializing psychological and sociological concepts onto the brain—an
organ residing within each individual—may in fact reinforce rather than challenge the
social concerns he raised.
Summary of themes. Throughout Cozolino’s text, major themes included the
use of evolutionary theory as a central principle for his mind-brain and psychologyneuroscience integration efforts, synonymity and convergence between academic
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disciplines and human relationships, the brain as a controller of human experience and
psychology, integration (e.g., mind-brain integration and psychotherapy integration), and
the progression of neuroscience whereby brain research has recently become concerned
with issues related to social psychology, and can be influenced, interpreted, and applied
by non-scientists, and serves as a field that can actually counter the problems of Western
individualism and scientism.
Cozolino’s use of evolutionary theory to explain human culture and society, and
to reduce psychology to physiological processes, is a controversial and problematic
premise because it individualizes and scientizes cultural and historical phenomena,
including selfhood. His use of neuroscience to integrate fields of study is a form of
reductionism that overlooks the social and historical significance of unique areas of
knowledge and cultural institutions. His understanding of the brain as the controller of
human experience challenged the existence of subjectivity and agency before he restored
those important aspects of humans by implying that by learning about the brain humans
can learn how to gain control over it. His integration of mind and brain either posited
brain functioning as the source of human social interactions, or portrayed social
interactions as valuable because of their effects on the individual brain. Both conclusions
imply an a priori individualism rather than an a priori shared context into which
individuals are born and develop together. Using mind-brain research to advocate for a
more contextual rather than narrow scientific approach reinforces rather than adequately
challenges the supremacy of science as a way of explaining human life or psychology.
Cozolino’s efforts suggest a reduction of psychology to neuroscience.
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Summary
In this chapter I presented the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and major
themes of Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the
Social Brain. In the next chapter I conclude my research project with a discussion of the
content, rhetoric, and themes in Cozolino’s book in light of the historical and cultural
circumstances from which the book emerged, and the understandings of self that a
psychotherapy discourse based on his book might perpetuate.
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Chapter V: Discussion
In this Chapter I conclude my hermeneutic research project by discussing the
primary content, rhetorical strategies, and themes in Louis Cozolino’s (2010) The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain in light of the cultural and
historical trends from which the integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy
emerged, which I described in Chapters I and II. The purpose of this discussion is to
identify the understanding of self that a therapy discourse based on Cozolino’s text might
unknowingly reflect and perpetuate.
Summary of Results Chapter
In Chapter IV I laid out the primary content, rhetorical strategies, and recurring
themes in Cozolino’s (2010) book. I discussed the primary content of his text in three
general sections: In the outline and background section of Chapter IV I summarized the
six parts of the book and I discussed Cozolino’s understanding of the historical origins of
psychotherapy, the place of his text within the history of psychotherapy, typical
psychotherapy theories, and differences between his theory and other theories. Cozolino
described his efforts as a return to Freud’s original intentions of delineating brainbehavior relationships now that neuroimaging has advanced to a point that allows for
describing Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of mind according to its neural correlates. I
argued that Cozolino’s understanding of the history of psychotherapy was an origin myth
that he used to validate a reductionist mind-brain theory using a broader reduction of
human psychology to neurobiology.
In the second primary content section of Chapter IV I laid out the tenets of
Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory (see pp. 127-164). According to Cozolino,
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psychotherapy is an intervention that is curative to the extent that it fosters neural
integration or proper flow and balance between brain regions. He asserted that neural
integration is an indicator of healthy psychological functioning, and therefore all
problems for which patients seek psychotherapy—from severe psychopathology to
general life concerns that are not symptoms of serious mental illness—are products of
inadequate neural integration (he acknowledged that neural bases for general life
concerns that are not the result of mental disorders have yet to be studied using brain
imaging). Cozolino primarily used the concepts of self and mind as ways to describe
brain functioning. For example, he mapped a psychoanalytic (primarily Winnicottian)
understanding of self as a product of neural development and functioning. It was unclear
how he defined the concept of mind (which he used infrequently) and therefore his use of
that concept was vague and confusing. His infrequent and unclear use of the concept of
mind portrayed that hallmark psychological concept as antiquated and better understood
as the behaviors and experiences produced by individual brain functioning. According to
Cozolino, the extent to which psychological treatments are effective is understood to be
reflective of the extent to which these treatments activate neural plasticity (the ability of
the brain to change according to experience and environment) in a way that fosters neural
integration. He seemed to imply a correlation between human volition and brain
functioning (rather than asserting a directionality between mind and brain) but his use of
language was often vague, as I discuss further below. In his account the brain evolved to
be responsive to the qualities that are central in effective psychotherapies. Those qualities
include the use of narrative or language in a secure attachment relationship based on a
combination of supporting and challenging patients.
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Cozolino described a variety of indicators of successful psychotherapy that
included symptom reduction, affect regulation, and ego strength or the use of higherorder defenses. His primary content suggested that he attempted to integrate a wide array
of psychotherapy theories and concepts by subsuming them all under a neurobiological
understandings of self, illness, and healing methods.
Cozolino’s (2010) text was suggestive of materialist reductionism justified by a
misunderstanding of the historical emergence and cultural relevance of psychological
concepts. According to Cozolino, the brain controls human experience and therefore must
be influenced or changed in order for individuals to gain agency or self-directedness. His
brain-based psychotherapy theory assumed that the concept of personhood is comprised
of separate mental and physical aspects, and therefore it reinforces rather than resolves
Cartesian dualism.
I also discussed two case vignettes from Cozolino’s text that illustrated some of
his recurring treatment suggestions, understandings of the origins of psychological
difficulties, and ways in which psychotherapists foster psychological change with
patients. In the first vignette I reviewed, Cozolino referenced his use of a Winnicottian
developmental scheme to suggest that his patient, Sandy, needed to spend time coping
alone and developing a safe, “internal” place to turn to in order to cope with mood
swings. With Sandy, Cozolino also focused on behavioral changes based on a tenuous
behavior cycle related to recurring sinus infections rather than work, family, or social
difficulties. In the second case vignette Cozolino described his treatment for a Holocaust
survivor suffering from trauma-related anxiety. Cozolino used a creative role-play
intervention that portrayed the traumas of being a member of a persecuted minority
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religious group as a set of isolated curable symptoms able to be relieved by imagining a
different personal history. I noticed that in both cases Cozolino’s approach focused on
teaching new and creative ways of thinking and talking about patients’ lives and
symptoms based on brain changes. In both cases it was unclear why he avoided any
relational or depth-oriented conceptualization or treatment approach. He justified his
approaches with neurobiological evidence of how the brain changes in response to
altering memories, yet was unclear how he decided upon the specific interventions that he
implemented. Cozolino’s approaches seemed eclectic, reductionist, and decontextualized.
After my descriptions and interpretations of Cozolino’s (2010) primary content
and psychotherapy case vignettes, I examined his use of rhetorical strategies, especially
in his portrayals of relationships between brain functioning and psychological experience.
I categorized these strategies under ambiguity (unclear statements that could be
interpreted in two or more ways), analogy (logical comparisons concerning relationships
between concepts or entities), aporia (statements in which Cozolino acknowledged doubt
about a premise or purpose of his entire book), diction (word choice), epigraph (quotes
preceding the start of each chapter and subsection), and figures of speech which included
apposition (the use of a noun to modify another noun), metaphor (a comparison between
concepts or entities without using the words like or as), personification (attributing
human characteristics to nonhuman yet physical entities), and prosopopoeia
(personification of nonmaterial concepts). Cozolino used these strategies to portray
relationships or synonymity between brain functioning and psychological experience, and
more generally between neuroscience and psychology. These strategies furthered a
material reductionism of mind to brain while obfuscating historical and epistemological
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differences between psychology and neuroscience. Later in this chapter I devote a section
to discussing his use of these strategies and their significance at greater length (see
p. 255).
Finally, I identified some of the recurring themes contained in Cozolino’s (2010)
book. The central organizing principle of Cozolino’s text was the theory of evolution,
which Cozolino used to explain human psychology, culture, and societies as resulting
from how the brain developed throughout the history of the human species (see
Cozolino’s Thesis below). I also identified as another theme Cozolino’s brain-based
attempt to integrate various disciplines, fields of study, and human relationships. Another
theme was Cozolino’s portrayal of the brain as a distorted and biased controller of
individual beliefs and perceptions. Cozolino used this theme to describe how
psychotherapy offers the potential for regaining control over the brain. I identified the
progression of neuroscience as one of Cozolino’s major themes, which he portrayed by
including several brain-based accounts of his personal history such as his early
psychological development as a child, typical behaviors as an adult, insights about human
psychology generally, and insights about the origins of his own behaviors he has tried to
change.
Cozolino’s Thesis
The central argument in Cozolino’s (2010) book is that neuroscience is the true or
master science for revealing the origins of human culture, society, and psychological
experience because recent advances in neuroimaging reveal (or have the potential to
reveal) the neural structures and functions that have evolved to produce all individual and
social phenomena. According to his thesis, psychology and psychotherapy are institutions
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whose emergence was inevitable because of the contemporary problems and solutions
that the brain evolved to produce and heal. Because the brain is the material source of all
human experience, the brain is the source of personal difficulties ranging from general
life stressors to serious mental illness. However, evolution also resulted in a brain that
retains throughout the lifespan the ability to be influenced by relationships and other
experiences. This confers upon individuals the potential for psychological healing and
personal change. Since neuroscience is the master science, it confirms or validates the
accuracy of psychoanalytic and other therapy theories that happen to share an established
efficacy for reducing or eliminating psychological symptoms.
Historical Support for the Thesis
Cozolino (2010) argued that neuroscience is the true science and the brain is the
true source of human personhood. He supported his thesis with the argument that therapy
theories—with their understandings of self, illness, and psychological healing—have
been historical placeholders for neurobiological descriptions of human experience. He
claimed that neuroscience is now showing why effective psychological treatments happen
to be correct in their understanding of psychological functioning and methods of
impelling psychological change. Cozolino depicted his efforts as picking up where Freud
left off when Freud devised the tripartite theory of mind, psychological defense
mechanisms, the use of free association and interpretation in the talking cure, and other
aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice.
According to Cozolino (2010), Freud initially aspired to create a brain-based
mapping of behavior and human experience, yet neuroimaging technology had not yet
been created to allow for that, and the idea was also unpalatable to his contemporaries.
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Freud’s theory of mind (and the century of psychological and psychotherapy theories that
followed it) was simply a metaphor that Freud was forced to adopt. This implies that
mind can now be discussed directly in terms of neural correlates now that these factors
are no longer a problem. Based on this premise and Freud’s training in neurology,
Cozolino asserted that psychotherapy emerged from neurology, and now the two fields
can merge again after a century of being wrongly separated. I argue that this is an origin
myth (see Samelson, 1974) in which Cozolino makes an appeal on behalf of psychology
to the higher-status profession of neurology (and neuroscience generally) to show that
psychology is useful for advancing a brain-based understanding of self, illness, and
healing.
Cozolino drew from the narrative that psychology originated from neurology in
order to reduce psychology to neuroscience, and also to reduce the concept of mind or
human subjectivity to the material processes of the brain. By claiming that
psychoanalysis (and the therapy theories that followed it) was a historical placeholder
rather than a unique field, Cozolino provided an ahistorical, scientized understanding of
psychology and psychotherapy. His argument relocates psychotherapy from a significant
social and cultural institution to an individualized and mechanized healing instrument for
the physical brain. Cozolino therefore used psychotherapy as a vehicle for neuroscience
in order to show how neuroscience is the master science by asserting that neuroscience
confirms the validity and accuracy of how Western culture thinks and talks about the self
and psychological illness, healing, and healing technologies or practices. The use of
psychotherapy as a vehicle for neuroscience is what Brothers (2001) argued neuroscience
has needed in order to transform the socially widespread discourse about the self from
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philosophical and social concepts into a discourse based on neuroscientific terminology.
Cozolino’s conclusions suggest that the work of psychotherapists should become one of
promoting neuroscience through psychotherapy theory and practices.
Rhetorical Strategies Supporting the Thesis
Scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001, Tallis, 2004; Uttal, 2007)
have argued that cognitive neuroscience literature frequently relies on certain words,
sentence structure, and other grammatical strategies to imply relationships between brain
functioning and the concept of mind or subjective conscious experience. These portray
unresolved yet significant questions about the self as already resolved (or likely to be
resolved with more neuroscience research). These rhetorical strategies also materialize
psychological concepts so that they appear objective and verifiable. In my textual
analysis of Cozolino’s (2010) book (see Chapter IV) I provided examples of rhetorical
strategies that he used to portray relationships between mind and brain, and psychology
and neuroscience, which warrant critical examination.
I began with statements that I categorized as ambiguous because they had two or
more possible meanings as a result of the order of words in the statements. In some
passages it was unclear whether Cozolino (2010) intended to describe people or brains. In
other ambiguous passages Cozolino discussed mental experiences alongside descriptions
of the brain yet it was unclear whether he intended to posit a causal relationship or simply
a direct correspondence between neurobiological and psychological processes. His use of
analogy to compare brain structures to social structures suggested a direct relationship
between the individual brain and the emergence of human society, yet no specific
scientific explanation was provided for how social order is a reflection of neural patterns.
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This suggested that his premise of a strong relationship between psychology or
psychotherapy and neuroscience relied upon a taken-for-granted or assumed relationship
between brain and human personhood. Cozolino also used analogy to compare the roles
of therapists, parents, and teachers based on the social functions of the brain that he
implied to be similar to relationships between patient and therapist, child and parent, and
student and teacher. This suggests that there is nothing inherently unique or special about
psychotherapy that could not be achieved in another relationship as long as the brain is
changed in the same way. This decontextualized and ahistorical representation of
psychotherapy fit with his depiction of psychology and psychotherapy (and the human
tendencies they study and problems they remedy) as inevitable products of the evolution
of the brain rather than unique and important social institutions that emerged because of a
confluence of historical and cultural factors.
Cozolino’s use of diction (word choice and sentence structure) seamlessly
intertwined psychological concepts and neuroscientific ones, thereby reappropriating the
former as the latter, or in some cases directly asserted that the two epistemologies were
interchangeable. At times he employed that strategy unbeknownst to the reader, and
therefore his rhetorical support for his thesis was often very subtle. Unsuspecting or
inexperienced readers might easily be convinced that psychological terms were intended
to refer to neurobiological structures and functions. This is significant because it creates a
discourse in which psychology is absorbed into neuroscience, thereby using psychology
to relocate shared social and cultural understandings of humans to individual
neurophysiology. Speculative language was also present throughout Cozolino’s book.
Many of his claims about evolution, neuroscience, and mind-brain correlates were
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prefaced with language suggesting that the claims are hypothetical; at other times he
offered predictions about what neuroscience might eventually discover about human
consciousness and behavior. These predictions might seem exciting but it is unclear
whether they are feasible.
The dramatic and broad quotes from important historical figures Cozolino (2010)
placed before each chapter and subsection (epigraph) suggested that the scientized and
reductionist understandings of human psychology that followed these quotes were in fact
evidence supporting philosophical, religious, scientific, cultural, and literary observations
of human beings across historical eras and epistemologies. Cozolino’s thesis implies that
all theories of human experience (such as psychoanalysis and other therapy theories) have
unknowingly been descriptions of brain functioning rather than moral claims about
health, illness, and the best way of life, and therefore his use of epigraph enacted and
thereby reinforced his claim that psychological discourse was a historical placeholder for
a neuroscientific one. Cozolino used figures of speech such as metaphor and
personification to reduce mind to brain and therefore reduce psychology to neuroscience.
He used personification, for example, to portray a brain that itself thinks, believes, learns,
and decides on behalf of individuals. The sense of agency and control that this rhetoric
strips from people in its depiction of human beings mirrored his thesis that human
experience is a product of brain evolution.
I used the literary concept of aporia to describe statements in which Cozolino
called into question whether his text could answer some of the important questions on
which it was allegedly premised. For example, early in his book he rejected the
possibility that his psychotherapy-neuroscience integration would be considered
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reductionism, and he promised a thorough treatment of the task of identifying individual
potential for psychological change and healing. Later in his book he denied that he was
responsible if his efforts to integrate psychotherapy and neuroscience were interpreted as
a reduction of mind to brain. As I showed throughout the Results chapter (see Chapter
IV), much of his book contained highly reductionist and scientized understandings of
psychology and psychological treatment. Therefore his use of aporia to deny
responsibility for the likely effects of his book seemed more permissive that cautionary.
In other words, he ultimately showed that he lacked concern about the effects of a brainbased psychotherapy on traditional psychological concepts such as mind. This disregard
for psychology fit with his assertion that the field was a historical placeholder rather than
an important institution whose emergence and broad societal relevance cannot be
understood through a contemporary neuroscientific theory.
In another example of aporia, Cozolino putatively rejected the authority of
neuroscientists who claim to have definitively determined how to predict an individual’s
potential for behavior change or psychological recovery. He encouraged readers to have
faith in the ability of the brain to change, rather than having faith or trust in
neuroscientists themselves. Finally, in another statement he acknowledged that if one
follows his premise that the brain largely controls what individuals believe and what
actions they initiate, then brain research might never be usable for explaining human
functioning since scientists and others can never be sure that the brain is not deceiving
them in their interpretations of research findings. These examples of aporia cast doubt on
claims that a merger between therapy and neuroscience is a useful, relevant, and
scientifically accurate endeavor. These statements were surprising because they seemed
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to contradict the premise of his book, and they even implied that neuroscience is
insufficient for addressing the large issues that he raised. However, rather than addressing
these important concerns about brain-based psychotherapy, Cozolino did not engage in
any significant discussion about the implications of these statements. It appeared to be
more a strategy to relax the reader and appeal to an anti-authority tendency in
contemporary American life, rather than a serious critique of all he previously asserted.
This promotes an uncritical, resigned way of thinking. Below I discuss this problem
further.
The Understanding of Self Perpetuated by the Thesis
The understanding of self in Cozolino’s (2010) The Neuroscience of
Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain begins with the assertion that the brain is first
shaped by experience early in life (especially attachment relationships) outside of an
infant’s control, and later in life comes to exert tremendous influence over a person based
on the patterns of neural firing that early experiences impressed into the brain.
Throughout his book, individuals are at once portrayed as embedded within a social
context because social contexts shape brain development, and then removed from that
social context because Cozolino also described the brain as having innate tendencies that
explain inherent qualities such as language, adaptability, and the potential for
psychopathology. In other words, he attempted to explain both structuralist and
poststructuralist social theory as reified in brain structures. Regardless, according to
Cozolino’s theory, humans are able to gain control of their lives and their psychological
functioning by regaining control over the brain through acting in whatever ways have
been proven to change its functioning. This implies that individuals must learn about
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neuroscience, or certain interpretations of neuroscience, in order to learn about how and
why the self can change. Human agency thus becomes a quality that is not possessed by
individuals, but instead is dependent on the pronouncements of neuroscientific expertise.
These conflicting visions of a material human being suggest that Cozolino’s theory holds
a vision of a perpetually uncertain self, lingering between genetic determinism and the
brain research Cozolino positioned as necessary for rejecting it. The self is trapped
between a sense of agency and acquiring knowledge about neuroscientific findings that
grant that agency. Cozolino serves as an interpreter of brain science who depicts this
science as accessible and easy to learn for lower-status professionals (psychotherapists)
who have not studied neuroscience yet have come to believe in its relevance and
accuracy. Therapists are made to be the model for a self that is a scientific novice who is
dependent on scientific expertise to validate socially valued theories about human nature.
Above I reviewed Cozolino’s strategy of aporia (see pp. 178-182) or statements
that call into question the entire purpose of his text. In one of those statements Cozolino
wrote that he does not trust neuroscience experts who claim to have found any answers to
questions about the human potential for change, which was surprising for a text based on
neuroscience research and jargon. He claimed that he instead trusts in the ability of the
brain to change, and in the ability of “our own ingenuity to discover new solutions”
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 210) to those issues. His statement casts doubt on whether
neuroscience is able to discover anything that psychological research methods, combined
with clinical judgment and experience, had not already established. However, his
statements assume that even if neuroscientific claims about the self are useful only to
support what therapists and others already know, neuroscience should still be combined
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with everyday psychological discourse because ideas about the brain are privileged as a
way to understand the self. Even with Cozolino’s surprising rejection of neuroscience
expertise about psychology and the self, he assumes the role of alternative neuroscience
expert who interprets this science and mandates its use. Despite the rhetorical promise to
liberate the self from uncritical allegiance to the authority of neuroscience, the self is still
a scientific novice dependent upon neuroscience experts. In other words, he portrays a
certain inevitability to the understanding that the study of the brain is the study of the
self. The choice to forego the use of neuroscience altogether is never presented; whether
humans have or do not have agency and self-directedness is still dependent upon whether
Cozolino and other experts permit it.
Throughout my Results chapter (see Chapter IV) I argued that Cozolino’s (2010)
neuroscientific interpretations of the self perpetuate an interiorized, socially removed, and
inward vision of human beings that is reminiscent of much modern era philosophy. His
claim that Winnicottian and object relations schemes best describe the self that is created
by brain functioning is evidence of that interiorized modern self. Even when he claims
that the brain is a social organ that is socially interdependent, and is constructed through
narrative, by having materialized those social qualities Cozolino presents a vision of
human beings that is individualized rather than contextualized. This is a significant
problem with using neuroscience to solve the mind-body or mind-brain problem.
Cozolino’s efforts show how the idea of a brain-based psychotherapy represents a literal
perpetuation of Cartesian dualism through a physical reification of structuralism wherein
moral discourse is concretized through the brain and disguised as scientific findings.
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In another example of aporia, Cozolino (2010) surprisingly noted that, since the
brain is a biased and distorted controller of perception, yet individuals rely on it to
interpret neuroscience research about human psychology and the self, humans might
never obtain the objective understanding of the brain or human experience that
neuroscience seemingly promises. This statement seemed to acknowledge a legitimate
concern about his use of neuroscience, yet he ignores any further implications and instead
resigns to continuing these efforts. Cozolino’s statements only further an uncritical and
enduring belief that personhood is equivalent to brain functioning since he dismisses any
other approach to understanding the self. In that regard, even the self as scientific novice
becomes an illusion produced by the brain. I posit that since neuroscience is an expertise
that might never be able to live up to its promise of providing objective answers, readers
are left in an untenable position characterized by uncertainty about what to believe about
themselves yet hopeful that brain science will confirm their beliefs. For therapists these
beliefs are often represented by psychotherapy theories. Psychotherapy theories embody
cultural and historical understandings of self, and Cozolino maps those theories onto the
brain.
Cozolino keeps the reader locked in a cycle of hoping that neuroscience will
resolve important philosophical questions about human beings. For example, he briefly
speculated that neuroscience research will reveal the origins of human consciousness.
Elsewhere his speculation ranged from ways in which rat brains could be models for the
human brain, to ways in which the brain is activated during psychodynamic therapy
interventions. His speculative approach (and his brief acknowledgement of the logical
flaws of a brain-based understanding of human personhood and psychological
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experiences) leaves readers indefinitely reliant upon neuroscience to answer these
questions. Cozolino’s writing style almost invariably overlooks the concept of mind and
instead mostly describes human experience alongside descriptions of brain functioning.
One could argue that throughout his book Cozolino simply portrayed eliminativism (that
is, the belief that psychological concepts such as subjectivity and consciousness are
without neural correlates and are therefore fictions that are waiting to be replaced with
descriptions of how brain functioning produced reality). Yet he also proposed that, with
enough support from interpreters of neuroscience such as himself, neuroscience could be
used to challenge eliminativism if psychological concepts are verified by mapping them
onto the brain. In this conflicting theory the self is perpetually reliant upon interpretations
of neuroscience research because the self is resolute in its assumed need for
neuroscientific validation of psychological, psychotherapy, and other theories about the
self. However, the self is also portrayed as equivalent to the brain. Cozolino offers hope
that maybe this is not true by challenging the expertise of neuroscientists. But even if
people find their own ways of believing that they are their brain, biological determinism
still stands because the language of psychology and subjectivity is lost. When Cozolino
applies his theory to psychotherapy through his case vignettes, freedom is restored in
suddenly ambitious, overly technical, and eclectic ways. However, even after he positions
himself as a savior of human freedom, it is not clear that he ever truly restores the
freedom to humans that his brain-based understanding of self already stripped away. In
other words, beneath the excitement and hopefulness that neuroscientific jargon might
generate, there is a rather unfulfilling and depressing understanding of human beings.
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Cozolino never presents readers with the option to disregard neuroscience or
brain-based understandings of therapy or the self. Therefore, sociocultural perspectives
that coherently address these conflicts are dismissed entirely in a discourse founded on a
materialized intrapsychic self over which patients are trying to regain control. He leaves
no room to talk about the historical and cultural circumstances in which individuals are
born and develop. For Cozolino there is ultimately no shared context aside from whatever
our brains evolved to have in common, which is his definition of culture and society. In
other words, there is little that is shared aside from the common need of personal
enhancement and private gain. Because there is no option in his book to forego the
conflation of psychotherapy and neuroscience, there is no way of thinking about the self
that understands the cultural and historical crossroads from which contemporary
neuroscience emerged and later became integrated with psychotherapy theories. His
approach uses therapy as a tool to ensure that neuroscience retains control of the study of
self, the outcomes of that study, and whatever commercial, biomedical, and other
purposes that such an understanding of the self might further.
The Potential Effects of the Thesis on the Practice of Psychotherapy and the
Profession of Psychology
Above I suggested that Cozolino places therapists in the role of a model for a
confused yet compliant self. Simply because Cozolino intermittently alludes to the idea
of a socially-emerging selfhood embedded in a cultural context does not necessary
translate into a truly contextual, historically- and socially-minded understanding of
human psychology. In fact, his confusing (and generally absent) use of the concept of
mind is a blatant disregard for psychology and instead represents a perpetuating of self as
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brain and psychology as fiction. Although for much of the 20th century psychotherapy
theories have perpetuated the problems of an individualized, modern era configuration of
self, a brain-based psychotherapy theory is especially persuasive because it seems to be
justified primarily by the excitement that is often generated by neuroscientific rhetoric
and its taken-for-granted claims about materialism and the self. Perhaps his conflicting
views represent an attempt at creating a wide appeal for his book. However, as I have
suggested, his understanding of self as brain is a depiction of at least material
reductionism, and possibly eliminativism. Psychotherapists and psychologists should
recognize that a vision of psychological concepts as historical placeholders for
neurobiological processes ultimately results in the expiration of psychology as a serious
profession, academic field, or way of talking about human beings (see I. Gold & Stoljar,
1999). The self is required to be a scientific novice about a science that might not even
work to achieve what it is supposed to achieve. The self is at once confused about
whether it has agency yet continues to be compliant in a fruitless attempt to address that
and other philosophical issues. Therapists are assigned the role of modeling this confused
yet compliant self.
Cozolino (2010) positions psychotherapists as advocates for neuroscience as the
correct paradigm for understanding the self and the relationship between individual
development and the cultural context in which personhood emerges. One way that this
shows up is with Cozolino’s recommendation that therapists assure patients that their
problems are common to all humans because of imperfect brain functioning that is not
unique to individual patients. This is an example of how the incorporation of a
neuroscientific understanding of self into therapy discourse could directly disregard
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subjectivity and agency (and therefore detract from the ability of therapists to engage in
any meaningful discussion of morality and responsibility). At the same time, he used
neuroscience to explain and combine established therapy theories rather than invent a
new one. He also described case vignettes that depict courses of psychotherapy in which
he applied an assortment of interventions in a rather confident fashion without consistent
theory or justification other than the portrayal of quick psychological change and easy
malleability of the brain and self. His combination of a material self that has the potential
for quick-changing malleability led to interventions that are instrumentalist, targeting
specific psychological and neurophysiological goals. These interventions produced little
insight about how or why patients’ difficulties arose. The result was an incoherent
eclecticism rather than a clearly articulated treatment approach.
Cozolino often demonstrated rather playful and creative therapy activities—for
example, having a patient imagine a different personal history in order to change the
recurring psychological effects of painful memories that are purportedly stored in the
brain. His approach disregards the contexts in which patients’ problems arise and therapy
is effective. There was little rationale given for his treatment choices. In other words, the
use of neuroscience fails to answer the questions of what therapists are doing, who they
are doing it with, and why they are doing it. As I discussed earlier (see Chapter II),
addressing those issues has been described as the point of integrating neuroscience and
psychotherapy. Cozolino’s theory gives therapists permission to implement whatever
therapy theories or techniques they desire as long as they can be justified by an appeal to
brain functioning. This does nothing to address the moral questions raised by the debates
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within psychology about how or whether to establish best practices in psychotherapy and
assess their efficacy (i.e., the meanings of concepts such as cure and health).
In Cozolino’s psychotherapy theory, insight about the self or psychological
development becomes insight about the brain. He even demonstrates how to rewrite
psychological development through his brain-based accounts of his own development of
self, as well as some of his typical behaviors. He materializes family life by describing its
influence on brain structures as a way to create an integrated or coherent narrative about
psychological difficulties and the ways in which psychotherapy remedies those
difficulties through the effects that the therapy relationship and therapy discourses confer
upon the brain. Cozolino’s rejection of neuroscientists claiming to have discovered with
certainty answers about the potential for individual change appeals at once to the
antiauthority sentiments that are a hallmark of the modern self, and the antiscientific
sentiments that took hold during the 20th century and cast doubt on the applicability of
the scientific method to the understanding of individual experience. Yet the portrayal of
neuroscience as an alternative and progressive science that lends support to social
selfhood, healthy individuality, and critical treatment of scientific authority could serve
simply to reinforce the authority and appeal of a scientific study of human psychology.
The creative variety of appeals to neuroscience is an implicit acknowledgement of the
methodological flaws of cognitive neuroscience (that is, the effort to ascertain the neural
correlates of psychological concepts). This exemplifies why mind-brain literature is
vulnerable to melding cultural discourse to interpretations of brain functioning in
whatever way an author or researcher desires. There are traditional guidelines about what
makes a good interpretation, but they are found in the humanities, not in neuroscience.
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Cozolino’s (2010) ahistorical and scientized understanding of psychotherapy has
several possible consequences for psychology and psychological treatment. It is helpful
to recall that Cozolino concludes his book by predicting ways in which therapy will
become more closely tied to neuroscience. For example, he predicts the use of
neuroimaging as a routine part of psychotherapy planning and progress monitoring, and
the use of neuroscientific terms in therapy case conceptualizations. These are lofty
predictions. First, there are many problems with those ideas that Cozolino does not
address. For example, if patients do not report psychological improvement even though
brain scans suggest it (or conversely, if a brain scan fails to indicate the neural correlates
of the psychological improvements that patients are reporting), in what ways could
psychologists and psychotherapists expect to be held ethically and legally accountable?
Cozolino’s prediction assumes a direct mind-brain correlation; therefore his predictions
for the practice of psychotherapy imply that he is also predicting that neuroscience will
thoroughly map direct mind-brain relationships. In other words, he is encouraging
therapists to adopt a mindset of hope and expectancy that the self will be even more
understood as a function of human neurobiology. Psychologists and psychotherapists
should remember the work of scholars (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Brothers, 2001;
Noë, 2009; Tallis, 2004) who have argued that neuroscience will never solve many of the
mysteries of human consciousness, not because of a lack of trying, but because
positioning the study of psychological concepts as the study of those concepts’ neural
correlates is a conceptually flawed endeavor.
One possible effect of Cozolino’s (2010) theory is that neuroscience could serve
to distract psychologists and psychotherapists from efforts that are more likely to
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maintain the viability of psychotherapy as a profession. After considering arguments such
as those of Orange (2003) about the problems with total physical reductionism in
psychology, I have come to believe that the only way to substantiate the field of
psychology and the practice of psychotherapy is through using the psychological methods
already available to us (quantitative, qualitative, and sociocultural or interpretive research
approaches), through continuing to debate in psychological rather than neuroscientific
terms the benefits and difficulties with each of those methods, and through addressing the
moral questions raised by psychological theories and these debates surrounding how best
to understand them.
Although the incorporation of neuroscience into psychotherapy research (and now
into psychotherapy discourse with texts such as The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy)
could not have happened without the longstanding desire by psychology to legitimize
itself as a true science, neuroscientific visions for psychotherapy do not only reproduce
and further empirical research methods and the problems with using the scientific method
to understand individuals. Cozolino’s (2010) theory also diminishes the reader’s ability to
think critically about psychological theories and research methods because neuroscience
is used to meld all of those approaches together, thereby denying that these moral debates
even exist. Readers are permitted to believe not only that evidence exists for whatever
therapy approaches they happen to believe in or utilize, but also that all psychotherapy
theories make the same claims about the self and the best way of life—specifically, a self
that is biomedical in its origins and concerned with neuroscience as its primary
intellectual endeavor. This is why, although I disagree with the primacy given to
empirical outcome studies in psychotherapy research over sociocultural or historical
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interpretations of therapy practices, I believe it is far more dangerous to move these
important debates entirely into a neuroscientific discourse rather than a social or
philosophical one to avoid addressing these contentious issues altogether. Doing so
perpetuates the problem of psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychotherapy trainees
not having the knowledge or interest in addressing the moral issues that are often veiled
in psychotherapy theories and practices. Neuroscientific explanations are simple, and for
cultural reasons they are often exciting for readers as well. However, Cozolino’s (2010)
book illustrates how this excitement unknowingly reduces psychology to neuroscience,
and this ultimately erases issues of consciousness and subjectivity. The loss of
psychological concepts is dehumanizing, and I find that to be more disconcerting than
exciting.
One reason Cozolino is able to make a brain-based psychotherapy appear useful
and appealing is that he positions the brain as an easy answer to the questions of how and
why psychologists and psychotherapists became tasked with such a wide variety of
professional duties. For example, many psychologists and psychotherapists—even within
a single day—provide treatment for patients whose symptoms range from neurological
disease, to chronic mental illness, to general life stressors, while alternating between
various treatment modalities (individual, family, group). Blurring the boundaries between
psychology and neuroscience is easy when Cozolino blurs the boundaries between
clinical psychology and neuropsychology. There is certainly professional overlap
between clinical psychology and clinical neuropsychology (e.g., neuropsychologists
invariably deal with all categories of mental health diagnoses when assessing and treating
brain disease and injury, and many clinical psychologists conduct assessment,
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evaluations, and even treatment for disorders such as attention deficit disorder, autism, or
dementia that are typically understood to have neurobiological correlates). However,
readers should not be easily persuaded by undisciplined uses of concepts such memory,
which have different meanings in clinical neuropsychology than traditional
psychotherapy theory. This recommendation is not meant to condemn the relationship
between psychological assessment and psychotherapy. Those endeavors are parts of the
same field, and how they fit together is an important issue that comprises psychology’s
unique domain over mental health research, treatment, advocacy, forensic and medical
applications, and other interests. What is troubling, however, is the prospect that
Cozolino’s readers might be convinced that talk therapy is simply a neurobiological
intervention because therapists have an interest in the effects of memory on individual
functioning and experience, and some psychologists (particularly neuropsychologists)
study and evaluate symptoms of memory difficulties (such as sudden forgetfulness or
longstanding disabilities with learning or retaining information).
With this type of conflation Cozolino exploits any possible unawareness amongst
readers that psychology has had a longstanding interest in proving itself a legitimate
science, and that even scientific psychology is not a natural scientific observation of the
physical world. However, there is good evidence in Cozolino’s case vignettes that he
intentionally used neuropsychology in this way. In one of his first case vignettes,
Cozolino recalls conducting family therapy for the treatment of a patient with a traumatic
brain injury. His treatment involves psychoeducation with the family about their son’s
psychological symptoms such as irritability that resulted from the injury, and ways to
support his recovery, in addition to community reintegration through social services.
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The above seems to be a reasonable approach with this patient. However, in the
remainder of Cozolino’s case vignettes he frequently discusses various psychotherapy
interventions in terms of their alleged effects on the brain. Mental health researchers and
practitioners should remember that even if symptoms have some neurological
component, psychologists are uniquely qualified to treat patients because of a deep
understanding that those symptoms are still embedded within systems and relationships,
and even neurological issues manifest in symptoms that are psychological and therefore
exist because they are based on observations of persons (not observations of the brain).
Moreover, psychologists devised assessments for cognition, memory, attention,
and personality prior to the early 1990s when neuroimaging was first used in
psychotherapy research. Neuroimaging at times provides support for psychological
findings, and it has certainly been used as evidence in legal matters. For example,
locating brain lesions that are causing behaviors beyond individual control has helped to
establish reduced culpability in criminal proceedings. But Cozolino’s book is not about
that issue. It is important that readers consider the difference between something that is
interesting and something that is necessary. The fact that some neurological disorders can
cause involuntary physical and psychological symptoms does not translate into an
assumption that all behaviors and experiences throughout a person’s life are also
involuntary and spurred by the brain’s alleged control over one’s life.
Rather than attempting to transform psychological concepts into material objects
for natural science inquiry, ensuring the long-term viability of professional psychology is
likely to require political activism that empowers psychologists through measures such as
fair reimbursements from insurance companies and expanded access to treatment
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populations. Those measures necessarily involve issues of fairness, civic engagement,
and shared responsibility for managing the societal impact of mental disorders. In other
words, these measures require the type of thinking that Cozolino never mentioned in his
book, and worse, is made more difficult by a brain-based discourse that locates the social
within a materialized, somatic individual.
Regardless of Cozolino’s brief disavowal of reductionism, and regardless of his
understanding of the brain as a social organ, his attempt to combine psychotherapy and
neuroscience is suggestive of an a priori, individual, neural self. At the very least this
perpetuates reductive materialism, and likely propagates eliminativism or the position
that psychology is a historical placeholder for neuroscience. The hope that readers come
to place on neuroscience proving the validity of psychology and psychotherapy seems to
perpetuate the position that psychological concepts such as mind, subjectivity, and
consciousness are merely fictions that should be done away with so that humans can
speak about themselves in neuroscientific rather than social and philosophical terms. In
fact, Cozolino’s portrayal of traditional psychotherapy concepts as historical placeholders
for neurobiological theories is a good strategy for depicting human psychology as a myth.
In his book, the absence of much use of the concepts of mind and consciousness also
might further an eliminativist position.
Sociocultural theories posit that psychology and psychotherapy are inseparable
from the Western cultural context because they are cultural and historical institutions that
have an irreplaceable influence over the way people think and talk about the world and
the purpose of humans within it. To extract these fields from culture and history with
decontextualized descriptions about their origins (and scientized claims about their
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purpose) in essence furthers a society in which psychological theories and treatments at
first perpetuate a technicized, instrumental understanding of self, and later erases the self
altogether.
In sum, the effects of incorporating into psychotherapy theories a vision of
materialized personhood (presented as a mechanized brain that controls individual
functioning) is ultimately an erosion altogether of psychology and psychotherapy. In
other words, Cozolino might cause therapists unknowingly to cheer for their own demise.
This might seem to be a dire prediction. However, if one takes seriously the possible
disregard for subjectivity and agency that neuroscientific visions of humans suggest
(especially in the absence of coherent or sincere efforts to address psychological concepts
such as mind), then one should seriously question whether psychology and psychotherapy
could exist if therapists, researchers, and patients began to discuss human problems and
solutions entirely in terms of the brain.
The Political, Economic, and Social Arrangements Replicated by the Thesis
A cultural and historical interpretation of Cozolino’s (2010) psychotherapy theory
highlights a need amongst psychologists and psychotherapists to challenge the promises
of an uncritical integration between neuroscience and psychotherapy. His efforts warrant
closer scrutiny than psychotherapy scholars have adequately provided. For example,
Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s (2010) criticism of the use of the concept of brain plasticity to
validate sociological theory (and progressive political ideas about the impact of culture
and history on human functioning) is one example of an especially relevant criticism
because Cozolino’s brain-based psychotherapy seems to promote an individualized,
material understanding of the self and self-improvement. She argued that the underlying
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ideas about citizenship and selfhood valued by biomedical selfhood are consistent with
neoliberal economic and political arrangements that hold a vision of a priori
individualism valued above democratic ideals and the collaborative civic engagement
necessary to foster equity and justice. The understanding that the self is a brain that
inevitably evolved to control human psychology and subjective experience is an
understanding of self and human nature that is universal across time and place. This is
incompatible with cultural sensitivity, recent philosophical theory, or relevant mental
health practices. Cozolino’s case vignettes are good evidence of how a technicized and
instrumentalized talk therapy purposed to target specific brain changes inherently
dismisses psychological concepts such as subjectivity and consciousness, and therefore
unknowingly dismisses the role of culture and context in creating a shared discourse
about psychological illness and change.
I argue that universalizing human experience as a product of the brain rather than
understanding its emergence within a social and cultural matrix threatens to unknowingly
perpetuate conservative or status quo political arrangements. For example, in my textual
analysis I interpreted one passage that was indicative of Cozolino’s overreach (he
claimed that women often return to employment shortly after childbirth because the brain
commands it). His brain-based understanding of this issue overlooked the lack of
progress in public policy related to workers rights and general family services that has
been associated with the issue of insufficient maternity leave in the United States.
Reducing problems to the evolution of the brain dismisses the ways in which shared
economic and social arrangements produce distress and difficulties amongst citizens in
many capitalist systems. Cozolino’s application of a brain-based therapy theory directly
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threatens to diminish a reader’s ability to contextualize psychological issues and to
recognize that inadequate democratic representation and fairness is contributing to
patients’ difficulties.
Near the end of his book, while reiterating the importance of remembering that
the brain changes in response to experience, Cozolino (2010) abruptly asserted that, “the
neural network dissociation that often results from exposure to combat should make us
pay closer attention to those whom we put in harm’s way” (p. 357). This is a good
example of a statement that might appeal to therapists during a cursory reading because it
sounds as if Cozolino is bravely questioning the institution of war. He seems to be
subversively challenging authority and presenting a progressive social and political
alternative to the state of perpetual war that has been a defining feature since the first
colonists arrived in the U.S., and which has of course been quite pronounced in the
decade between September 11, 2001 and 2010 when Cozolino’s book was published in
its current edition. In fact, a closer examination of his statement shows that he takes no
political stance whatsoever. It is not even clear that he is challenging the institution of
war itself. His statement is at best meaningless, and at worst subtly reinforces the
moderate position that perhaps combat is regrettable yet should remain a fairly common
endeavor for the United States to engage. His statement’s most literal meaning—that
brain science should cause people to “pay attention” to active duty soldiers but take no
active political position regarding the institutions they represent—is a good metaphor for
Cozolino’s broader depiction of the relationship between neuroscience and
psychotherapy. That is, Cozolino supports questioning neuroscience, interpreting
neuroscience in ways that support psychotherapy theories, using it to justify
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psychological healing and change, and even perhaps advocating for a more sociallyminded rather than individualized use of science—yet he never provides the option to
disregard neuroscience entirely, develop a more robust sociocultural vision, or avoid
altogether the integration between brain research and psychotherapy. Like the soldiers
whose welfare he really only minimally cares about, Cozolino’s concern for the
institution of psychotherapy is at best minimal.
Despite the many therapy theories that Cozolino (2010) presents as options for
mental health practice, and despite the treatment of neuroscience as an alternative-minded
science that could confirm important values about psychology and the self, he presents
little choice to readers, and instead depicts a great deal of inevitability with regards to the
merger between neuroscience and psychotherapy even in general therapy practice. His
implications lead to statements that sound progressive but never really challenge the roots
of social injustice and violence—namely, the complicity with the status quo, an erosion
of civil society and community involvement, and resignation about the possibility that
individuals may affect larger change through psychotherapy discourse. It seems more
likely that broader social progress is not possible with a reductionist, material selfhood
such as the vision of humans that a brain-based therapy promotes. Why would it be?
According to Cozolino, human selfhood, culture, society, and history have been primarily
products of the evolution of the brain. This necessarily implies that war, for example, or
the inability of women to take time away from work following childbirth, must also be
products of brain functioning. Yet to admittedly naturalize social ills such as war, and to
declare it inevitable, would be quite unappealing to many readers. In other words,
Cozolino’s vision of the brain as the self is a vision of justified helplessness. Cozolino

278

could not elaborate on what he intended to convey with his recommendation that readers
pay attention to soldiers, since a logical conclusion following his brain-based theory
would suggest that war itself is inevitable (or, that the inevitability of war is just as
tenable of a position as the opposition to it). However, in order to actually question
something like war, psychological concepts such as mind and self must be located in a
sociocultural context—that is, in the relationships between people (such as therapist and
patient) rather than in brain cells and circuits of individuals. The brain-based self and
brain-based psychotherapy is an understanding of self and psychology with no cultural or
historical frame and therefore no shared understanding of the good, other than whatever
values and ways of living are promoted or reinforced by neurochemical or biomedical
selfhood. The reader becomes easily manipulated, just like he or she is convinced of the
ability to manipulate the brain functioning of patients to help them heal and change. This
is a helpless and complacent selfhood. Not questioning the authority of neuroscience is
good practice for not questioning other forms of authority as well.
Although brain-based therapies hold the hope for many therapists for advances
such as greater reimbursements from third party payers and greater societal esteem
through scientific accuracy in diagnosis and treatment of psychological conditions,
scientized and reductionist texts breed the very complicity that therapists need to avoid in
order to reclaim some authority over psychotherapy practice from interests such as
insurance companies or government programs that therapists appeal to for
reimbursement. In other words, brain-based psychotherapy theories could unknowingly
have little or even detrimental effects on the efforts for which therapists seem to have
placed many personal and professional hopes. In my hermeneutic interpretation of
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Cozolino’s (2010) text I have shown why his use of neuroscience is likely to convince
readers that everything in his book is true. With his statements I labeled aporia (see
above) Cozolino then casts doubt on his entire purpose, quite suddenly nothing becomes
true. At its worst, confusion and ambiguity result in political apathy, which ultimately
leads to hopelessness and despair. Because Cozolino’s (2010) efforts are ahistorical, his
book is unable to foster a way of thinking that might condemn anything about the current
time and place in which it has emerged and gained favor. Cozolino’s vision is a neutral
understanding of therapy and mental health. It safely avoids polarizing readers at a time
when the United States is quite polarized politically, economically, and socially. In The
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy, American complicity is reinforced through the use of
psychotherapy as a venue to further remove the mind or self from context and human
relationship. In Cozolino’s book there is a psychotherapy theory or practice that could
appeal to nearly any therapist, as long as readers do not disagree with the use of the brain
as a means by which to understand and integrate psychotherapies. That is why a
hermeneutic interpretation of the context, claims and rhetoric involved in integrating
mind and brain is especially helpful for revealing the implications of mind-brain
reductionism for the self, and thus for society more broadly. Psychologists and
psychotherapists should attend closely to the cultural and historical circumstances from
which brain-based therapy theories have emerged before adopting these therapy
practices.
Finally, Cozolino is a good writer, and like most good writers, his efforts
culminate in a book that is easy to read and which seems quite appealing. Unfortunately,
the use of psychotherapy as a vehicle for a more widespread neuroscientific discourse,
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and one that is firmly engrained in how people talk about the self and its ills, ultimately
seems dismissive of psychological research and psychotherapy theories because it
unknowingly dismisses subjectivity, agency, and morality. It is therefore dismissive of a
more coherent discussion about relationships, culture and civic engagement—in other
words, the good. The sense of complacency that Cozolino’s efforts perpetuate could be
more likely to harm the viability of psychotherapy than to save it. A brain-based
psychotherapy, in addition to being scientifically and logically questionable, is simply too
good to be true. In other words, it is too easy for solving the difficult historical and moral
problems that psychotherapy has for some decades been facing. As psychologists and
psychotherapists we have to try harder.
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Appendix A
Further Examples of Primary Content of
The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (Cozolino, 2010)
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The definition or general purpose of psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy as a venue for neural integration.
“At the heart of psychotherapy is an understanding of the interwoven forces of
nature and nurture, what goes right and wrong in their developmental unfolding,
and how to reinstate healthy neural functioning” (p. 13).
Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that
promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and process
complexity. The way the brain changes during therapy will depend upon the
neural networks involved in the focus of treatment. (p. 20)
The very way that the brain has evolved to successfully cope with immediate
threat appears to have created a vulnerability to longer term psychological
distress: Enter psychotherapy. Applying this model, psychotherapy is a means of
creating or restoring coordination among various neural networks. (p. 25)
A basic assumption of both neuroscience and psychotherapy is that optimal
functioning and mental health are related to increasingly advanced levels of
growth, integration, and complexity. On a neurological level, this equates to the
integration and communication of neural networks dedicated to emotion,
cognition, sensation, and behavior and a proper balance between excitation and
inhibition. On an experiential level, integration is the ability to live life—love and
work—while employing a minimum of defensiveness. . . . From the perspective
of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a specific kind of enriched
environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons and the integration of
neural networks. The therapeutic environment is individually tailored to fit the
symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here that all forms of therapy,
regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to the degree to which they
foster appropriate neuroplasticity. (p. 25)
“Psychotherapy can serve as a means to reintegrate the patient’s disconnected
hemispheres through reality testing, emotional expression, and putting words to
feelings in the context of a caring relationship” (p. 110).
The organization of autobiographical memory that includes input from multiple
neural networks enhances self-awareness and increases the ability to solve
problems, cope with stress, and regulate affect. This integrative process is what
psychotherapy attempts to establish when it is absent. (p. 207)
“Given that psychotherapy is an enriched environment for social-emotional
learning, we can assume that the challenges we provide our clients build more
complex and resilient brains” (p. 330).
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Psychotherapy as a relationship that is similar to other relationships that
facilitate neural integration.
“In psychotherapy we are tapping the same principles and processes available in
every relationship to connect to and heal another brain” (p. 305).
“Language within significant relationships has shaped the brain during evolution
and continues to do so throughout our lives. Because of this, narratives embedded
within an emotionally meaningful relationship (like psychotherapy) are capable of
resculpting neural networks throughout life” (p. 343).
General reasons why people seek psychotherapy.
A lack of “optimal” neural functioning is implicated in the problems for which
people seek treatment with psychotherapy regardless of the severity or types of problems.
At the heart of psychotherapy is an understanding of the interwoven forces of
nature and nurture, what goes right and wrong in their developmental unfolding,
and how to reinstate healthy neural functioning. When one or more neural
networks necessary for optimal functioning remain underdeveloped,
underregulated, or underintegrated with others, we experience the complaints and
symptoms for which people seek therapy. We now assume that when
psychotherapy results in symptom reduction or experiential change, the brain has,
in some way, been altered. (Kandel, 1998, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 13)
Many people, perhaps even the majority of clients in psychotherapy, do not come
for treatment of a major psychiatric illness. Most clients who are somewhat “less
ill” have so far not been included in extensive (and expensive) outcome research
that includes brain imaging studies. Many people seek psychotherapy simply
because, as they often say themselves, life has somehow gotten out of balance.
This may mean that their fears and worries have taken control of their lives and
limited their ability to function or find happiness in the world. Others find
themselves devoid of emotion and without empathy for others, leading them to
seek therapy to save their marriages and relationships with their children. Many
have the sense that they are not living up to their potential or get in their own way
when it comes to worldly success and emotional satisfaction. These clients are
often referred to as the ‘worried well,’ implying that they should somehow get
over themselves and get on with life. My sense is that this group of patients, in
which I would include myself, also suffer various versions of a homeostatic
imbalance. An exaggerated reliance on intellectual defenses, overemotionality, or
a negative attachment experience can become established as self-perpetuating
patterns that lead to social isolation and underperformance. All of these
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suboptimal lifestyles are most likely reflected in biased patterns of neural
activation, which become the focus of psychotherapy. (pp. 162-163)
The following eight problematic aspects of brain functioning…cause many people
to come to psychotherapy:
1. The suppression of language and predictive capacity under stress
2. Divergent hemispheric processing
3. The bias toward early learning
4. The tenacity of fear
5. The damaging effects of stress hormones
6. The speed and amount of unconscious processing
7. The primacy of projection
8. Unconscious self-deception
(p. 306)
Psychotherapy remedies problems that result because the human brain initially
develops in accordance with early childhood experiences.
As highly adaptive social organs, our brains are just as capable of adjusting to
unhealthy environments and pathological caretakers as they are to good-enough
parents. While our brains become shaped to survive early traumatic environments,
many of these adaptations may impede health and well-being later in life.
Negative interpersonal experiences early in life are a primary source of the
symptoms for which people seek relief in psychotherapy. (p. 206)
Patients are often being held back in their potential to enact desired changes
because of the way in which their brains have constructed reality.
At the heart of psychotherapy are two interwoven processes; the first is the way in
which our brains and minds construct reality, while the second is our ability to
modify these constructions to support mental health and well-being. In other
words, why are we so vulnerable to constructing distorted realities, and how can
we learn to counterbalance these distortions? People come to therapy because one
or more aspects of their lives are not how they would like them to be. Most often
our clients know what they should be doing differently but cannot bring
themselves to make changes. They come in with a feeling that something within
them is holding them back. The answers to their questions can usually be found in
the architecture of the hidden layers of neural processing—those networks within
the brain that construct reality, guide our experience, and shape our identity.
(p. 133)

302

Psychological defenses (also described as the adaptations of neural networks) are
no longer effective for coping.
“What Freud called defenses can be seen as ways in which neural networks have
adapted to cope with emotional stress. People seek treatment when their defense
mechanisms cannot adequately cope with repressed emotions, or when symptoms
become intolerable” (p. 34).
The definition and etiology of psychopathology.
Mental disorders are types of inadequate neural integration.
If everything we experience is represented by instantiations within neural
networks, then by definition, psychopathology of all kinds—from the mildest
neurotic symptoms to the most severe psychosis—must also be represented within
and among neural networks. In line with this theory, psychopathology would be a
reflection of suboptimal development, integration, and coordination of neural
networks. Patterns of dysregulation of brain activation found in disorders such as
depression and obsession-compulsive disorder support the theory of a brain-based
explanation for the symptoms of psychopathology. (p. 24)
I postulated earlier that neural network integration should correlate with mental
health, while dissociation or imbalance among neural networks should correlate
with mental illness. If this is true, we can assume that integration between the
right and left hemispheres is one element of optimal brain functioning. It turns out
that anxiety, affective disorders, psychosis, alexithymia, and psychosomatic
conditions have all been linked to deficits in the integration and balance among
the cerebral hemispheres. (pp. 105-106)
Humans have the potential to experience psychopathology because of how the
brain evolved.
The neural circuitry involved in fear and anxiety, although biased toward the right
hemisphere, involves both hemispheres and all levels of the triune brain. The most
primitive subcortical fight-or-flight circuitry, shared with our reptilian ancestors,
interacts with the most highly evolved regions of the cortex. This results in the
capacity to experience anxiety about everything from an unexpected tap on the
shoulder to an existential crisis. (p. 239)
“The increased size of the human brain and its additional processing capacity
make it possible for us to worry about many more potential dangers, both real and
imagined” (p. 253).
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The continuum of normality to abnormality represents a continuum of stress
responses.
Early deprivation or chronic stress increase the chances of damage to the brain,
deficits in memory and reality testing, and the prolonged utilization of primitive
defenses…With increased nurturance and support, stress hormone levels
decrease; physical comfort and soothing talk with caretakers helps the brain to
integrate experience. (p. 22)
From extreme PTSD to everyday neurosis, we all exhibit a pattern of integration
and dissociation reflective of our adaptational history and the health of our brains.
At the level of the experience of self, networks dedicated to sensation, perception,
and emotion seamlessly integrate into the emergence of conscious experience.
(Damasio, 1994; Pessoa, 2008; Fox et al., 2005, as cited in Cozolino, 2010,
p. 151)
For each of us there is a point at which fear crosses the line into trauma, causing
severe disturbances in the integration of cognitive, sensory, and emotional
processing. The psychological and neurobiological reactions to traumatic
experiences lie on a continuum of severity. As a general rule, the earlier, more
severe, and more prolonged the trauma, the more negative and far reaching its
effects (De Bellis, Baum, et al., 1999; De Bellis, Keshavan, et al., 1999).
Unresolved trauma may result in symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), which reflect the physiological dysregulation and dissociation of
multiple neural networks. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 262)
Psychopathology resulting from nonsecure attachment experiences.
“A basic assumption is that loving connections and secure attachments build
healthy and resilient brains, while neglectful and insecure attachments can result
in brains vulnerable to stress, dysregulation, and illness” (p. 180).
Bowlby suggested that early interactions create attachment schemas that predict
subsequent reactions to others. Schemas are implicit memories that organize
within networks of the social brain, based on experiences of safety and danger
with caretakers during early sensitive periods. A secure attachment schema
enhances the formation of a biochemical environment in the brain conducive to
regulation, growth, and optimal immunological functioning. Insecure and
disorganized attachment schemas have the opposite effect, and correlate with
higher frequencies of physical and emotional illness. (p. 198)
“The three nonsecure patterns of attachment research all reflect lower levels of
psychological and neurological integration” (p. 205).
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“Secure attachments represent the optimal balance of sympathetic and
parasympathetic arousal, whereas their imbalance correlates with insecure
attachment patterns such as fight or flight and splitting” (p. 206).
“We can hypothesize that many who engage in domestic violence, child abuse,
and other forms of aggressive behavior may not have had the kinds of early
attachment relationships required to build an adequate vagal system” (p. 234).
The existence and definition of self.
Influenced by D.W. Winnicott, Cozolino described self as developing during
periods in childhood marked by calmness and being alone.
“Creating a quiet internal world allows for private thought, self-reflection, and
traveling through time via episodic memory. Quiet moments can then serve as the
grounds for mentalization, creativity, and consolidating the self” (Winnicott,
1958, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 145).
Winnicott (1962) suggested that the ego and one’s sense of self consolidate during
the periods of quiescence when children feel safe and calm in the presence of their
parents. Good-enough parenting scaffolds the child, allowing him or her to go
‘inside’ and rest in imagination and the experience of self (Stern, 1985, as cited in
Cozolino, 2010, p. 146)
Secure attachments and a sense of a safe world create the context for the
development of the true self, which represents those aspects of the self that
develop in the context of manageable (minor) impingements, support,
encouragement, and proper meaning by the caretaker. Respect for the autonomy
and separateness of the child motivates the parent to discover the child’s interests,
instead of imposing his or her own upon them. (p. 191)
When self-involved or pathological parents use children for their own emotional
needs, the child can become compulsively attuned to the parents, creating a false
self designed to regulate the parents’ needs. Without appropriate assistance in
developing his or her self-reflective capacity, such children live through reflexive
social behavior and never learn that they have feelings and needs of their own that
should be expressed and nurtured. (p. 192)
Self formed through narrative.
Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and
increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can
escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and
worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to
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ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts. In life
and in therapy, we can use stories to imagine our problems happening to someone
else or view ourselves at a distance (externalization). We can share versions of
possible selves and receive input from others. Finally, we can experiment with
new emotions, actions, and language to edit the scripts of our lives. . . . Our ability
to edit narratives summons us to try on new ways of being. (p. 165)
Co-constructed narratives form the core of human groups, from primitive tribes to
modern families. The combined participation of caretakers and children in
narrating shared experiences organizes memories, embeds them within a social
context, and assists in linking feelings, actions, and others to the self. (p. 207)
Narrative or “stories of the self” enables affect regulation.
“Autobiographical memory creates stories of the self capable of supporting affect
regulation in the present and the maintenance of homeostatic functions into the
future” (p. 47).
Self and imagination.
Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and
increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can
escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and
worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to
ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts.
(p. 171)
“Because our imaginal capabilities have allowed for the construction of the self,
we can also become anxious about potential threats to our psychological survival”
(p. 240).
The existence and definition of mind.
Mind is how Freud chose to describe the brain.
Freud, the neurologist, became all but forgotten as his psychological theories
moved further and further from their biological roots. He chose instead to utilize
the more palatable and accessible metaphors of literature and anthropology to
provide the primary vocabulary for psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, Freud’s shift
from the brain to metaphors of mind opened psychoanalysis up to all sorts of
criticism throughout the 20th century. Metaphors such as the Oedipal and Electra
complexes were seen as contrived fictions, shielding them from scientific
evaluation. Perhaps Freud anticipated that in the future, psychoanalysis would
eventually be integrated with its neurobiological substrates. (pp. 4-5)
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Although psychotherapy originally emerged from neurology, differences in
language and worldview have limited collaboration among the two fields for most
of the 20th century. While psychotherapists developed a rich metaphoric language
of mind, neurologists built a detailed database of brain behavior relationships. As
we approached the 21st century, neuroscience began providing us with tools to
explore what happens in the brain during early development, and later in
psychotherapy. A return to Freud’s Project of a biological psychology is finally at
hand. (p. 12)
The brain is what therapists have unknowingly been working with or describing
while calling it mind.
“The similarity between hemispheric specialization and Freud’s notion of the
conscious and unconscious mind has not been lost on psychotherapists” (p. 110).
The relationship between mind and brain.
Mind and brain are “a unified process.”
How does the brain give rise to the mind? Where do the brain and mind meet, and
by what means do they interact with one another? These are difficult questions—
so difficult, in fact, that the common reaction is to focus on either the mind or the
brain and act as if the other is irrelevant (Blass & Carmeli, 2007; Pulver, 2003).
The problem with this approach is the barrier it creates to understanding that the
human experience of brain and mind is essentially a unified process (Cobb, 1944).
Neurology and psychology are simultaneously pushed apart by academic and
intellectual politics while being drawn together by their common
psychobiological foundation. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 1)
Mind is “embedded” within processes of the brain.
Theories of psychological development by Winnicott, Freud, and others provide
us with models for the development of mind embedded in these more basic
neurobiological processes. The development of a sense of self requires periods of
freedom from external threat and inner turmoil. It also requires the development
of frontal-parietal systems responsible for inner imaginal space. (p. 196)
Mind might emerge from the brain.
“As our knowledge of neural networks expands, perhaps we gain a greater
understanding of how the mind emerges from the wetware of the brain” (p. 132).

307

Certain states of mind might influence brain functioning.
The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional arousal and stress.
It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and control activate
frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation. In other words,
thinking we have some control puts us in a state of mind that prepares us to think
and activates prefrontal functioning, which reduces our emotionality. As a selffulfilling prophecy, believing you are an efficacious person stimulates frontal
activation, making you a more efficacious person. (p. 169)
Phrases that suggested mind and brain are not synonymous.
Ancient networks have been conserved, expanded, and reorganized, while new
networks have emerged and combined to perform increasingly complex functions.
In the process, some executive functions remained with earlier evolving networks,
and some moved up to frontal and prefrontal regions, while still others were
assumed by the mind and the social group. (p. 115)
“Further, stories link individuals into families, tribes, and nations and into a group
mind linking each individual brain” (p. 164).
“These ways in which the brain and mind have evolved have created a wide
variety of threats to our emotional and physical well-being” (p. 316).
The relationship between self and brain.
The extent of neural integration corresponds to the extent of psychological
integration or coherence of self.
Numerous processing networks combine affect, sensation, behavior, and
conscious awareness into an integrated, functional, and balanced whole—the
neural substrate for what Freud called the ego. The ego is essentially shorthand
for how the organization of the self comes to be expressed in dimensions such as
personality, affect regulation, coping styles, and self-image. (p. 27)
Consciousness and identity are complex functions constructed from the
contributions of multiple, primarily nonconscious, neural networks. Pathological
states highlight the fact that the self is a fragile construction of the brain.
Furthermore, there is considerable flexibility in the location, experience, and
organization of the self within our imagination. (p. 286)

308

Left and right hemispheres of the brain correspond to distinct aspects of self.
The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and
danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self
(Devinsky, 2000). Appraisal simply means attaching a positive or negative
association to a stimulus, while emotion is the conscious manifestation of this
appraisal process (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Fox, 1991). The vast
majority of appraisal occurs at an unconscious level. This is why the right
hemisphere is more often associated with the unconscious mind, that is, what
guides our thoughts and behavior outside of our awareness. (Cozolino, 2010,
p. 97)
Gazzaniga (1989) later developed the concept of the left hemisphere interpreter
that synthesizes available information and generates a coherent narrative for the
conscious social self. The strategy of filling in gaps in experience and memory,
and making a guess at an explanation, parallels confabulatory processes seen in
patients with psychosis, dementia, and other forms of brain damage.
Confabulation appears to be a reflexive function of the left hemisphere interpreter
as it attempts to make sense of nonsense, organize experience, and present the self
in the best possible light. This phenomenon is likely related to Freudian defense
mechanisms that distort reality in order to reduce anxiety. (Cozolino, 2010,
p. 103)
The parietal lobes of the brain contribute significantly to the experience of self.
It seems that the parietal lobes developed a parallel capacity for constructing and
navigating a map of internal, imaginal space. . . . The parietal lobes’
interconnections with the rest of the cortex allowed for the integration of working
visual memory, attentional capacities, and bodily awareness necessary for these
imaginal abilities. This suggests that our self-awareness was likely built in a
stepwise manner during evolution through a series of overlapping ‘maps’—first of
the physical environment, then of self in environment, and later of self as
environment. Thus, the growth of imaginal abilities allowed us to create an
increasingly sophisticated inner topography. (p. 141)
“Damage to the parietal lobes disrupts the experience of location, self
organization, and identity—in other words, who and where we are” (p. 142).
“These findings point to the fact that the parietal lobes are far more than sensory
motor association areas, but are involved in the deployment of attention,
understanding the environment, and constructing the experience of self” (p. 143).
There is also evidence to suggest that the parietal lobes participate in the creation
of internal representations of the actions of others within us (Shmuelof & Zohary,
2006). In other words, we internalize others by creating representations of them in
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our imaginations. This allows us to both learn from others and carry them with us
when they are absent. These inner objects, as described in psychoanalysis, likely
serve as the infrastructure of the construction and maintenance of our experience
of self (Macrae et al., 2004; Tanji & Hoshi, 2001, as cited in Cozolino, 2010,
p. 143).
Some sort of frontal-parietal network appears to be essential to our experience of
self. Neural fibers connecting the middle portions of these two areas appear to
serve a general integrative function of linking right and left hemispheres, limbic
and cortical structures, as well as anterior and posterior regions of the cortex (Lou
et al., 2004, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 144)
The frontal-parietal network may be primarily responsible for the construction of
the experience of self (Lou, Nowak, & Kajer, 2005). A properly functioning
frontal-parietal network allows for the successful negotiation of our moment-tomoment survival and the ability to turn our attention to inner experience. . . .
Without the ability to reflect on and sometimes cancel reflexive motor and
emotional responses, there is little freedom. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 145)
We believe that early caretaking builds and shapes the cortex and its relationships
with the limbic system, which supports emotional regulation, imagination, and
coping skills. To this we now must add the development of the parietal lobes in
the construction of internal space. (p. 146)
Winnicott’s concept of true self describes neural integration and healthy
psychological development.
Winnicott (1962) suggested that the ego and one’s sense of self consolidate during
the periods of quiescence when children feel safe and calm in the presence of their
parents. Good-enough parenting scaffolds the child, allowing him or her to go
“inside” and rest in imagination and the experience of self (Stern, 1985). This
may serve as an important mechanism of the transmission of neural organization
from parent to child. It is rare to find a child who is able to be still and centered
and feel safe in the presence of chaotic adults. We believe that early caretaking
builds and shapes the cortex and its relationships with the limbic system, which
supports emotional regulation, imagination, and coping skills. To this we now
must add the development of the parietal lobes in the construction of internal
space. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 146)
The true self reflects our ability to tolerate negative feelings and integrate them
into conscious awareness and to seek out what feels right for us in our activities,
ourselves, and our relationships with others. Winnicott’s true self is obviously one
in which neural network development has been maximized, affect is well
regulated, and emotions and cognition are well integrated. The true self reflects an
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open and ongoing dialogue among the heart, the mind, and the body. (Cozolino,
2010, p. 191)
Self and contemporary problems of the self both result from how the brain
evolved to allow for imagination.
With the expansion of the cerebral cortex and the emergence of imagination, we
have become capable of being anxious about situations we will never experience.
We can now worry about monsters living under our beds and the incineration of
the earth resulting from the sun’s expansion. Because our imaginal capabilities
have allowed for the construction of the self, we can also become anxious about
potential threats to our psychological survival. Psychotherapists deal with a wide
variety of anxiety disorders based in the fear of social death. The expectation of
rejection by another can result in social withdrawal; the fear of forgetting one’s
lines in a play can result in stage fright. Systems of physical survival have been
conserved in the evolution of consciousness and the ego, to be triggered when
threats to these abstract constructions are activated. (p. 240)
The ways in which the brain interprets social interactions contributes to a sense
of self.
The internal emotional associations linked to mirror circuitry are activated via
outwardly expressed gestures, postures, tone, and other pragmatic aspects of
communication. Thus, our internal emotional state—generated via automatic
mirroring processes—can become our intuitive “theory” of the internal state of
the other. These structures are at the core of our ability to develop intimate
relationships, be attuned to one another, and aid our children in shaping a healthy
and balanced sense of self. (p. 189)
Neural integration enables self to be experienced as embodied.
“An organized sense of the body in space and the embodied self form in
subcortical and cortical networks involving the thalamus, cerebellum, and parietal
cortex” (p. 95).
“The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and
danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self”
(Devinsky, 2000, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 97).
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Language and narrative foster neural integration, thereby enabling a coherent
experience of self.
Putting feelings into words and constructing narratives about our experiences are
integral to emotional regulation, the interweaving of neural networks of emotion
and cognition, and the experience of a coherent sense of self. Perhaps most
important, a lack of language can separate us from the healing effects of positive
connections with others. The loss of the ability to construct narratives is
especially problematic in situations where individuals are forced into silence by
their abusers, or after enduring the “unspeakable horrors” of torture, war, or the
death of friends and family. (p. 306)
Self-reflection facilitates neural integration.
“The relationship between coherence and reflective self-functioning is powerful,
and that the ability to reflect on the self plays an important role in the integration
of multiple processing networks of memory, affect regulation, and organization”
(p. 208).
Narratives foster neural integration which enables affect regulation.
Autobiographical memory creates stories of the self capable of supporting affect
regulation in the present and the maintenance of homeostatic functions into the
future. Memory, in this form, may maximize neural network integration as it
organizes vast amounts of information across multiple processing tracks. Thus,
language is an important tool in both neurological and psychological
development. (p. 47)
The relationship between self, mind, and brain.
Exemplary of his self-mind-brain integration was Cozolino’s depiction of the
relationship between the right hemisphere of the brain, the “unconscious” mind, and
physical and emotional aspects of self.
The right hemisphere is generally responsible for both appraising the safety and
danger of others and organizing a sense of the corporeal and emotional self
(Devinsky, 2000). Appraisal simply means attaching a positive or negative
association to a stimulus, while emotion is the conscious manifestation of this
appraisal process (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Fox, 1991). The vast
majority of appraisal occurs at an unconscious level. This is why the right
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hemisphere is more often associated with the unconscious mind, that is, what
guides our thoughts and behavior outside of our awareness. (Cozolino, 2010,
p. 97)
Neurobiological mechanisms of effective psychotherapy.
The ability to alter gene expression.
This gets us back to the old nature-nurture debate and the question: What do we
inherit, and what do we learn from experience? Our best guess is that almost
everything involves an interaction between the two. While we inherit a template
of genetic material (genotype), what gets expressed (phenotype) is guided by
noncoded genetic information that is experience dependent. . . . So while template
genetics may guide the early formation of the brain during gestation, the
regulation of gene expression directs its long-term development in reaction to
ongoing adaptation to the social and physical worlds. . . . As therapists, we
attempt to reprogram these neural systems via a supportive relationship and the
techniques we bring to bear during treatment. In other words, we are using
epigenetics to change the brain in ways that enhance mental and physical wellbeing. (pp. 64-65)
Neural plasticity.
The growth and connectivity of neurons is the basic mechanism of all learning
and adaptation. Learning can be reflected in neural changes in a number of ways,
including changes in the connectivity between existing neurons, the expansion of
existing neurons, and the growth of new neurons. All of these changes are
expressions of plasticity, or the ability of the nervous system to change in
response to experience. (p. 17)
Neural integration.
From the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a
specific kind of enriched environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons
and the integration of neural networks. The therapeutic environment is
individually tailored to fit the symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here
that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to
the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity. (p. 25)
“Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness,
all forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration”
(p. 46).
I postulated earlier that neural network integration should correlate with mental
health, while dissociation or imbalance among neural networks should correlate
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with mental illness. If this is true, we can assume that integration between the
right and left hemispheres is one elements of optimal brain functioning. It turns
out that anxiety, affective disorders, psychosis, alexithymia, and psychosomatic
conditions have all been linked to deficits in the integration and balance among
the cerebral hemispheres. (p. 106)
Although the executive areas of the brain are traditionally thought of as being
responsible for our rational abilities, they actually combine sensory, motor,
memory, and emotional information to shape ideas, plans, and actions. This
broader view of executive functioning has been guided, in part, by an increasing
appreciation of the contribution of emotion and intuition in decision making
(Damasio, 1994). Because so much of brain functioning is unconscious,
nonverbal, and hidden from conscious observation, the executive brain is also
strongly influenced by nonconscious processes. Psychotherapy calls on the
executive brain to update and reorganize the relationship among the conscious
and unconscious networks they oversee in the service of mental and physical
health. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 116)
New learning alters the effects of memories on psychological functioning or
subjective experience.
This mosaic of firing patterns, the networks’ instantiation, will determine which
set of output neurons fire. . . . Instantiations are sculpted by experience and
encode all of our abilities, emotions, and experiences into one or more forms of
memory. It is the consistency of these firing patterns that results in organized
patterns of behavior and experience. Once these neural patterns are established,
new learning modifies the relationship of neurons within these networks. (p. 16)
“The process of psychotherapy is totally dependent upon memory. From what we
know of clients’ past and current lives, to their ability to bring the lessons of
therapy into practice, everything depends on their ability to learn and remember”
(p. 73).
Given that memory is encoded among neurons and within neural networks, the
malleability of memory is an observable manifestation of the plasticity of these
neural systems. . . . But from the perspective of psychotherapy, this plasticity
provides an avenue to the alteration of destructive memories. Revisiting and
evaluating childhood experiences from an adult perspective often leads to
rewriting history in a creative and positive way. The introduction of new
information or scenarios to past experiences can alter the nature of memories and
modify affective reactions. (p. 89)
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Psychological mechanisms that enable neurobiological mechanisms of effective
therapy to occur.
Four broad conditions common to successful therapies.
From the perspective of neuroscience, psychotherapy can be understood as a
specific kind of enriched environment designed to enhance the growth of neurons
and the integration of neural networks. The therapeutic environment is
individually tailored to fit the symptoms and needs of each client. I propose here
that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will be successful to
the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity. Further, I also propose
that neural plasticity, growth, and integration in psychotherapy are enhanced by:
1. The establishment of a safe and trusting relationship
2. Mild to moderate levels of stress
3. Activating both emotion and cognition
4. The co-construction of new personal narratives.
(pp. 24-25)
Language and narrative.
“Narratives co-constructed with therapists provide a new template for thoughts,
behaviors, and ongoing integration” (pp. 26-27).
“In editing our narratives, we change the organization and nature of our memories
and, hence, reorganize our brains. This is a central endeavor in many forms of
psychotherapy” (p. 92).
“The integrative properties of language may be unequaled by any other function
of the brain. Creating and recalling a story requires the convergence of
multisensory emotional, temporal, and memory capabilities that bridge all vectors
of neural networks” (p. 102).
“A primary tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the selfnarrative of the left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right” (p. 110).
Narratives allow us to place ourselves within alternative points of view and
increase our understanding of the experience of ourselves and others. We can
escape our bodies in imagination to other possible selves, ways of being, and
worlds that have yet to be created. Through stories we have the opportunity to
ponder ourselves in an objective way across an infinite number of contexts. In life
and in therapy, we can use stories to imagine our problems happening to someone
else or view ourselves at a distance (externalization). We can share versions of
possible selves and receive input from others. Finally, we can experiment with
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new emotions, actions, and language to edit the scripts of our lives. . . . Our ability
to edit narratives summons us to try on new ways of being. (p. 165)
Much of therapy consists of uncovering and exploring reflexive social language
and internal dialogue, both of which reflect unconscious aspects of the self. In this
process we develop the language of self-reflection, learning that we are not only
our social reflexes plus the voices that haunt us but are also the one that can
observe, listen, and judge what we hear these voices say. As the language of selfawareness is expanded and reinforced, we learn we are capable of evaluating and
choosing whether to follow the expectations of others and the mandates of our
childhoods. The language of self-reflection…most likely reflects a higher level of
integration. In this language, cognition is blended with affect so that there can be
feelings about thoughts and thoughts about feelings. At a very deep level, this
language leads us to meditation, where we learn to quiet our thoughts and move
beyond words. (p. 171)
Create a nurturing and supportive therapeutic relationship that facilitates secure
attachment.
Our brains are capable of continual adaptation in both positive and negative
directions and…successful psychotherapy, one that establishes a nurturing
relationship, may well be capable of triggering genetic expression in ways that
can decrease stress, improve learning, and establish a bridge to new and healthier
relationships. (p. 223)
As in early development, the repeated exposure to stress in the supportive
interpersonal context of psychotherapy results in the ability to tolerate increasing
levels of arousal. This process reflects the building and integration of cortical
circuits and their increasing ability to inhibit and regulate subcortical activation.
Affect regulation, especially the modulation and inhibition of anxiety and fear,
allows for continued cortical processing in the face of strong emotions, allowing
for ongoing cognitive flexibility, learning, and neural integration. In this process
the therapist plays essentially the same role as a parent, providing and modeling
the regulatory functions of the social brain. (p. 21)
Networks of our complex social brains include brain regions, neural systems, and
regulatory networks. . . . These are the same circuits that therapists attempt to
influence in reshaping the brain in ways which lead to more positive adaptation
later in life. The idea that psychotherapy is a kind of reparenting may be more
than a metaphor; it may be precisely what we are attempting to accomplish at the
level of the epigenome. This research establishes attention, care, and nurturance
as a way to influence the very structure of our brain and places psychotherapy at
the heart of biological interventions. (p. 227).
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An appropriate amount of stress helps patients learn to regulate their own affect.
Mild to moderate stress (MMS) activates neural growth hormones. . . . Thus,
MMS may be utilized to enlist naturally occurring neurobiological processes in
the service of new learning. Although we use the term stress in animal research,
humans also demonstrate arousal in the form of curiosity, enthusiasm, and
pleasure. Humans can also be motivated to learn new skills and take on new
challenges to relieve discomfort and stress. These motivational states have all
been recognized for their role in successful outcomes from psychotherapy. (p. 20)
As in early development, the repeated exposure to stress in the supportive
interpersonal context of psychotherapy results in the ability to tolerate increasing
levels of arousal. This process reflects the building and integration of cortical
circuits and their increasing ability to inhibit and regulate subcortical activation.
Affect regulation, especially the modulation and inhibition of anxiety and fear,
allows for continued cortical processing in the face of strong emotions, allowing
for ongoing cognitive flexibility, learning, and neural integration. In this process
the therapist plays essentially the same role as a parent, providing and modeling
the regulatory functions of the social brain. (p. 21)
“Assistance with experiencing increasing levels of positive and negative affect is
a vital component of both parenting and psychotherapy” (p. 23).
How therapists should provide psychotherapy.
Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate
neuroplasticity.
Although psychotherapists do not generally think in “neuroscientific” terms,
stimulating neuroplasticity and neural integration is essentially what we do. We
provide information to clients about our understanding of their difficulties in the
form of psychoeducation, interpretations, or reality testing. We encourage clients
to engage in behaviors, express feelings, and become conscious of aspects of
themselves of which they may be unaware. We dare them to take risks. We guide
them back and forth between thoughts and feelings, trying to help them establish
new connections between the two. We help clients alter their descriptions of
themselves and the world, incorporating new awareness and encouraging better
decision making. With successful treatment, the methods being used are
internalized so that clients can gain independence from therapy and we do this all
in the context of a warm, supportive, committed, and consistent relationship.
These same factors are at play across psychodynamic, systems, and cognitivebehavioral approaches to treatment. (p. 26)
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Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists who create individually tailored
enriched learning environments designed to enhance brain functioning and mental
health. We are skilled at teaching clients to become aware of unconscious
processing, take ownership of their projections, and risk anxiety in the service of
emotional maturation (Holtforth et al., 2005). In our work, illusions, distortions,
and defenses are exposed, explored, and tested or modified with understandings
closer to reality. Implicit memory—in the form of attachment schemas,
transference, and superego—are made conscious and explained as expressions of
early experiences. We use a combination of empathy, affect, stories, and
behavioral experiments to promote neural network growth and integration.
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 341)
Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked
about.
Another way of describing therapy from the perspective of laterality is that we
teach clients a method by which they can learn to attend to and translate right
hemisphere processing into left hemisphere language. We teach them about the
limitations and distortions of their own conscious beliefs presented by their left
hemisphere interpreter. . . . This is why reality testing is so important for
treatment success. It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with
what the client is unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to
him or her in a way that will allow it to become integrated. This human process
serves hemispheric integration. (p. 111)
Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize
them and to engender a sense of control for patients.
On a practical level, adding a neuroscientific perspective to our clinical thinking
allows us to talk with clients about the shortcomings of our brains instead of the
problems with theirs. The truth appears to be that many human struggles, from
phobias to obesity, are consequences of brain evolution and not deficiencies of
character. Identifying problems that we hold in common and developing methods
to circumvent or correct them is a solid foundation upon which to base a
therapeutic alliance. (p. 356)
Identify the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect.
When patients come to therapy, the left hemisphere interpreter tells its story. But
something is usually wrong: the story does not fully account for what is
happening in their lives. The narratives that organize their identities inadequately
account for their experiences, feelings, and behaviors. The right hemisphere also
speaks via facial expressions, body language, emotions, and attitudes. Thus, we
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listen to both stories for the congruence between the verbal narrative, and
nonverbal and emotional communication. In this process, we analyze the
integration and coherence of left-right and top-down neural networks. A primary
tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the self-narrative of the
left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right. (p. 110)
Using narratives in a way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional
regulation and a sense of control.
Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting from their own perspective
to looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation
once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and
dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective
of a life situation. (p. 161)
Putting feelings into words (affect labeling) has long served a positive function
for many individuals suffering from stress or trauma. . . . The narrative, which
simultaneously activates an array of networks, enhances metabolic activity and
neural balance. The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional
arousal and stress. It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and
control activate frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation.
(pp. 168-169)
Therapy attempts to create this metacognitive vantage point from which the
shifting states of mind that emerge during day-to-day life can be thought about.
This is accomplished by interweaving the narratives of client and therapist and
hopefully leading them in a more healthful direction. You begin by making clients
aware of one or more of the narrative arcs of their life story and then help them
understand that change is possible and offering alternative story lines. As the
editing process proceeds, new narrative arcs emerge, as do possibilities to
experiment with new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. (p. 171)
Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or
not being talked about.
“It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with what the client is
unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to him or her in a way
that will allow it to become integrated” (p. 111).
Therapists employ the projective hypothesis to explore the architecture of their
clients’ unconscious. . . . Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light
of conscious awareness on belief perseverance and attribution biases, and
undermine the conservative nature of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep
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exploration of the dynamic unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states.
By encouraging clients to be open to new ideas, explore the connections within
their hidden layers, and take responsibility for positive change, we challenge them
to reorganize the neural networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138)
In making an interpretation, the therapist points out an unconscious aspect of the
patient’s experience, such as a defense he or she is using to avoid negative
feelings. . . . When an interpretation is accurate and delivered in an appropriate
and well-timed manner, a number of things occur. The client generally becomes
quiet; there may be a change in facial expressions, posture, and tone of voice.
Very often the client will begin to fully experience the emotions against which he
or she was defending. (pp. 294-295)
“In therapy, we teach our clients to ask themselves if the pot is calling the kettle
black: that is, are their thoughts and feelings about others autobiographical?”
(p. 315).
How therapists should provide psychotherapy.
Common interventions across established psychotherapy models that stimulate
neuroplasticity.
Although psychotherapists do not generally think in ‘neuroscientific’ terms,
stimulating neuroplasticity and neural integration is essentially what we do. We
provide information to clients about our understanding of their difficulties in the
form of psychoeducation, interpretations, or reality testing. We encourage clients
to engage in behaviors, express feelings, and become conscious of aspects of
themselves of which they may be unaware. We dare them to take risks. We guide
them back and forth between thoughts and feelings, trying to help them establish
new connections between the two. We help clients alter their descriptions of
themselves and the world, incorporating new awareness and encouraging better
decision making. With successful treatment, the methods being used are
internalized so that clients can gain independence from therapy and we do this all
in the context of a warm, supportive, committed, and consistent relationship.
These same factors are at play across psychodynamic, systems, and cognitivebehavioral approaches to treatment. The broad context in which these processes
can successfully occur is one of increasing levels of affect tolerance and
regulation and the development of integrative narratives that emerge from the
client-therapist relationship. In the context of empathic attunement within a safe
and structured environment, clients are encouraged to tolerate the anxiety of
feared experiences, memories, and thoughts. In this process, neural networks that
are normally inhibited become activated and available for inclusion into conscious
processing (Siegel, 1995, as cited in Cozolino, 2010, p. 26)
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Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists who create individually tailored
enriched learning environments designed to enhance brain functioning and mental
health. We are skilled at teaching clients to become aware of unconscious
processing, take ownership of their projections, and risk anxiety in the service of
emotional maturation. . . . In our work, illusions, distortions, and defenses are
exposed, explored, and tested or modified with understandings closer to reality.
Implicit memory—in the form of attachment schemas, transference, and
superego—are made conscious and explained as expressions of early experiences.
We use a combination of empathy, affect, stories, and behavioral experiments to
promote neural network growth and integration. (p. 341)
Consider how the brain distorts thinking and listen for what is not being talked
about.
Another way of describing therapy from the perspective of laterality is that we
teach clients a method by which they can learn to attend to and translate right
hemisphere processing into left hemisphere language. We teach them about the
limitations and distortions of their own conscious beliefs presented by their left
hemisphere interpreter. . . . This is why reality testing is so important for
treatment success. It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with
what the client is unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to
him or her in a way that will allow it to become integrated. This human process
serves hemispheric integration. (p. 111)
Attribute psychological symptoms to the brain or body in order to depathologize
them and to engender a sense of control for patients.
On a practical level, adding a neuroscientific perspective to our clinical thinking
allows us to talk with clients about the shortcomings of our brains instead of the
problems with theirs. The truth appears to be that many human struggles, from
phobias to obesity, are consequences of brain evolution and not deficiencies of
character. Identifying problems that we hold in common and developing methods
to circumvent or correct them is a solid foundation upon which to base a
therapeutic alliance. (p. 356)
Think about the congruence between a patient’s cognition and affect.
When patients come to therapy, the left hemisphere interpreter tells its story. But
something is usually wrong: the story does not fully account for what is
happening in their lives. The narratives that organize their identities inadequately
account for their experiences, feelings, and behaviors. The right hemisphere also
speaks via facial expressions, body language, emotions, and attitudes. Thus, we
listen to both stories for the congruence between the verbal narrative, and
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nonverbal and emotional communication. In this process, we analyze the
integration and coherence of left-right and top-down neural networks. A primary
tool across all models of therapy is editing and expanding the self-narrative of the
left hemisphere to include the silent wisdom of the right. (p. 110)
Using narratives in way that puts feelings into words and engenders emotional
regulation and a sense of control.
Consider what we do when we assist clients in shifting from their own perspective
to looking at a situation from another point of view, to thinking about the situation
once again from a more objective perspective. We are calling upon the ompfc and
dlpfc in different ways as we attempt to guide them to a more holistic perspective
of a life situation. (p. 161)
Putting feelings into words (affect labeling) has long served a positive function
for many individuals suffering from stress or trauma…The narrative, which
simultaneously activates an array of networks, enhances metabolic activity and
neural balance. The perception of control has been shown to reduce emotional
arousal and stress. It is likely that cognitive processes involved in prediction and
control activate frontal functioning and downregulate amygdala activation.
(p. 169)
Therapy attempts to create this metacognitive vantage point from which the
shifting states of mind that emerge during day-to-day life can be thought about.
This is accomplished by interweaving the narratives of client and therapist and
hopefully leading them in a more healthful direction. You begin by making clients
aware of one or more of the narrative arcs of their life story and then help them
understand that change is possible and offering alternative story lines. As the
editing process proceeds, new narrative arcs emerge, as do possibilities to
experiment with new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. (p. 171)
Make interpretations, analyze projection, and discuss whatever is dissociated or
not being talked about.
“It is the therapist’s job to hear what is not said, resonate with what the client is
unable to consciously experience, and communicate it back to him or her in a way
that will allow it to become integrated” (p. 111).
Therapists employ the projective hypothesis to explore the architecture of their
clients’ unconscious. . . . Most forms of psychotherapy attempt to shine the light
of conscious awareness on belief perseverance and attribution biases, and
undermine the conservative nature of the hidden layers. Others engage in a deep
exploration of the dynamic unconscious, defenses, and primitive emotional states.
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By encouraging clients to be open to new ideas, explore the connections within
their hidden layers, and take responsibility for positive change, we challenge them
to reorganize the neural networks of their hidden layers. (p. 138)
In making an interpretation, the therapist points out an unconscious aspect of the
patient’s experience, such as a defense he or she is using to avoid negative
feelings. . . . When an interpretation is accurate and delivered in an appropriate
and well-timed manner, a number of things occur. The client generally becomes
quiet; there may be a change in facial expressions, posture, and tone of voice.
Very often the client will begin to fully experience the emotions against which he
or she was defending. (p. 294)
“In therapy, we teach our clients to ask themselves if the pot is calling the kettle
black: that is, are their thoughts and feelings about others autobiographical?”
(p. 315).
Indicators of successful psychotherapy outcomes.
Neural integration.
Psychotherapy can be thought of as a specific type of enriched environment that
promotes social and emotional development, neural integration, and process
complexity. The way the brain changes during therapy will depend upon the
neural networks involved in the focus of treatment. (p. 20)
“I propose here that all forms of therapy, regardless of theoretical orientation, will
be successful to the degree to which they foster appropriate neuroplasticity”
(p. 25).
Less dissociation or greater integration.
Dissociation is a common result of the high levels of stress associated with
traumatic experiences. Characterized by a disconnection among thoughts,
behaviors, sensations, and emotions, dissociation demonstrates that the
coordination and integration of these functions is an active neurobiological
process. Because all of these functions are seamlessly and unconsciously
interwoven during normal states of awareness, it is easy to overlook the fact that
their integration is a central component of mental health. (p. 21)
Symptom reduction.
There is a recognition that the evocation of emotion coupled with conscious
awareness is most likely to result in symptom reduction and personal growth.
Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego strength, or awareness, all
forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neural networks for integration. (p. 46)
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Traumatic experiences result in a variety of well-understood physiological and
psychological reactions to threat, which cause a number of predictable symptoms
to emerge. These symptoms tend to gradually diminish after the resolution of the
traumatic situation, as we gather support from others, and repeatedly talk through
the experience. These conditions allow us to regain both neurobiological
homeostasis and a sense of emotional control. (pp. 262-263)
Affect regulation.
Increased integration results in tolerating and experiencing thoughts and emotions
previously inhibited, dissociated, or defended against. Affect regulation may be
the most important result of the psychotherapeutic process across orientations,
because it allows for a reconnection with the naturally occurring salubrious
experiences in life. (p. 47)
Secure attachment.
“Throughout our lives, but especially during childhood, relationships with others
regulate our stress and fear. A secure attachment indicates that we have learned to
successfully utilize our relationships with others to quell our fears and modulate
our arousal” (p. 233).
Ego strength and higher-order defenses.
Ego strength, or our ability to navigate reality with a minimum of defensiveness,
reflects the integration of neural networks of emotion and thought, and the
development of mature defenses. The more primitive or immature the defense
mechanism, the more reality is distorted and the more functional impairment
occurs. . . . Mature defenses, like sublimation or humor, allow us to assuage
strong feelings, keep in contact with others, and remain attuned to a shared social
reality. (p. 34)
“Secure attachment and ego strength are correlated with our ability to hear
feedback, accept our own limitations, and use less reality-distorting defenses—
humor instead of repression and sublimation instead of denial” (p. 316).
Self-reflective language.
“When clients shift to the language of self-reflection, the changes in their tone,
manner, and mood are palpable. I imagine at this moment that clients have the
clearest perspective on their thoughts, behaviors, and feelings” (p. 173).
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Earned autonomy and avoiding pathological caretaking of others.
“Earned autonomy is convincing evidence that early negative experiences can be
reinstated and repaired later in life. Personal growth has the ability to heal because
the social brain remains plastic” (p. 209).
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Appendix B
Further Examples of Rhetorical Strategies in
The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (Cozolino, 2010)
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Human development metaphors used to describe the brain.
“At the same time, middle portions of the prefrontal cortex are maturing and
integrating with subcortical structures to establish the basic structures of
emotional regulation and attachment” (p. 95).
“The corpus callosum begins to develop at the end of the first year, is
significantly developed by age 4, and continues to mature past the age of 10”
(p. 95).
“At birth, the human brain is dependent on caretakers for its survival and growth”
(p. 216).
Technology Metaphors.
“The right hemisphere is heavily wired to the limbic system” (p. 97).
“Through countless adaptational challenges and the process of natural selection,
we find ourselves with staggeringly intricate and sophisticated brains: Ferraris—
not fords” (p. 115).
“The control of the vast majority of our bodily and mental functions is on
automatic pilot” (p. 115).
“This carryover of past learning into the present where it may be irrelevant or
destructive is certainly one of the contemporary human brain’s design flaws”
(p. 136).
“It seems that the parietal lobes developed a parallel capacity for constructing and
navigating a map of internal, imaginal space” (p. 141).
“High levels of cortisol, dopamine, and bottom-up inhibition from the amygdala
can all take the prefrontal cortex ‘off-line’ during stress” (p. 157).
“Much of neural integration takes place in the association areas of the frontal,
temporal, and parietal lobes, which serve to coordinate, regulate, and direct
multiple neural circuits. They are our conscious switchboard operators” (p. 164).
“Now she was sharing the content of her internal dialogue, likely programmed
early in life” (p. 173).
“The right-hemisphere-biased circuits of the social brain come online at birth”
(p. 182).
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“Genes first serve to organize the brain and trigger sensitive periods, while
experience orchestrates genetic transcription in the ongoing adaptive shaping of
neural systems, so that experience becomes the actual hardware of our brains”
(p. 216).
“Environmental programming is a term used to describe this orchestration of
epigenetic factors” (p. 217).
“Although we are genetically programmed to become anxious about things like
snakes or abandonment, fear can be learned by pairing any thought, feeling, or
sensation with a noxious stimulus” (p. 245).
“NE activation makes us become vigilant, scan for danger, and maintain a posture
of tense readiness. It also heightens our memory for danger, creating a sort of
‘print now’ command for amygdala memory circuits” (p. 249).
“On the other hand, evolution has also provided us with caretakers who allow us
to link into their developed cortex until our own is ready” (p. 253).
“We mature into self-awareness having been programmed by early experience
with sensory and emotional assumptions that we accept as truth” (p. 309).
Building and infrastructure metaphors.
“Mirror neurons may bridge the gap between sender and receiver, helping us
understand one another” (p. 188).
“Keep in mind that, just as in rats, these systems are also built by the attachments
they come to control. Thus, our learning history comes to be reflected in the
architecture of our neural systems” (p. 228).
“The caretaking and resonance behaviors made possible by the cingulate also
provide an important component of the neural infrastructure for social cooperation
and empathy” (p. 229).
“The insula begins life on the lateral surfaces of the brain, only to become hidden
by the rapid expansion of the frontal and temporal lobes” (p. 229).
“The hippocampus is constantly remodeled to keep abreast of current
environmental changes” (p. 254).
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Personification.
“Although most neural processing requires the contribution of both hemispheres,
there are situations when the hemispheres not only think differently but also
compete with one another” (p. 93).
“Overall, the left side of the brain appears to be in charge of the successful
navigation of the social world” (p. 98).
“This allows each human brain to be a unique blending of nature and nurture as it
builds its structures through interactions and molding itself to its environment”
(p. 216).
“In essence, rats who receive more maternal attention have brains that are more
robust, resilient, and nurturing of others” (p. 218).
“In interpersonal situations, our amygdala reflexively and unconsciously
appraises others in the context of our past experiences” (p. 244).

